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Summary
The study of social inequality has been slow to fully capitalize on the advantages
offered by recent developments in mechanism-based explanations in science, by
a turn towards generative processes in theory development and by empirical re-
search that promises to leverage causal explanations across contexts. Acknowl-
edging the need to put forward an effective explanatory agenda that avoids the
pitfalls of both grand theories and the ’balkanization’ of research into highly spe-
cialized theories that are confined to particular domains, the present study devel-
ops an explanation of social inequality based on social mechanisms and empiri-
cally tests its validity across contexts. For this purpose, the Weberian concept of
social closure is redefined as exclusionary action and its fruitfulness in explaining
the emergence of social inequality in markets, families, and networks is empiri-
cally assessed.
Social closure has been chosen as a central mechanism in the production of in-
equality because it applies to a myriad of phenomena across levels of analysis
and forms of inequality. The concept has undergone important extensions since
its introduction by Weber in Economy and Society, in which closure was used to
denote the concerted actions undertaken by groups with the purpose of secur-
ing privileges either through group boundaries or through restrictions to access
markets. This dissertation reviews these conceptual extensions and by way of
synthesis offers a general definition of closure as exclusionary action. Accord-
ing to this new definition, closure not only encompasses intentional collective
action aimed at securing privileges but also entails unintended exclusionary acts
by individuals that have a similar effect on the distribution of valued resources
or opportunities among groups. Thus defined, closure can be viewed as a gen-
eral transformational mechanism (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010) that explains the
emergence of intergroup inequality resulting from interaction processes among
individuals or groups.
A typology of closure, that classifies exclusionary action according to an actor’s
intentional or unintentional exclusionary motives and direct or mediated forms
of interaction is presented and illustrated in different domains. First, closure
is studied as practiced by professional groups in markets in the form of group
closure and market closure that generate intergroup differences in market share.
Second, exclusionary action is further explored when carried out by parents who
v
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invest selectively in siblings according to their perceived skills, gender or birth or-
der, thereby producing skill inequality both within and across generations. And
third, exclusionary action is studied in processes of network formation among
preschool children that lead to the segregation of personal networks according to
language skills and can potentially affect language development early in the life-
course. Given the multidimensionality of social inequality and the generality of
closure across contexts, this study investigates exclusionary action using multi-
ple methods, specifically agent-based simulation models (ABM) and exponential
random graph models (ERGM), a special modeling tool used in social network
analysis (SNA).
The main findings of the present investigation can be summarized as follows:
Social mechanisms
• Social mechanisms and mechanistic explanations appeal to a way of theo-
rizing and conducting empirical research that focuses on generative causal-
ity, an explicit reconstruction of how causes bring about effects. There are
two ways to approach a mechanistic agenda in sociology. First, as a style of
research social mechanisms are synonymous with causal explanation, gen-
erative causality, and middle-range theorizing. Second, as an ontology of
the social world, social mechanisms demand the search for phenomena that
are recurrent in time, robust to initial conditions, and causally productive
of comparable outcomes.
• The mechanistic agenda in sociology, if adopted, may prove to be fruit-
ful in properly spelling out the inner workings of social inequality, aiding
causal inference and producing deeper causal explanations that make intel-
ligible how inequality comes about across contexts. Even if such explana-
tions constitute the ultimate goal of a mechanistic approach, understanding
and controlling are additional gains from focusing on social mechanisms in
the study of social inequality. Not only does this make sociological explana-
tions more effective but, perhaps more importantly, it may allow knowledge
to be converted into interventions targeted at reducing inequality.
• For both the gullible and the skeptical, this thesis is an invitation to recon-
sider the idea of mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in sociology by
filtering out programmatic biases and focusing on its core message about
causation and understanding through causal explanation. Only then will it
be possible to conduct a fair discussion on the desirability and viability of a
mechanistic agenda in sociology.
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Closure as exclusionary action
• Weber’s definition. There two meanings of the word ‘closure’ in Weber’s
writings that are confused in contemporary usage of the concept. The first,
group closure, denotes how groups draw boundaries against outsiders to
exclude them from the privileges of participating in the group. The second,
market closure, describes a form of economic action by which groups in-
strumentally use their boundaries with the explicit purpose of limiting or
eliminating competition from rival groups and thus securing access to eco-
nomic resources and opportunities. Despite the differences, both forms of
interaction presuppose the existence of collective actors and intentionality
about the goal of excluding outsiders from privileges and opportunities.
• A new definition. In this study, the Weberian definition of closure was ex-
tended beyond strategic collective action inspired by the works of Raymond
Murphy, Frank Parkin, Charles Tilly, and Vincent Roscigno, to include all
forms of preferential or discriminatory interactions and transactions among
groups or categorically bounded individuals that accrue or secure benefits
to one group or category by actively excluding others. Different forms of
closure were classified in a ‘closure space’ that spans two dimensions: mo-
tives (intentional or unintentional) and forms of interaction (direct or medi-
ated). Given the different manifestations of exclusionary action that result
from the combination of motives and forms of interaction, closure can be
used as a transformational mechanism to explain the connection between
the micro-level of interaction and the macro-level of intergroup inequality
across multiple domains. Three contexts were studied: markets, families,
and networks.
• Markets. A market for professional services in which groups compete for
market share and individuals compete for group membership was simu-
lated using an agent-based model. Contrary to expectations, high level of
market and group closure do not produce the highest levels of intergroup
inequality. The interaction between group and market closure is, in fact, not
linear and depends on market conditions, in particular unemployment rate
and number of competing groups. Even if low degrees of group closure
increase intergroup inequality in combination with high levels of market
closure, the benefits of market closure for a particular group are reduced as
group closure increases. By contrast, a low degree of group closure in com-
bination with no market closure produces low intergroup inequality; as the
degree of market closure grows, so does inequality. Finally, and irrespec-
tive of levels of group or market closure, a reduced number of groups and a
higher unemployment rate push market share inequality upward. In short,
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closing the group can be as effective as closing the market in producing
intergroup inequality among professional groups.
• Families. Exclusionary action inside the family results from the unequal dis-
tribution of parental resources among siblings. Intentional forms of closure
may be the consequence of gender, birth order, or skills-related parental
bias. Some siblings may also receive more than their fair share uninten-
tionally. The timing of investments and the available resources to parents,
which are functions of number of children and child spacing explain why
the distribution of resources inside the family departs from a perfectly egal-
itarian rule even if parents try to spread resources evenly among their chil-
dren. The consequences of these intended or unintended variations in the
intrahousehold distribution of resources on skill inequality were explored
using an agent-based simulation model. The simulation can be described
as a middle-range model, informed by research on skill formation and the
intrahousehold allocation of resources. Simulation experiments made ev-
ident the effects of closure on skill inequality: the more equal resources
are distributed inside the family, the lower the intragenerational inequal-
ity (more equally distributed skills among individuals) and the higher the
intergenerational inequality in society (higher parent-child correlations and
sibling correlations), and vice versa. Hence closure inside the family has the
potential to affect the production of skill inequality both within and across
generations.
• Networks. Closure in the form of preferential tie formation in networks con-
ditions access to valuable resources. In particular, there is evidence that
the number and composition of peer networks may affect language devel-
opment. The friendship networks of 125 preschool children in two Ger-
man kindergartens were analyzed using exponential random graph models
(ERGM) to explore whether language skills in German affect tie formation
in a way that those who are more proficient (native speakers) end up with
networks that are more favorable to further their language development,
while those with lower language skills (children whose native language is
not German) lose from less favorable networks. Model estimates show that
known processes such as reciprocity, triadic closure, gender and age dif-
ferences in activity and popularity as well as age and gender homophily
predict network ties. The primary language spoken at home, a proxy for
German language skills, also affects tie creation. Children with lower Ger-
man language skills prefer to befriend children with higher German lan-
guage skills, while the latter are indifferent to language when choosing
friends. Moreover, children with higher language proficiency in German
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are more active and popular in building friendship ties and hence enjoy
bigger networks. The net effect of this relationship between language skills
and friendship ties on inequalities in German language development is am-
biguous: composition effects seem to favor children with low German lan-
guage skills, because they tend to have a higher proportion of friends with
high German language proficiency (but have smaller networks), whereas
size effects seem to benefit children with high German language skills, be-
cause they have more peers to practice with (but have a higher share of
friends who are less proficient in the German language).
Contributions of the study The main contributions of this investigation can be
summarized as follows:
i) Social mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in sociology.
– This study offers a general definition of social mechanisms, an en-
riched heuristic that is free from particular ontological and method-
ological preferences.
– It shows how to conduct mechanism-based research, emphasizing me-
thods that allow explicit modeling processes that actively bring about
the explanandum.
– It calls attention to the programmatic bias in discussions of social mech-
anisms in sociology.
ii) Closure as an explanation of social inequality.
– This dissertation has redefined the Weberian concept of closure as an
action-based transformational mechanism connecting various forms
of exclusionary action at the microlevel to intergroup inequality at the
macrolevel across contexts.
– It offers a typology of different manifestations of closure, classifying
them according to the form of interaction and motives of action in-
volved in exclusionary action.
– Based on three separate studies it shows how exclusionary action brings
about inequality in markets, families, and networks.
iii) Agent-based modeling (ABM) and the life course.
– A first step is taken toward bringing together ABM and social inequal-
ity research from a life course perspective.
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– The code for a simulation model about parental investments and skill
inequality is available for the scientific community to use and further
develop.1
iv) Network formation among preschool children.
– Exponential random graph models (ERGM) are used to investigate the
so far neglected role of language proficiency in friendship tie forma-
tion.
– Network formation is analyzed from the perspective of peer effects
and of their potential impact on the creation and reproduction inequal-
ity of language development.
1 See http://www.openabm.org/model/4084/version/1/view
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The last two decades have witnessed a renewed interest in mechanisms and me-
chanism-based explanations in both philosophy and science. Discussions sur-
rounding the existence of mechanisms and their proper definition, as well as
methods to identify and model them in order to improve our scientific under-
standing of the physical and social world, have become ubiquitous in various
disciplines ranging from biology (Bechtel, 2006; Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005;
Machamer, 2004; Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000) and neuroscience (Craver,
2007) through medicine (Schaffner, 1993; Thagard, 1999) and economics (Lawson,
1997, 2003) to political science (Collier & Mazzuca, 2008; Johnson, 2006) and soci-
ology (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998a). Briefly, the mechanistic agenda in philos-
ophy and science aims to solve two perennial questions found at the core of the
metaphysics of causation and the epistemology of causal explanation: What is
the relationship between cause and effect? How do we formulate scientific causal
explanations? According to the mechanistic approach, causation should refer to
the generative phenomena connecting cause and effect, the ’mechanisms’ which
actively bring about the effects studied (Harré, 1972, 115–8; Machamer, 2004, 34;
Machamer et al., 2000, 21–22; in sociology, see Goldthorpe, 2001). Furthermore,
’mechanistic explanations’ are a plea to move beyond the logical formalities of
a deductive-nomological framework, as dictated by the covering-law model of
Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), and to seek instead to reconstruct how causes
produce effects as explicitly and transparently as possible (Bunge, 1997, 2004).
The mechanistic view of the world in scientific thought is certainly not new
(Bechtel, 2006, ch. 2). Mechanistic models of nature go as far back in the history
of modern science as the 17th century when the first natural philosophers, as
a reaction against the dominant teleological perspective of Aristotle, which op-
posed mechanisms to nature, began to use machines as models for making sense
of the world. Galileo, Descartes, and Boyle all conceived of natural phenomena
such as the movement of planets, the inner workings of the human body, and
the properties of chemical elements, as machines operating according to straight-
forward mechanisms resembling man-made objects like clocks or mills. It was
Newton who introduced the idea of laws of nature and put an end to this first
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surge of mechanical thinking in early modern science (Bechtel, 2006, 23–4). After
Newton’s laws came Hume’s idea of causation at distance and with it the logical
positivists of the 20th century who, led by Hempel and Oppenheim, developed
the deductive nomological model of explanation (the D-N model). According to
this model, which radically departs from the mechanistic models of the 17th cen-
tury, scientific explanations consist exclusively of subsuming phenomena under
general laws given certain antecedent conditions (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948).
Although the D-N model quickly became the dominant view in the philosophy of
science after its publication in 1948, Railton (1978) and Salmon (1984) revived the
idea of mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in the philosophy of science
later in the 20th century and successfully recaptured the attention of contempo-
rary natural and social scientists (Glennan, 2002, 343).
In sociology, too, the concepts of ‘social mechanism’ and ‘mechanistic explana-
tion’ have increasingly found their way into both theoretical and empirical work.
The mechanistic agenda in sociology has appealed to many because of its promise
to solve some fundamental methodological issues inside the discipline. Aside
from general criticism of the covering-law model, the champions of this approach
claim that adherence to a mechanistic agenda should reduce the risks imposed
by a heavy reliance on correlational analysis as the preferred tool for causal in-
ference, in particular the dangers of spurious correlations and endogeneity, and
should avoid the pitfalls of sociological theorizing based on statistical analysis
or variable-based sociology on the one hand and the search for grand theories
or closed theoretical systems on the other. As a solution to each of these chal-
lenges, social mechanisms and mechanism-based explanations should provide
more ’transparent’ causal explanations that reconstruct how causes bring about
effects (Elster, 1990, 1999; Hedström & Swedberg, 1996); aid causal inference by
minimizing the risks of endogeneity and spurious correlation (Elster, 2007; Hed-
ström, 2008; Hedström & Swedberg, 1998b); and favor multidisciplinarity while
reducing theoretical fragmentation by concentrating on middle range theories
(Hedström, 2005; Hedström & Bearman, 2009; Hedström & Swedberg, 1998b).
However, in developing a mechanistic agenda in sociology, these very ambi-
tious goals have been displaced by more mundane programmatic priorities that
serve particular theoretical and methodological preferences. Some have gone so
far as to denounce the whole effort as pure “mechanistic talk” that simply refor-
mulates old methodological and theoretical debates in the discipline using new
concepts but without adding anything substantively new (Norkus, 2005). This
programmatic bias of the mechanistic agenda in sociology has confronted sociol-
ogists with a dilemma that resembles the one faced by statisticians struggling to
judge the truth of a hypothesis: the risks of extreme gullibility and extreme skep-
ticism. Some are already convinced of the advantages of a mechanistic agenda in
sociology, while others are no longer paying attention to the debate.
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In parallel to the recent surge of mechanisms in the realm of science, the last
decade has witnessed a growing focus on issues related to social inequality. In
fact, it would not be very controversial to assert that social inequality has become
one of the most recurrent and prominent subjects of both national and global pol-
icy agendas (International Monetary Fund, 2007; The World Bank, 2005; United
Nations, 2005, 2013), matched perhaps only by the increasing challenges posed
by climate change.3 Not only income, education, and health but also housing,
work conditions, political participation, access to technology, and all constitutive
elements of individual life chances in general, are the subject of debate from the
perspective of social inequality.
In this context of an increasing need for scientific knowledge to tackle real-
world problems, sociological theorizing and research seem to lag behind. Re-
grettably, efforts to explain social inequality appear to have languished under
the weight of the tired tradition of class analysis (Grusky & Sørensen, 1998), or
have gone unnoticed given the high level of specialization and domain specificity
found in what has been lamented as the ‘balkanization’ of inequality research (Re-
skin, 2003). Thus, in a way, sociological stratification analysis has yet to capitalize
on the promises of a mechanistic approach (Diewald & Faist, 2011), by looking for
explanations that are effective in accounting for the particularities of specific con-
texts while providing a certain level of generality and explanatory power across
contexts that can be applied to real-world problems.
Among the causes so far identified in sociology as being responsible for the
emergence of inequality, which include most prominently cumulative advantage,
exploitation and discrimination (Therborn, 2006; Tilly, 1998), social closure is per-
haps one of the most general and prevalent phenomena responsible for multi-
ple forms of inequality. As he briefly discussed in Economy and Society, Weber
introduced the concept of closure to describe two different group-related phe-
nomena. Closure denotes, first, the more or less intentional process of groups
drawing boundaries against outsiders, driven not only by economic interests but
also by tradition or affectual bonds (Weber, 1978, 43–6). Group closure leads to
the formation of exclusive groups regulated by formal or informal membership
rules such as those observed, for example, in private clubs or political parties.
Besides the creation of group boundaries, Weber also used the word ‘closure’ to
describe a form of economic action in which groups strategically instrumental-
ize their boundaries with the sole purpose of limiting or eliminating competition
from rival groups to secure access to economic resources and opportunities (We-
ber, 1978, 339–48). In this second type of closure, it is not the group but the market
that becomes closed to free entry and free competition. In closed markets, allo-
3 See the most recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) at
http://www.ipcc.ch
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cation is conditioned by group membership, as in the extreme case of regulated
markets for professional services where entry is reserved only for licensed prac-
titioners.4
Since, in both cases, the outcome of closure is the emergence of ‘outsiders,’ ei-
ther in the form of individuals excluded from a group (e. g., women in a men-only
club) or groups excluded from a market (e. g., unlicensed lawyers in a regulated
market for legal services), the concept has greatly appealed to contemporary so-
ciologists devoted to the study of stratification and inequality. On the theoretical
side, the concept of closure with its double meaning of market closure and group
closure has been extended and articulated into broader theories of stratification
by Parkin (1979), Murphy (1988), and, more recently, Tilly (1998) and Roscigno
(2007). At the same time, and mostly influenced by the works of Parkin and Mur-
phy, empirical research on stratification over the past two decades has shown
a growing interest in closure as a mechanism producing different forms of in-
tergroup inequality, including dimensions such as gender, race, occupation, and
citizenship, among others (see Table 0.1).5
The goal of the present investigation is twofold. First, it aims to bring needed
clarity to the debate about social mechanisms in sociology by discussing its philo-
sophical foundations and critically reviewing the direction taken by the debate
inside the discipline. Second, it generalizes the Weberian concept of closure as
an action-based mechanism in the production of inequality and applies it to the
explanation of inequality in three contexts: markets, families, and networks. The
ultimate objective of this work is to show how to apply mechanism-based science
to the study of social inequality.
The study is divided into four main parts and a total of seven chapters. The first
part deals with mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in science (Chapter 1).
The second part turns to the definition of social closure. It first reviews Weber’s
original formulation (Chapter 2) and explores the two sides of the concept, as
group closure and as market closure. After revisiting the Weberian definition
4 There are at least two alternative uses of the word ’closure’ in sociology that are not directly
related to the Weberian definition. The first is found in Giddens (1973) and his theory of class
structuration. There, he uses the word ‘closure’ to refer to intergenerational and individual
mobility chances (p. 107). Coleman (1988) also employs the word ‘closure’ in his seminal article
on social capital to refer to the density of personal ties in social networks. Network closure
is a condition for both the effective normative control of individuals and the emergence of
trustworthiness within networks (pp. 105–7) and has subsequently been used in research on
social capital (e. g., Burt, 2005). Neither of these two alternative usages of the word ‘closure’
should be confused with the Weberian definition used here.
5 Concepts similar to the Weberian notion of closure and their use in stratification theory are
discussed in Murphy (1988) and Manza (1992). In economics, too, the dynamics of groups
acting strategically to secure benefits has been widely studied. Prominent examples in this
literature are the economic theory of groups (Olson, 1971), the theory of clubs and public goods
(Buchanan, 1965), studies on rent-seeking, and the voluminous body of research on economic
regulation and interest groups (Buchanan, 1980; Rowley, 1991; Tollison, 1982).
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Table 0.1: Selected studies applying the concept of closure empirically
Subject(s)) Article(s)
Professions and occupations Amark (1990); Chua and Clegg (1990); Chua
and Poullaos (1998); Giesecke and Verwiebe
(2009); Groß (2009); Haupt (2012); Hollenberg
(2006); Kelner, Wellman, Welsh, and Boon
(2006); Kidder (2004); Lee (2010); Macdon-
ald (1985); O‘Regan (2008); Ramirez (2001);
Richardson (1997); Walker and Shackleton
(1998); Weeden (2002); Weiss and Miller (2010);
Welsh, Kelner, Wellman, and Boon (2004).
Gender and racial discrimination Elliott (2001); Neuwirth (1969); Roscigno (2007);
Roscigno, Garcia, and Bobbitt-Zeher (2007);
Roscigno, Karafin, and Tester (2009); Stainback
(2009); Tomaskovic-Devey (1993a, 1993b).
Ageism Roscigno, Mong, Byron, and Tester (2007).
Workplace incivilities Roscigno, Hodson, and Lopez (2009).
Educational homogamy Smits (2003); Smits and Park (2009).
Citizenship Brubaker (1992).
Welfare state Rodger (1992).
Social movements McCauley (1990).
Religion Vertigans (2007).
and discussing its extensions by later theoretical and empirical work in Sociol-
ogy, a general definition of closure as exclusionary action is formulated and dif-
ferent forms of closure are identified and classified according to the form of in-
teraction and motive of action implied by acts of closure (Chapter 3). The third
part applies the new definition of closure to the study of inequality in markets
(Chapter 4), with an agent-based simulation of a labor market where both pro-
fessional groups and individuals compete for jobs; in families (Chapter 5), with
an agent-based simulation of parental investment decisions in children and skill
inequality within and across generations; and in networks (Chapter 6), analyzing
data on friendship ties of preschool children and the effect of German language
skills on tie formation. The fourth part concludes by discussing both theoretical
and empirical aspects of previous chapters (Chapter 7).
Some parts of this work have already been shared with the scientific commu-
nity. Chapters 2 and 4 can be found as a working paper (Cardona, 2013a). Most
of Section 1.2 and some parts of Section 1.3 are also available as a working paper
(Cardona, 2013b), while Chapter 5 has been published in the Journal of Artificial
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Societies and Social Simulation (Cardona, 2014a).6 Also, the main ideas about We-
ber’s definition of closure and the mechanistic agenda in sociology mentioned in
this introduction and further in Chapter 7, were already discussed in one way or
another in the two aforementioned working papers (Cardona, 2013a, 2013b).
The remaining parts of this work, i.e. Chapter 1 (except Section 1.2 and some





Social mechanisms and mechanistic
explanations in sociology
This chapter reviews the recent discussion in philosophy and sociology that fol-
lowed from the reintroduction of the idea of mechanisms in science by the works
of Railton (1978) and Salmon (1984). The aim of this literature review is not to ad-
dress, let alone resolve, all philosophical intricacies raised by this renewed meta-
physical and methodological perspective in scientific inquiry. Instead, the survey
of the literature will serve the higher purpose of helping to lay the theoretical and
methodological foundations for the present study by providing answers to the
following two questions:
(i) What are the advantages of adopting a mechanistic approach in sociology?
(ii) Which are the core elements of the mechanistic approach and how should
they be put into practice? That is, how to define, identify, model, and em-
pirically test social mechanisms?
It is only after having answered these two questions, that it will become clear
why the new definition of closure as a transformational mechanism connecting
the level of action with the aggregate level of intergroup inequality is not only
justifiable as an adequate scientific explanation, but also meaningful and promis-
ing for advancing an explanatory agenda in the study of social inequality.
Given the sociological scope of this study, the primary focus in reviewing the
literature will be placed on the reception of mechanisms and mechanistic expla-
nations in sociology. Nonetheless, a first step will consist of reviewing the philo-
sophical literature on the subject, for it is the philosophers and not the sociologists
or any other scientists who are best capable of spelling out, in all its complexity
and depth, the debate surrounding mechanisms and mechanistic explanations.
This is not to say, of course, that the philosophical and sociological debates do
not take each other into account. On the contrary, both philosophers and sociolo-
gists borrow constantly from each other to advance their arguments and are fairly
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aware of the homologous discussions on mechanisms and mechanistic explana-
tions taking place outside their disciplines. In this sense, to review both bodies of
literature separately responds not only to a real substantive division but partially
also to an argumentative strategy adopted for the sake of exposition.
Having said that, it is true that philosophers, at least in this particular case, are
better acquainted with the work of sociologists than the other way around. Fur-
thermore, asserting that the contributions of both disciplines should be seen as
equally integral parts of the same debate on mechanisms and mechanistic expla-
nations is not to deny the fact that each discipline focuses on its own problems
and addresses its specialized audience. It is fairly evident for anyone familiar
with the subject that while philosophical discussions tend, as a rule, to relate to
broader issues on the theory of causation and the theory of explanation in general,
social scientists usually focus their effort on narrower, intradisciplinary issues on
method (Kuorikoski, 2009, 143–4). These more general considerations on causa-
tion and explanation found in philosophical publications on the subject will with-
out a doubt prove to be very useful in illustrating the complexities of appealing to
mechanisms in science and will be most fruitful in dispelling deeply entrenched
misunderstandings in sociology about social mechanisms and mechanistic expla-
nations.
Recognizing the importance of the contribution of philosophy for making sense
of social mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in sociology, the present chap-
ter is divided into three sections. Section 1.1 briefly outlines the main debates
found in the philosophy of science on mechanisms and mechanistic explanations.
Here the emphasis will not be placed on spelling out each of the competing po-
sitions championed by different authors in the philosophical literature, nor on
discussing their highly contested validity or mentioning their innumerable de-
tractors and suggested revisions. The aim of this review is rather to prepare the
ground for the discussion on social mechanisms by pointing out the most rele-
vant conceptual distinctions and disputes found in the philosophy of science as
well as to show that the subject is far from being reducible to some simplified
metaphysical and epistemological assumptions as some social scientists tend to
believe. Section 1.2 provides an analysis of the reception of this wider philosoph-
ical discussion on mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in sociology. Again,
the focus will continue to be on showing the most prominent positions in the
debate and not on reviewing all their empirical or theoretical intricacies nor on
providing a comprehensive account of all other authors related to the discussion.
In this section too, the definition of social mechanisms to be used henceforth in
this study will be presented. Summing up the theoretical and methodological
lessons learned from the ideas advanced in the first two sections, Section 1.3
gives an answer to the two questions raised at the beginning of this introduc-
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tion on the usefulness and appropriateness of social mechanisms for the present
investigation.1 This section is of particular importance because it provides an
explicit formulation of the methodological and theoretical assumptions made in
this dissertation.
1.1 Philosophical considerations
Most of the recent philosophical discussions on mechanisms and mechanistic ex-
planations tend to be confined to particular scientific disciplines like molecular
biology or neuroscience (Tabery, 2004). Some philosophers, however, have tried
to offer more general accounts of mechanisms, which can be applied, at least
potentially, to various disciplines of both natural and social sciences (e. g., Bunge,
1997, 2004; Glennan, 1996, 2002). Irrespective of the field of application, the philo-
sophical literature on the subject can be divided into two different, though closely
related aspects: (1) metaphysical questions on the existence of mechanisms (on-
tological discussions) and on the principles governing their existence (causality,
law-like principles), and (2) epistemological considerations about how to explore,
reconstruct, and represent a supposedly mechanistic reality, or if mechanisms are
not conferred an ontological existence, about how to make sense of observed phe-
nomena using mechanistic explanations.2
To distinguish between metaphysical and epistemological claims, the following
review of the literature will consistently make use of the concepts mechanism and
mechanistic explanation to refer to each side of the discussion, respectively. The de-
nomination “mechanism” will thus be reserved exclusively for ontological state-
ments on mechanisms: mechanism are, they exist in the real world and are consti-
tutive in a very essential way of real phenomena. On the other hand, “mechanistic
explanation” will refer to representations and abstractions of reality in the form of
models or propositions that can be described as mechanistic either because they
are models of ontologically existing mechanisms or solely because they are some
sort of mechanism-based thinking used to abstract a non-mechanistic reality.
Keeping ontological and epistemological claims apart will prove to be a very
helpful way to avoid misunderstandings even if they ultimately can hardly be
1 Most of Section 1.2 and some parts of Section 1.3 can be found as a working paper in Cardona
(2013b).
2 To avoid lengthy digressions on even more general philosophical matters, the concepts of
“metaphysics,” “ontology,” and “epistemology” are here understood in a very general and
loose sense: Metaphysics is the major branch of philosophy devoted to the investigation of
the nature of reality, in particular, to answering the questions on what reality is and what the
principles are which apply to everything that is real. Ontology in turn can be defined as the
part of metaphysics concerned with the investigation of existence and being. Epistemology, on
the other hand, is concerned with the nature and scope of human knowledge about reality, not
with reality itself (Craig, 1998).
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treated separately. As Kuorikoski (2009, 145) observes, if concepts are correctly
applied, they must correspond to real things in the world; likewise, ontological
claims about the world can readily be translated into theories and models. As
a consequence, epistemological and ontological claims should tend to overlap.
Nonetheless, insisting on this distinction may be useful for yet another reason: it
corresponds roughly to the different approaches to the discussion found in the
philosophy of science compared with sociology. While the philosophy of science
is mostly concerned with ontological issues of the real existence of mechanisms
as constituent parts of the world, social sciences tend to focus on epistemological
questions on the construction of sound social theories and the conduction of solid
empirical research to better explain social phenomena.
1.1.1 Mechanisms: metaphysical issues
Both the existence of mechanisms and the properties governing their function-
ing are subject to metaphysical deliberation. In fact, besides defining mecha-
nisms, concerns about causality and the nature of the regularities brought about
by mechanisms occupy a prominent position in most contemporary philosoph-
ical discussions on mechanisms. Spelling out the different views on these two
fronts will therefore be the first step in reviewing the philosophical literature on
the subject. Some other issues such as reduction, which could also have been ad-
dressed from an ontological perspective, will be treated for the sake of argument
in the next subsection on epistemological considerations. As already noted, the
division between metaphysical and epistemological aspects is to some extend ex-
positional and allows some flexibility in presenting the different topics. To begin
with, and before defining mechanisms, it may be convenient to briefly dispel a
widespread misunderstanding about the recent surge of mechanisms in science,
namely whether they are ‘mechanical’ or not.
Are mechanisms mechanical? Put briefly, the contemporary view on mecha-
nisms is not mechanical in the sense that the concept was originally used in 17th
century philosophy of science. According to Deutsch’s brief reconstruction of
the early history of mechanistic thinking in the Renaissance, the classical view of
mechanisms, or what he calls the “classical model of mechanisms,” can be sum-
marized as follows (Deutsch, 1951, 234): (1) the whole is exactly the sum of its
parts, (2) mechanisms can be run in reverse, (3) they always preserve their prop-
erties even if disassembled and reassembled, and (4) each part always performs
the same function irrespective of other parts and independent of time. As Deutsch
observes, this type of mechanism in which neither interaction between the parts
nor interaction with the environment play any role whatsoever and where time is
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irrelevant resembles at best carefully crafted manmade machines. But even ma-
chines may prove to be more complex than the classical model of mechanisms
requires because they normally include interacting parts and most likely do not
comply with the 4 properties he formulated as the core characteristics of the clas-
sical view on mechanisms.
In this sense, most real mechanism are nonmechanical. The classical conception
of mechanisms is best understood as a highly idealized metaphor that hardly cor-
responds to any existing mechanism in the world—a point that has consistently
been made in the contemporary discussion on mechanisms (e. g., Machamer et
al., 2000, 2; Gorski, 2009, 152–7).
Three approaches to mechanisms: processes, systems, and processes in systems.
If mechanisms are not strictly mechanical, how should they be described? As
Glennan (2002, 2009) argues, mechanisms can be conceived as processes or as
systems. A third view is to combine both notions of system and process by re-
garding mechanisms as processes in systems (Bunge, 1997, 2004). The following
are descriptions of each of these three approaches along with brief discussions of
their differences.
(i) The process approach to mechanisms goes back to the works of Railton (1978)
and was further elaborated by Salmon (1984). Although Salmon focuses primar-
ily on mechanistic explanations and causation rather than on the metaphysics of
mechanisms (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005, 423), and does not even offer an ex-
plicit definition of the concept (Glennan, 2002, 343), his views on mechanisms can
be inferred from his more general framework on causation. It suffices to know
that for Salmon, processes and their interaction—in opposition to events—are to
be regarded as the fundamental entities of causality or of what he calls “the causal
structure of the world,” which is the way causal influences are transmitted and
propagated in time and space (Salmon, 1984, 146–7).3 Although Salmon does not
provide any definition of processes, he contrasts them with events by arguing
that they show a greater persistence in time and extension in space (p. 139). He
further distinguishes between causal processes and pseudo-processes, the former
being the only ones capable of transmitting information and energy, of preserv-
ing some uniform structure over time, and of displaying some self-determination
or robustness to external influences (pp. 141–7). Based on this view of process (or
causal process) as persistent, interacting, information-transmitting, and robust,
structured events, mechanisms are processes to the extent that they constitute
sequences of causally interconnected or interacting events persistent in time and space
3 See Dowe (2009) for a short discussion about Salmon’s theory and other process theories of
causation.
14 1.1 Philosophical considerations
(Glennan, 2009, 323).
(ii) To a certain extent the second approach is similar to but essentially dif-
ferent from the process perspective, resorting to systems as the basic ontologi-
cal form of a mechanism. This systems approach to mechanisms appeals to many
contemporary philosophers of science and is especially popular in the life and
brain sciences (Bechtel, 2006; Craver, 2007; Machamer et al., 2000). The definition
of mechanisms as a system differs from author to author and in most cases in-
volves deeper metaphysical considerations about the nature of the system, and
the parts, properties, and forms of interaction (e. g., Machamer, 2004). In general
terms, however, and combining elements from the definitions of various authors,
a mechanism is a system if it corresponds to a concrete object in the world consist-
ing of a (hierarchically) organized and stable collection of parts interacting within some
boundary in a regular way to produce certain outcome(s). Table 1.1 summarizes some
prominent definitions of the systems approach to mechanisms. The accounts of
Bechtel and Abrahamsen explicitly refer to biology, especially cell biology (see
also Bechtel, 2006). Similarly, Machamer et al. limit their definition of mecha-
nisms to systems in neurobiology and molecular biology, although in contrast to
Bechtel and Abrahamsen they leave the possibility open to extend their approach
to other scientific fields like cognitive or social sciences (Machamer et al., 2000,
2). Glennan, on the other hand, aims for a more comprehensive framework for
mechanisms, excluding only fundamental physics from his analysis (Glennan,
1996, 10).4
The distinction between mechanisms as processes and mechanisms as systems
may be easily drawn by recalling from the definition of system the idea of sta-
ble structure. As already mentioned, processes may be understood as robust se-
quences of events that, though interconnected and persistent in time and space,
do not resemble concrete objects in the world with a definite constitutive struc-
ture or a stable configuration of parts, as systems do. This difference can best
be illustrated with an example: a system is a thing like an organism or a cell, a
watch, or an engine; a process, on the other hand, may simply consist of more
contingent sequences of events like a baseball striking a window (Glennan, 2002,
345).5 In the latter case, even if the process of breaking a window with a baseball
may display some robustness (i.e., every time someone hits a baseball and directs
it with a certain velocity against a glass window, the window will break), it would
4 Although these three accounts on mechanisms are not directly related, there is an ongoing de-
bate on how they can complement each other. For example, Tabery (2004) has recently argued
that an improved definition of mechanisms can be formulated by combining the concept of
interaction (Glennan, 1996, 2002) with the concept of activity (Machamer et al., 2000).
5 See also Glennan (2009, 322–26). The example of a baseball colliding with a window was
originally used by Salmon to illustrate the concept of process (Salmon, 1984, 139).
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Table 1.1: Systems approach to mechanisms: Selected definitions
Author(s) Definition Field of application
Bechtel &
Abrahamsen
“a mechanism is a structure performing a
function in virtue of its component parts,
components operations, and their organiza-
tion. The orchestrated functioning of the
mechanism is responsible for one or more
phenomena” (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005,
423).
Biology (especially cell biol-
ogy).
Glennan “a mechanism underlying a behavior is a
complex system which produces that be-
havior by the interaction of the number of
parts according to direct causal laws” (Glen-
nan, 1996, 53).
All sciences except fundamen-
tal physics.
“a mechanism for a behavior is a complex
system that produces that behavior by the
interaction of a number of parts, where the
interactions between parts can be charac-
terized by direct, invariant, change-relating




“mechanisms are entities and activities or-
ganized such that they are productive of
regular changes from start or set-up to fin-
ish or termination conditions” (Machamer
et al., 2000, 3).
Neurobiology and molecular
biology (future extension to
other fields like cognitive or
social sciences not precluded).
be misleading to refer to this very contingent configuration of causally intercon-
nected events as a stable “window-breaking system” (Glennan, 2009, 325). That
processes are to be distinguished from systems should not, however, imply that
they are completely independent from one another. In fact, systems can readily be
understood as higher-level entities composed of various processes; the opposite,
as shown by the example of the baseball breaking the window, is not necessarily
true: processes are not systems, nor are they always parts of systems.
(iii) The close relation between systems and processes is explicitly addressed
in a third approach to mechanisms advanced by Bunge (1997, 2004). Bunge, a
philosopher of science with extensive works on natural and social sciences, sub-
scribes to the philosophical view of reality called systemism, according to which
everything that happens in the universe is a system or part of a system (Bunge,
2004, 190). From this systemic point of view, he defines a mechanism as "a process
in a concrete system, such that it is capable of bringing about or preventing some
change in the system as a whole or in some of its subsystems" (Bunge, 1997, 414).
In later publications a more compact definition can be found of a mechanism as
“a process (or sequence of states, or pathway) in a concrete system, natural or
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social” (Bunge, 2004, 186).6 Hence, despite his view of reality as being ontolog-
ically constituted by systems, Bunge defines mechanisms not as systems but as
the processes that systems rely on in order to function. These processes, as Bunge
emphatically underscores, are not independent of systems but embedded in them
(Bunge, 1997, 439–40). So, for example, if one regards the market, the family, and
democracy as social systems, then market transactions, child socialization, and
voting would constitute, in each case, concrete processes (or mechanisms) em-
bedded in and specific to those distinct systems (pp. 447–8).
The objection could be raised that Bunge’s view on mechanisms should not be
granted the status of “third approach,” but should instead be regarded either as a
special case of the process approach or as part of the systems approach. Yet there
are good reasons to conceive of this third definition of mechanisms as a different
approach. On the one hand, and against the first objection, even if mechanisms
are always processes, not all processes are mechanisms (Bunge, 1997, 415). It
is true, though, that Bunge’s systemic view of the universe regards everything
as belonging to a system. Even so, it can readily be accepted that sequences of
events, like the ones Salmon is referring to (e. g., the baseball hitting a window),
are not necessarily part of any system and may still be regarded as processes. On
the other hand, and meeting the second objection, it would be equally erroneous
to classify Bunge’s view on mechanisms as a subsidiary of the systems approach,
for not only does he define mechanisms as processes in a system and not as the
system itself (i.e., cell metabolism and not the cell itself is a mechanism), but also,
and more convincingly, he explicitly distances himself from both Machamer et al.
(2000) and Glennan (1996, 2002). Bunge reproaches the former by contending that
the definition of mechanisms they suggest is “not only imprecise but also incor-
rect” (among other things for failing to properly define systems); as for Glennan,
he observes that the suggested definition of system is very narrow and requires
further elaboration (Bunge, 2004, 183). Accordingly, Bunge’s theory of mecha-
nisms can best be seen as a third approach to mechanisms that is independent
from, even if closely related to, processes and systems.
Mechanisms and causation. The debate on mechanisms overlaps with a further
major issue in the philosophy of science: causation. As a matter of fact, most
philosophers taking part in the discussion on mechanisms in science, irrespective
of which of the three approaches mentioned in the foregoing discussion they feel
obliged to, appeal explicitly or tacitly to some notion of causal connection. The
6 For Bunge a concrete system is “a bundle of real things held together by some bonds or forces,
behaving as a unit in some respects and (except for the universe as a whole) embedded in some
environment.” (Bunge, 1997, 415). Mechanisms are only present in material systems, such as
natural, social, and technical systems, and not in immaterial one, as in the case of conceptual
and semiotic systems (Bunge, 2004, 191).
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myriad of theories on causation abound in Western philosophical thought, hence
multiplying the potential variations of any account on mechanisms depending on
which theory is assumed. For instance, and just to name some of the most promi-
nent alternative theoretical approaches to causation, causes can be understood as
some sort of consistent dependence between two events (regularity theory), as
some event whose absence prevents other events from occurring (counterfactual
theory), or as events that can be manipulated to give rise to some further events
(interventionist theory) (Beebee, Hitchcock, & Menzies, 2009, parts II and III).
However, no account of mechanisms is bound to any specific theory of cau-
sation. Not only can different accounts about mechanisms draw upon different
theories on causation, but also one and the same definition of mechanisms can
be readily modified by making different assumptions about the nature of causa-
tion. For instance, the mechanism account by Machamer et al. (2000) has been
reformulated to comply with the counterfactual theory of causation, by describ-
ing the functioning of mechanisms as invariant under interventions (Woodward,
2002). Despite this flexibility and diversity in the relation between mechanisms
and causation, two questions can be raised. First, given that different theories of
causation can be used with mechanism accounts, which kind of causation theory
is most likely to be compatible with mechanisms? Second, is a mechanistic theory
of causation possible? That is, can causation itself be mechanistically defined?
(i) As can be inferred from numerous recent publications on mechanisms (e. g.,
Machamer et al., 2000, 21–2), theories of mechanisms favor a notion of causa-
tion that is generative in nature and thereby directly opposed to the Humean or
regularity theory of causation. According to Hume, two events are regarded as
causally related if they are contiguous, one of them precedes the other, and it can
be observed that both are constantly conjoined even if the “secret connection”
bringing them together is not observable (Psillos, 2009). By contrast, the gener-
ative notion of causality assumed in theories of mechanisms conceives of causes
not merely as inexplicably connected with effects, but instead—and that is the
crucial difference—as actively producing the effects. This last point is made most
emphatically by Machamer (2004, 34), who further illustrates the idea of gener-
ative causation with the following illuminating example: A very ill patient may
die if a doctor does not intervene to cure her; if this were to happen, the non-
intervention of the doctor would certainly precede and be incontestably related
to the death of the patient (the doctor may even be held accountable for letting
the patient die); however, following a generative view of causation, the cause of
death is the illness rather than the doctor, for it is the former and not the latter
which directly corresponds to the cause producing death (pp. 35–6).
(ii) On top of this widespread assumption among philosophers that mecha-
nisms are wedded to a generative notion of causation, causality itself has been
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defined based on mechanisms. Glennan (1996, 2002, 2010), one of the leading
philosophers championing this position next to Machamer et al. (2000), contends
that the Humean “hidden connection” can be made explicit only if the mecha-
nisms connecting cause and effect are identified (Glennan, 1996, 65–6). Hence, ac-
cording to this view, causation may be unequivocally established only if a mech-
anism is uncovered connecting the phenomena at issue (Glennan, 1996, 56). It
follows by implication that all phenomena regarded as causally connected are to
be decomposed in their underlying mechanisms. Yet, as Glennan admits, there is
a limit to this mechanistic decomposition because not every causally related phe-
nomenon can be reduced to a mechanism, especially when it comes to explain-
ing the inner workings of mechanisms. Consequently, there has to be another
way in which phenomena are connected inside a mechanism without another,
deeper mechanism intervening. This type of nonmechanical connection is what
Glennan (2002) calls “fundamental physical laws” or “the brute nomological facts
of our universe” (p. 348). Machamer et al. (2000), do not mention laws as those
non-mechanical principles governing the functioning of mechanisms but instead
resort to “entities” and “activities.”
In any case, the conclusion is the same: restricting causality to mechanical con-
nections may prove to be limited in scope given the necessity, at some point, to re-
fer to deep nonmechanical principles. This restriction renders the mechanical the-
ory of causation less general and, as Psillos (2004) suggests, calls for other, more
comprehensive theories like Woodward’s counterfactual theory (Woodward, 2002).
Mechanisms and their regularities. Almost as central as the philosophical dis-
cussion on mechanisms and causation is the debate concerning the nature of the
regularities brought about by mechanisms. Two major questions are most com-
monly debated: (1) the generality of such regularities and (2) the origin of such
regularities, that is, whether mechanisms depend on lower-level mechanisms or
on deeper non-mechanical principles in order to function.
(i) According to the three definitions of mechanisms introduced above, the
functioning of a mechanism should regularly produce certain outcome(s) that
are not limited to a single occurrence (e. g., one neuron) but are instead equally
expected in all other individuals sharing the exact same characteristics (e. g., all
neurons). Yet, as stressed by Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005, 424–5) as well as by
Bunge (2004, 191), mechanisms are still by definition concrete things in the world:
they embody specific objects productive of some specific outcome or a specific
process in a specific system bound to a specific context. Consequently, and de-
spite similarities among different mechanisms, the regularities they produce are
of fairly limited generality and by no means represent universal principles that
apply to other processes or systems different from those they are referring to.
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Therefore, the regularities brought about by, say, cell metabolism apply at best to
other occurrences of cell metabolism and not, for example to human digestion,
despite the similarities.
(ii) A different question aside from the generality of the regularities produced
by mechanisms is how mechanisms produce such regularities, that is, what gov-
erns the functioning of mechanisms so that the same outcome is produced regu-
larly? It is true that a mechanism can be decomposed into deeper mechanisms in
such a way that its regular functioning is simply due to the regular function of
some other, lower-level mechanism. This mechanistic decomposition, as already
explained above, cannot go on indefinitely into deeper mechanisms and must
eventually reach nonmechanical principles.
To refer to these nonmechanical principles governing the stable internal func-
tioning of mechanisms, different philosophers appeal to alternative ontological
categories. Machamer et al. (2000) call them “entities” and “activities,” Glennan
(1996, 2002) “fundamental laws of physics,” and Woodward (2002) regularities
invariant under interventions.7 Bunge, by contrast, appeals to laws and empha-
sizes that mechanisms are lawful, meaning that they satisfy some law(s) (Bunge,
2004, 196–7).8 He further remarks, rather ironically, that “mechanisms without
conceivable laws are called miracles” (p. 196), unscientific conjectures based on
immaterial entities or processes. In any case, and despite these differences in the
characterization of the internal workings of mechanisms, there appears to be con-
sensus among the many philosophers writing on mechanisms about the fact that,
in order to function, mechanisms depend on some non-mechanical regularities,
law-like or otherwise that cannot be reduced to mechanisms.
1.1.2 Mechanistic explanations: epistemological concerns
Besides defining mechanisms, their causal properties, and the principles gov-
erning their functioning, the philosophical debate on mechanisms has devoted
considerable effort to the characterization of mechanistic explanations. Loosely
defined, a mechanistic or mechanism-based explanation is nothing more than
an explanation with the description of the functioning of a mechanism as ex-
planans and the outcome of a mechanism as explanandum.9 The characteriza-
tion of mechanism-based explanations in the philosophical literature generally
7 In later publications, Glennan himself abandoned the concept of law to describe the internal
functioning of mechanisms and replaced it with Woodward’s idea of “direct, invariant, change
relating generalizations” (see Table 1.1).
8 Bunge also mentions random mechanisms or processes that are not deterministic. However,
these random processes usually represent lower levels of higher level causal or determinis-
tic processes and should thus be regarded as always having some stable causal component
(Bunge, 2004, 195–6).
9 This definition will be further elaborated in Section 1.3.2.
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starts with a criticism of the covering-law model or of correlational analysis. It
then usually moves on to provide an assessment of the alleged advantages of
mechanism-based explanations and ends up with some methodological consider-
ations about the construction of mechanistic models and the way of mechanism-
based empirical research is conducted. The present section focuses on the charac-
terization and alleged advantages of mechanistic explanations. Because the third
section of this chapter will directly address the question of putting mechanistic-
explanations into practice, methodological issues concerning modeling and test-
ing mechanisms will not be discussed at this point.
Beyond the covering-law model. After it was introduced in 1948, the deductive-
nomological (D-N) model or covering-law model of explanation proposed by
Hempel and Oppenheim became the preferred reference of scientific inquiry. Ac-
cording to their original paper (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948), scientific explana-
tion should meet some minimal logical and empirical requirements or “condi-
tions of adequacy” to be regarded as scientific. These prescribe, in short, that the
explanans or statements constituting the explanation of the phenomena consist of
both a general law and a set of true antecedent conditions from which, by means
of logical deduction, the explanandum or description of the phenomena to be ex-
plained can be inferred (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948, 136–40). Explaining and
understanding in the D-N model are thus reduced to the expectability of the phe-
nomena that results from combining specific circumstances and laws (Hempel,
1965, 337).
However sound and appealing the covering-law model appeared to many sci-
entists who make use of it, criticism of the model grew almost as fast as its
widespread use in science. According to Craver’s review of the criticisms on the
covering-law model (Craver, 2007, 35–40), three main arguments can be raised
against Hempel and Oppenheim’s influential work. First, genuine law-like gen-
eralizations cannot always be easily distinguished from accidents (e. g., tempo-
ral sequences, correlations, or effect-to-cause relations); second, irrelevant state-
ments can be included in the explanans that may fundamentally blur the expla-
nation without violating any condition of the D-N model; third, phenomena call
for an explanation even if by subsumption to a general law, they are regarded
as unexpected (or improbable). In addition to these objections to the D-N model
summarized by Craver (2007), some authors have pointed out that the existence
of laws may be confined almost exclusively to physics, hence the applicability of
the covering-law model may be limited, especially in the social sciences (Elster,
2007, 35–6).
It is in light of this criticism to the covering-law model, and the resulting skep-
ticism toward its capacity to produce satisfactory scientific explanations, that the
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recent interest in mechanistic explanations can best be understood. As already
mentioned in the discussion on mechanisms as processes, the reintroduction of
the concept of mechanism and mechanistic explanation in contemporary phi-
losophy of science can be traced back to Railton (1978) and his concerns about
the covering-law model. According to Railton, subsuming an event under a law
makes for a logically correct explanation at best; albeit one that is able neither to
shed any light on the causes underlying the phenomena nor to provide a satisfac-
tory answer to the questions why and how it occurred. From this objection to the
covering-law model, he came to a conclusion that became the central argument
championed by virtually all contemporary advocates of mechanistic explanations
thereafter: the covering-law model is not incorrect but incomplete, and it can be
greatly improved if the mechanisms underlying the phenomena to be explained
are made a constituent part of the explanation (Railton, 1978, 207-8).
The question then arises how exactly mechanism-based explanations can do
better than the covering-law model. In a nutshell, the answer to this question is
fairly simple. Unlike the subsumption of phenomena under general laws, which
is basically a logical deductive procedure, mechanistic explanations show how the
phenomena described by the explanandum come about. Accordingly, a mecha-
nistic explanation consists not merely in alluding to a general principle as causing
the phenomena to be explained but instead, and perhaps more meaningfully for
scientific inquiry, in reconstructing causation and rendering it intelligible. This
difference in quality between explanations resulting from the covering-law model
and those based on mechanisms can best be illustrated using Bunge’s distinction
between shallow or black-box explanations and deep or translucent-box expla-
nations. While the former type of explanation solely connects input and output,
thereby hiding the inner workings of the phenomena, only the latter one allows
to look inside the box and see how things actually work (Bunge, 1997, 427–8).10
Thus, the covering-law model is best described as a black-box while mechanistic
explanations may rather be seen as translucent boxes.
The alleged advantages of mechanistic explanations. Knowing how is the dis-
tinctive characteristic of mechanistic explanations. Yet, the assertion that mecha-
nism-based explanations are better solely because they open the black box of the
covering-law model, even if it is intuitively appealing, does not sufficiently clar-
ify why knowing the how constitutes a better scientific explanation than subsum-
ing phenomena under general principles. Several arguments on the advantages
of mechanistic explanations have so far been advanced. Most of them refer to
10 Bunge also mentions “gray-box explanations” as some sort of underdeveloped translucent-box
account. The distinction is, however, not relevant for the present illustration of the opposition
covering-law/mechanism (see Bunge, 1997, 427–8).
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specific scientific disciplines and therefore have only limited validity, while oth-
ers can be regarded as advantages of mechanism-based explanations in scientific
research in general. Among the latter, three can be mentioned as the main advan-
tage of resorting to mechanisms to construct scientific explanations: aiding causal
inference, improving our understanding of phenomena, and making intervention
and control possible.
(i) A first, central argument championed by the advocates of mechanistic expla-
nations contends that knowing the how is the gold standard of causal inference,
serving both as a means of unveiling causal relations and as a tool to avoid well-
known pitfalls in causal inference like the problem of confounders (unmeasured
common causes explaining the correlation of two variables mistakenly regarded
as causally connected), and endogeneity (mixing up cause and effect or, syn-
onymously, dependent and independent variables). This first argument, which
has been advanced in both a strong version and a weak version, may be under-
stood best not as a criticism of the covering-law model but as a response to the
widespread empiricist statistical practices of correlation-based causal inference.
This practice, which consists in inferring the causal connection between two vari-
ables based on their correlation, has been called by Bunge “the mindless accu-
mulation of data and the mindless search for statistical correlations among them”
(Bunge, 2004, 207–8).
The strong version of this first argument subscribes to the aforementioned mech-
anistic theory of causation according to which two events are causally related
only if there is a mechanism connecting them. As pointed out by Steel (2004, 56),
this strong version of mechanistic causation can be applied to causal inference in
two ways. The first, as already mentioned, is a positive interpretation and states
that finding a mechanism is sufficient to establish causation between two vari-
ables. On the other hand, the same idea can be negatively stated by arguing that
mechanisms are necessary to raise causal claims; hence, if no mechanism can be
identified then no causality can be inferred even if two variables are observed to
correlate. If one or both of these interpretations are taken to be true, identifying
a mechanism would no doubt resolve the problem of causal inference. However,
such strong formulation of mechanisms and causal inference fails to recognize the
limitations of a mechanistic theory of causation. In particular, it neglects the fact
that mechanisms are neither always necessary nor sufficient to establish causation
(e. g., experimental manipulation can be used instead), and that other theories of
causation may also produce reliable causal inferences without resorting to mech-
anisms (e. g., Woodward, 2002, 2003).
Despite this criticism, which mostly applies to the natural sciences, some philoso-
phers of the social sciences, like Weber (2007), still defend the strong position
on mechanisms and causal inference. Weber argues that since experimentation
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outside the natural sciences is rare and simulation studies are not reliable for
causal inference, social scientists are “almost always” left with the knowledge
about mechanisms as the only tool to justify causal claims (p. 358). Appealing
as it sounds, this position on the necessity of mechanisms in social sciences to
establish causation has met strong resistance. As a direct reply to Weber’s posi-
tion, Steel (2007) objects saying that “simply pointing out that a problem is hard to
solve without mechanisms does not show that mechanisms will help” (p. 361). He
adds that the causal inference problem in the social sciences “might be unsolvable
with or without mechanisms” (p. 363) and concludes that causal inference based
on mechanisms may not differ that much from inference based on statistical data
(p. 364). The discussion is far from settled and, as Steel (2007) pleads, may require
a positive account of why and under which conditions knowledge of mechanisms
in the social sciences is needed or useful to draw causal inferences.
Until such a positive account has been distilled from philosophical delibera-
tions on mechanisms and causality, an intermediate position between Weber’s op-
timism and Still’s pessimism may safely be defended. Following Gerring (2007),
and still referring to the social sciences, an intermediate position consists of con-
ceiving of mechanisms not as necessary or sufficient for causal inference, but as
complementary to other inference methods. According to Gerring’s argument, it
may be easily accepted without making any strong assumptions on mechanisms
and causality, that by using mechanisms in addition to other non-mechanical infer-
ence methods like statistical information, causal inference may be more reliable
and convincing (pp. 173–5). In particular, as Psillos (2004, 316–7) observes in his
comparison of mechanistic and counterfactual accounts on causation, knowledge
about mechanisms may indeed aid causal inference and scientific explanations
by helping to resolve the problems of confounders and endogeneity.11 It follows
that resorting to mechanisms should be understood safely as a tool to improve, at
best, causal inference rather than a necessary condition to make it possible.
(ii) A second very common argument advanced by the advocates of mechanis-
tic explanations suggests that knowing the how, besides aiding causal inference,
improves our understanding of phenomena. To mention an example, following
this line of argument, Bunge (1997, 455) contends that knowledge about mecha-
nisms, on how things work, provides a deeper understanding as compared with
explanations based on the covering-law model, statistical correlations, or mere
descriptions, and should therefore be favored. Moreover, knowing how may be
regarded as an end in itself for it satisfies what Bunge (2004) refers to as “the plea-
sure of understanding” (p. 207). These claims are, it seems, not mere conjectures.
As quoted by Machamer (2004, 34), there appears to be psychological evidence
11 See Steel (2004, pp. 59ff.) for a discussion of the limitations of mechanism-based explanations
to fully account for the problem of confounders in the social sciences.
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suggesting that intuitive ways of thinking about causal connections in daily life
may be mechanistic: adults and children apparently make sense of the phenom-
ena they experience by assuming that some sort of active causal agent underlies
events.12 Consequently, mechanism-based explanations may be worth pursuing
not only because they are regarded as essential for understanding phenomena,
but also because mechanistic thinking may in fact be a very basic human intu-
ition used in making sense of phenomena experienced as causal.
(iii) A third argument found in philosophical discussions on mechanistic expla-
nations claims that knowing the how, in addition to aiding causal inference and
improving our understanding of phenomena, is requisite for manipulation and
control. Bunge (1997), for instance, concludes that “there is nothing like the dis-
closure of mechanisms [...] to empower us to control natural and social processes”
(p. 422). This line of argument, which can readily be accepted in the natural sci-
ences, proves to be more problematic in the social sciences where experimentation
and direct manipulation are rarely possible.
Despite these limitations, mechanistic explanations in the social sciences for
the purpose of manipulation and control could be used to leverage interventions
through social policy. According to Weber (2007, 352–4), an advocate of using
mechanism-based explanations for social policy, knowledge about mechanisms
enables social scientists to extrapolate results from empirical research to multiple
contexts, thereby making inferred causal connections useful for policy interven-
tions. This view, though appealing, is highly contested. Reiss (2007, 178–9), for
instance, argues that even if mechanisms have been identified and the causal re-
lations they are supposed to describe are true, it is most unlikely that a policy
intervention could modify the cause in exactly the right way without modifying
other causes of the phenomena so as to bring about the desired outcome in ev-
ery case. As a reason for this difficulty he underscores that the policy variable,
e. g., prohibiting smoking in bars, does not exactly correspond to the causal agent
to which the mechanistic explanation refers, e. g., nicotine causing lung cancer
(p. 180). In addition to that, the extrapolation of empirical results from one con-
text to other may prove to be highly problematic and not free of the same limita-
tions that all inductive generalizations share (see also Steel, 2007, 361–2). It may
therefore be safe to conclude, Reiss argues, that manipulation and control as a
property of mechanistic explanations should be confined to the natural sciences
where experimentation is possible and interventions can be performed more di-
rectly; their application to social policy, on the other hand, should be first fully
understood and positively addressed before preaching that mechanisms solve all
the problems of translating research into practical policy measures.
12 The studies quoted by Machamer et al. (2000) are Baillargeon, Kotovsky, and Needham (1995)
and Ahn and Kalish (2000). Still another study, not mentioned by Machamer, is Koslowski
(1996), which draws similar conclusions regarding the importance of mechanisms for scientific
thinking.
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To sum up, it is true that mechanistic explanations may be advantageous for
many purposes like improving causal inference, deepening our understanding of
phenomena, or enhancing the possibility of manipulation and control. However,
and specifically in the social sciences, some caution is advised against overstat-
ing the role of mechanistic explanations to solve methodological problems. As
Steel (2007) emphatically asserts, “mechanisms are not a magic wand that can be
waived to make methodological problems vanish” (p. 363).
Generality of mechanistic explanations. That mechanistic explanations are a re-
sponse to the covering-law model is not to say that they are incompatible with,
let alone opposed to, laws.13 Mechanisms opposing the existence of some fun-
damental principles were already shown to be misleading, if not impossible: the
functioning of a mechanism relies to some extent on certain deep nonmechanical
principles described by some philosophers such as Glennan or Bunge as laws. An
analogous opposition of mechanistic explanations to laws, understood as a gen-
eral hypothesis, is equally misleading yet can be found in the writings of promi-
nent social scientists (e. g., Elster, 1999, 5), as will be discussed in Section 1.2.
To put it briefly, the generality of a mechanism-based explanation depends on
the generality of the mechanisms it refers to and includes in its explanans. If very
general mechanisms are assumed, then general mechanistic explanations will fol-
low; on the contrary, if only a specific mechanism is included in the explanans,
then nothing more than the output of this very mechanism may constitute the
explanandum. Yet, as mentioned above, given the fact that mechanisms are by
definition concrete systems, processes, or processes in systems productive of some
regular outcome, one is forced to conclude that all mechanistic explanations are
specific, for any attempt to elevate the functioning of mechanisms or the regu-
larities they bring about to the level of a general principle applicable to a wider
range of phenomena would be contrary to their definition. If mechanisms are
assumed to be concrete, how then is it possible to talk about general mechanistic
explanations, let alone general mechanisms?
Even if there are no general mechanisms (they are all concrete), it may still be
possible, by means of analogy and abstraction (Bunge, 2004, 194–5), and by look-
ing for similarities among them (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005, 437–9), to group
concrete mechanisms into more general kinds. If used in a mechanism-based ex-
planation, these more abstract kinds of mechanisms confer on the explanation a
broader scope and allow it to refer to a wider range of analogous phenomena.
In fact, if these mechanism kinds are general enough, there is no reason not to
13 Laws are here loosely defined as “generalizations of wide scope that apply to many differ-
ent kinds of systems and [...] have few or no (or at least a very limited set of) exceptions”
(Woodward, 2002, 368).
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describe them as general hypotheses or laws. Hence it is perfectly possible to
formulate very general, law-like hypotheses using a mechanism kind that is wide
in scope and thereby to produce general mechanistic explanations. It is for this
reason that Bunge emphatically stresses that the opposite of mechanistic expla-
nations is a black-box explanation and not lawfulness (Bunge, 2004, 200) and that
the search for laws should not be replaced by a search for mechanisms, but in-
stead that law statements incorporating mechanisms should be preferred (Bunge,
1997, 442). However, as Bunge (2004, 195) warns, it must be borne in mind that
these groups or kinds of mechanisms are mere representations of different specific
mechanisms and should not be confused with the original, concrete mechanisms.
Most interestingly, if some mechanism kind is general enough to describe the
regularities brought about by many types of concrete mechanisms, a mechanism-
based explanation could be formulated to resemble the form of the D-N model,
that is, the subsumption of a particular event under a general law-like general-
ization (Glennan, 2002, 348–9). Even in this latter case, an essential difference
between the D-N model and mechanistic explanations remains: while the D-N
model is applied to particular cases modifying the antecedent conditions, a mech-
anistic explanation addresses particular cases by adapting the description of the
mechanism itself (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005, 439). Despite this very central
difference, opposing mechanistic explanations against explanations that comply
with the D-N model should therefore best be regarded as an assertion about the
transparency and depth of explanations rather than as a claim about the general-
ity of scientific hypotheses or about the logical adequacy of the explanans.14
Reduction in mechanistic explanations. Reduction in mechanism-based expla-
nations is particular to each scientific discipline and depends heavily on the as-
sumed definition of mechanisms. For instance, according to the systems approach
as applied in the natural sciences, mechanisms are complex multilevel and nested
objects that cannot be reduced to some fundamental level but instead call for what
Wimsatt (2006) refers to as “mechanistic reduction.” This form of reduction poses
analyzing phenomena at their different constitutive levels without favoring one
level over the other (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005, 426) with the assumption that
lower-level properties are equally relevant to bring about phenomena as higher-
level properties (Craver & Bechtel, 2007; Glennan, 2010). Accordingly, defining
a fundamental level of analysis to construct mechanistic explanations is mostly a
matter of convenience in specific scientific fields and entails deciding which level
is relevant and where to stop when going to deeper levels of one mechanism or
14 In the social sciences it seems that only a few authors have arrived at this same conclu-
sion—that the generality of mechanism-based explanations is not the crucial difference to laws
or law-like generalization. As will be further elaborated in Section 1.2, one of the rare cases is
Mayntz (2004, 240).
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in looking for further nested mechanisms (Machamer et al., 2000, 13). By con-
trast, as will be seen in the next section on the reception of mechanisms and
mechanism-based explanations in sociology, the question concerning reduction
in mechanistic explanations in the social sciences is part of the broader debate on
methodological individualism versus holism and bears only limited resemblance
to analogous discussions in the natural sciences or the systems approach to mech-
anisms. In this sense, reviewing the discussion on reduction and presenting it as
a reflection on mechanistic explanations in general would be misleading.
Table 1.2 sums up the review of the main aspects of the contemporary philo-
sophical literature on mechanisms and mechanistic explanations. Again, the se-
lection of subjects is representative and not exhaustive and focuses on the core
elements of the philosophical discussion that are relevant for the formulation and
later application of social mechanisms in sociology.
1.2 The sociological reception
Now that the philosophical literature has been reviewed, this section turns to
the sociological reception of mechanisms and mechanistic explanations to discuss
both the central claims of the mechanistic agenda and the difficulties of putting
its recommendations into practice.15
As in the natural sciences, use of the word “mechanism” in the social sciences
and, in sociology in particular, is not new. Over half a century ago, Merton (1968)
included the concept of mechanisms in his writings, which he defined as “[...]
social processes having designated consequences for designated parts of the so-
cial structure” (p. 43). Some years later, in his book Social Mechanisms, Karlsson
(1958) discussed different mathematical, rational-choice-based models to explain
the functioning or the “mechanisms” of society (p. 9). Despite these early refer-
ences to the notion of mechanism, it was only after Hedström and Swedberg pub-
lished a collection of essays on social mechanisms in 1998 that the concept took
on a clearly programmatic character in sociology. This “new mechanistic perspec-
tive”, as Reiss (2007, 166-7) labeled it, groups together researchers from various
disciplines in the social sciences who share the common commitment to explain
social phenomena based on the underlying mechanisms that produce them.
As already stated in the introduction to this chapter, reviewing the literature
on mechanisms and mechanistic explanations is not a goal in itself but an in-
termediate step in figuring out the most appropriate way to use a mechanistic
approach in the present study. Accordingly, the focus of the review is not broad
but narrow; it concentrates on the most prominent aspects of the discussion in
15 Some passages of this section are reproduced in slightly modified form in Cardona (2013b).
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Table 1.2: Review of the philosophical literature on mechanisms and mechanistic
explanations: Summary of metaphysical and epistemological issues
Mechanisms Mechanistic explanations
Are mechanisms mechanical? Mechanisms are
not mechanical as the classical, 17th-century
use of the concept implies.
Criticism of the covering-law model. The D-
N model is a black-box; mechanistic explana-
tions are translucent boxes showing how things
work.
Different approaches. Mechanism can be de-
fined as (i) processes or persistent chains of
events , (ii) systems regularly productive of a
certain outcome, or (iii) processes in concrete
systems.
Advantages of mechanistic explanations. (i)
improving causal inference by helping to re-
solve the problems of confounders and endo-
geneity; (ii) understanding phenomena in a
way compatible with intuitive causal think-
ing, and (iii) possibly enabling/improving in-
tervention and control, also in the social sci-
ences in the form of social policy.
Causation. Mechanisms imply a generative no-
tion of causality most directly opposed to the
regularity view of Hume; however, some spe-
cific theory of causality is not always explic-
itly invoked and different approaches to mech-
anisms can be modified by assuming different
causation theories. Furthermore, causality it-
self can—with some limitations—be mechanis-
tically formulated.
Generality. No matter how concrete mecha-
nisms may be, mechanistic explanations can, by
means of analogy, be formulated so as to have a
general scope. Mechanism-based explanations
may display different levels of generality, the
higher of which may be similar (and not op-
posed) to law-like hypothesis.
Regularities underlying and produced by
mechanisms. As concrete objects in the world,
mechanisms and the regularities they bring
about do not represent general principles but
are instead wedded to specific processes, sys-
tems, or processes in systems. Moreover, even
if a mechanism may be decomposable in lower-
level mechanisms, the regular functioning of
mechanisms relies at some deep level on me-
chanically irreducible principles (e. g., laws or
entities and activities).
Reduction. Reduction in mechanistic expla-
nations cannot be generalized to a standard
methodological rule; it depends both on the
definition of mechanism and on the scientific
discipline or field of application.
sociology without going any further into the details and controversies of the dif-
ferent positions. This, however, is not a simple task. Conducting a survey of the
literature focusing only on the main aspects presents two main difficulties. First,
the new mechanistic program in sociology is highly heterogeneous (Brante, 2008,
p. 271, footnote 1), so it is difficult to provide a complete review of the literature
without mentioning the numerous particularities of each author who make use
of the concept. Second, surveys of recent discussions on social mechanisms are
abundant, so any new attempt to review the literature would, at best, render the
same results already found in published articles (Gerring, 2007; Gross, 2009; Ma-
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honey, 2001; Mayntz, 2004; Norkus, 2005).16 In other words, not only would it
be impossible to review social mechanisms in sociology without mentioning the
particularities, but also, and perhaps more decisively, the demanding task of pro-
ducing a comprehensive summary of the different views on social mechanisms
has already been carried out successfully, if not exhaustively, by more than one
author over the past decade.
All these things considered, the literature review in this section follows a dif-
ferent strategy. Instead of expending fruitless efforts in rewriting what has al-
ready been written (either attempting a new review of the literature or redun-
dantly summarizing the already existing reviews), the mechanistic approach in
sociology will be selectively assessed. The works of the two main authors who
champion the recent surge of interest in social mechanisms, John Elster and Peter
Hedström, will be discussed; based on their work, the most relevant issues raised
by the reception of mechanisms in sociology will be addressed. It is true that
the views of Elster and Hedström on mechanisms are not consensually accepted,
nor do they cover the variations and alternative formulations of the subject put
forward by different authors in the last two decades. Nonetheless, they offer
a comprehensive account of social mechanisms that deals with the most relevant
aspects of introducing mechanisms in sociology, providing sufficient input to out-
line the core elements of this approach, and assess the best way of putting it into
practice.
This section is divided into three parts. After discussing the works of Elster and
Hedström in the first part, the second part critically examines the difficulties of
adopting a mechanistic approach in sociology. This second part is not restricted
to the works of Elster and Hedström. It also draws upon the different review arti-
cles as well as other articles about social mechanisms that tackle the problematic
aspects of the discussion on social mechanisms. Finally, the third part takes stock
of this review, giving a direct answer to the two questions raised at the beginning
of this chapter about the use of mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in so-
ciology and providing the definition of social mechanisms that will be adopted
throughout this study.
1.2.1 Leading advocates of a mechanistic approach in sociology
Among the authors championing the new mechanistic program in sociology, El-
ster and Hedström are widely regarded as the most central figures. Their in-
fluence in the contemporary discussion on social mechanisms not only has been
recognized by numerous authors taking part in the debate (e. g., Abbott, 2007;
16 In addition to these articles, Schmid (2006) offers a very comprehensive work on mechanisms
and mechanistic explanations in sociology. The work has not received much attention in the
discussion on social mechanisms, presumably because it is written in German.
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Bunge, 2004; Mahoney, 2001; Norkus, 2005), but also can be attested to by the
numerous empirical studies that have applied their definition such as those by
Wikström and Sampson (2003, 121), Barrera (2008, 2–3), and Baker and Faulkner
(2009, 1533), to name just a few of the most recent ones. Moreover, Elster’s and
Hedström’s works on social mechanisms rank among the most frequently cited
publications in the social sciences on this subject.17
Both authors have been very active in publishing their views on mechanisms
and mechanistic explanations, changing some of their ideas and consolidating
others over the years. In the case of Elster, five books contain most of his thoughts
on mechanisms. His early notions on mechanisms, found in Elster (1983), were
modified in Elster (1990) and worked out in more detail in Elster (1998), Elster
(1999) and Elster (2007).18 As for Hedström, his early views on the subject can be
found in Hedström and Swedberg (1996) and in perhaps his most quoted article
of 1998 (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998b), which is included as an introduction to
the collection of essays on social mechanisms published in conjunction with other
advocates of the mechanistic approach like Boudon, Stichcombe, and Elster (Hed-
ström & Swedberg, 1998a). Besides these two early articles, Hedström’s ideas on
mechanisms are most comprehensively developed in his book Dissecting the So-
cial: On the Principles of Analytical Sociology (Hedström, 2005). His most recent
publication (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010) basically summarizes the argument put
forward in that book.
The numerous publications of both Elster and Hedström, as well as the many
small modifications of their ideas make it difficult to summarize their views in a
straightforward way. Taking this difficulty into consideration, the following re-
view will seek to extract the pieces of thought that remained constant in each
author’s work and will attempt to reconstruct the evolution of the ideas that
have changed over the years. Special attention will be given to these author’s
arguments favoring mechanistic explanations, their various definitions of social
mechanisms (including their different typologies), and other issues such as the
nature of the inner workings of mechanisms and their generality.
Why social mechanisms and mechanism-based explanations? As already dis-
cussed in some detail in Section 1.1, the mechanistic approach to science aims
both to extend the covering-law model of scientific explanation beyond the use of
laws and toward deeper explanations and to overcome the difficulties of causal
inference posed by correlational analysis.
17 See the Science Citation Index (SCI) at http://www.isiknowledge.com
18 Elster (1998) is the exact same article as Elster (1999), and Elster (2007) is a slight modification
of these last two.
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In their plea for mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in the social sci-
ences, Elster and Hedström consistently share these same views about the cover-
ing-law model and correlation-based causal inference. Regarding causal infer-
ence, both authors extensively discuss the issues of spurious correlation, endo-
geneity, and confounders that apparently are aggravated by the sole use of cor-
relation tools (Elster, 1990, 5–6; Elster, 2007, 21–3; Hedström & Swedberg, 1998b,
17; Hedström, 2005, 23). As for the deductive-nomological (D-N) model, they also
agree that using laws to explain social phenomena results in black-box explana-
tions that simply connect input and output, adding hardly anything to our under-
standing of phenomena, not to mention their skepticism about the very existence
of laws in the social sciences (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998b, 8–9; Hedström, 2005,
15–7; Elster, 2007, 32,35), which serves well their preference for mechanism-based
explanations.19
Concerning the question of how a mechanistic approach may help improve
these insufficiencies, Elster and Hedström provide slightly different answers. In
Elster’s view, resorting to mechanisms makes causal inference more robust to the
risks posed by mere correlational analysis (Elster, 1983, 24; Elster, 2007, 33). In
addition to that, the use of mechanisms may provide deeper explanations that
effectively improve our understanding of social reality (Elster, 1990, 6; Elster,
1999, 10). On the other hand, although Hedström gives a similar argument in
support of the benefits of mechanisms and mechanism-based explanations, high-
lighting the same advantages mentioned by Elster (causal inference, intelligibility
of explanations, and understanding of phenomena), he further emphasizes some
additional disciplinary aspects of a mechanistic approach in sociology related to
theory building.
In Hedström’s opinion, sociological theorizing either has degenerated into vari-
able-based sociology, or the use of statistical analysis as a way of generating theo-
ries, or has lost itself in unsuccessful attempts to formulate grand theories (Hed-
ström & Swedberg, 1998b, 6; Hedström, 2005, 11–4). Between these two tenden-
cies—empiricism on the one hand and highly abstract theories on the other—he
suggests adopting a middle course that would produce theories having an inter-
mediate scope of generality based on mechanisms (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998b,
1; Hedström, 2005, 1). According to Hedström, making use of mechanisms in this
way would allow one to go beyond the empirical level of statistical analysis and,
19 A mechanistic explanation is still a deductive type of argument compatible with the D-N
model (Hedström, 2005, 30). Hence, claims raised against the covering-law model by these
two authors should be seen as a critique of the use of laws in explanation and not as an objec-
tion to the logical framework implied by the model. Considering the underlying logical struc-
ture of explanations, the only difference between a nonmechanistic-deductive explanation and
a mechanistic deductive explanation is that only in the former case does the explanandum
consist of the output of a mechanism and the explanans of the description of the mechanism
bringing about that output (cf. Glennan, 2002, 347).
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without having to provide a general theory of society, to reach a certain level of
generality above mere empirical findings. This, in turn, would bring two sig-
nificant advantages to sociological theorizing and research. First, it would open
the way for interdisciplinary research, since one and the same mechanism may
be relevant for more than one discipline (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998b, 6); and
second, given the middle level of generality of mechanism-based explanations,
such explanations would reduce the tendency toward theoretical fragmentation
observed in sociology by consolidating many dispersed theories under a common
mechanism (Hedström, 2005, 28).
To recap so far, according to Elster and Hedström, social mechanisms and
mechanistic explanations should solve the problems of using correlational anal-
ysis as a method for causal inference, of resorting to laws in the formulation of
explanations as prescribed by the D-N model, and of formulating sociological
theories following the logic of variable-based sociology or the search for grand-
theories. As a solution to these problems Elster and Hedström make a case for
(i) causal inference based on mechanisms that resolve the problem of spurious
correlation, endogeneity, and confounders; (ii) mechanism-based explanations
that make explanations more intelligible and favor our understanding of social
phenomena; and (iii) mechanism-based theorizing as theories of middle scope of
generality that favor multidisciplinarity and reduce theoretical fragmentation in-
side sociology. Although these reasons are not shared by everyone taking part in
the discussion on social mechanisms in sociology, they do constitute a compre-
hensive list of the potential advantages of adopting mechanisms and mechanistic
explanations in sociology.
As discussed in Section 1.1, similar reasons have been voiced in the philosophy
of science in favor of mechanisms and mechanism-based explanations—in partic-
ular, points (i) and (ii) above—including additional arguments not mentioned by
Elster or Hedström, such as the possibility of using mechanism-based research to
enhance our capacity for control and intervention. Worth noticing is the differ-
ence in depth with which the arguments about the benefits of mechanisms have
been put forward in sociology as compared with philosophy. Particularly in re-
gard to mechanisms and causal inference, and the closely related issue of a mech-
anistic theory of causation, sociologists tend to oversimplify the discussion and be
apologetic about the advantages of mechanisms for causation without devoting
much energy to critically exploring potential difficulties of such an approach. In
this regard the philosophical literature provides a much more unbiased account
and should therefore be preferred as a major source for matters about causality
and causal inference.
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Defining social mechanisms. Interestingly, most of the discussion about the need
for and potential advantages of a mechanistic approach to sociology has been
conducted without the participants having arrived at some minimal consensus
as to what a social mechanism is. Indeed, most of the controversies in sociol-
ogy about the introduction of mechanisms and mechanism-based explanations
revolve around the intricacies of their definitions and are less concerned with
questioning their relevance as a type of theorizing, a way to improve explana-
tions, or a solution to the problem of causal inference.
Elster, and particularly Hedström, have repeatedly struggled to come to grips
with this concept, changing their definition quite often as can be seen in Ta-
ble 1.3.20
Table 1.3: A comparison of Elster’s and Hedström’s definitions of social mecha-
nisms
Elster Hedström
“[...] intentional chains from a goal to an action
as well as causal chains from an event to its ef-
fect” (Elster, 1983, 24).
“[...] an integral part of an explanation
which (1) adheres to the three core principles
stated above [direct causality, limited scope and
methodological individualism], and (2) is such
that on the occurrence of the cause or input, I, it
generates the effect or outcome, O” (Hedström
& Swedberg, 1996, 299).
“[...] nuts and bolts, cogs and wheels – that can
be used to explain quite complex phenomena”
(Elster, 1990, 3).
“[...] an integral part of an explanation which
(1) adheres to the four core principles stated
previously [action, precision, abstraction and
reduction], and (2) is such that on the occur-
rence of the cause or input, I, it generates the
effect or outcome, O” (Hedström & Swedberg,
1998b, 25).
“[...] frequently occurring and easily recogniz-
able causal patterns that are triggered under
generally unknown conditions or with inde-
terminate consequences” (Elster, 1998, 45); see
also Elster (1999, 1) and Elster (2007, 36).
“[...] a constellation of entities and activities
that are linked to one another in such a way that
they regularly bring about a particular type of
outcome” (Hedström, 2005, 11).
If we compare the views of these two authors, Elster seems to be much more
consistent in his definition of mechanisms. To him, mechanisms are those inten-
tional somethings—causal chains; “nuts and bolts, cogs and wheels;” causal pat-
terns—that connect cause and effect on a regular basis. This view on mechanisms
follows directly from his conception of causality. According to Elster, causality
20 Elster does not use the term “social mechanism” but only the word “mechanism.” However,
because he is explicitly writing within the social sciences, it may be safe to call his account on
mechanisms “social.”
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has to be temporally and spatially local, meaning that action at a distance is im-
possible and that any effect is to be traced back to the existence of the continuous
and contiguous causal chains producing it (Elster, 1983, 28–9). Thus, the core idea
behind his definition is not, as it is in the natural sciences, a complete account of
the ontological underpinnings of mechanisms (e. g., processes, systems, or pro-
cesses in systems), but rather results most directly from his generative view on
causality, which does not go further than recognizing the existence of some regu-
lar causal chains or patterns.
Hedström takes a similar approach to the definition of mechanisms, at least
in his first two articles (Hedström & Swedberg, 1996, 1998b). Here he merely
characterizes the “fundamental principles” that a mechanistic approach to soci-
ology should adhere to (methodological individualism, middle-range theorizing,
and direct causality), without giving any explicit account of what mechanisms
are. Aside from these principles, which some years later became the principles
expressed in his text on analytical sociology, he merely describes mechanisms in
these first two articles as something producing some output from an input. Un-
like Elster, who refers to the mechanisms connecting cause and effect as regular
causal chains or patterns, Hedström gives in his first publications no description
whatsoever of what exactly these mechanisms are supposed to be.
This lack of clarity about the nature of mechanisms was dispelled in Hed-
ström’s book on analytical sociology, published in 2005, in which he takes on
the task of explicitly defining the nature of that “something” connecting input
and output referred to in his first works on mechanisms (Hedström, 2005). To do
so, he adopts Machamer’s ontology of “entities” and “activities” (Machamer et
al., 2000) and without much further elaboration, imports it into sociology by sim-
ply replacing the words “entity” with individual actor and “activity” with action.
Accordingly, social mechanisms are nothing more than the constellation of indi-
viduals and actions regularly producing an outcome (Hedström, 2005, 25–6).21
As in Elster’s definition, Hedström also does not resort to any of the ontological
categories mentioned in the previous chapter to describe social mechanisms; for
him what constitutes social mechanisms is simply the combination of individuals
and actions, not processes or systems.
Regularities underlying mechanisms. Whether as causal chains or patterns (El-
ster) or as the constellation of entities and activities (Hedström), the functioning
21 Whether this quick reconceptualization of Machamer’s definition is licit, should, in my opin-
ion, be left as an open question. Although Machamer et al. do not deny the possibility of
extending their definition of mechanisms to the social sciences (Machamer et al., 2000, 2), Hed-
ström‘s reformulation of the concepts of entity and activity seems to lack the same rigor and
depth as the original, and clearly much more complex treatment found in Machamer et al.
(2000) and Machamer (2004). It is not, however, the aim of this chapter to pursue this issue
any further.
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of mechanisms presupposes the existence of some deeper principles governing
their inner workings. How do both authors explain them?
According to Elster, and mostly unnoticed by his critics (e. g., Bunge, 2004,
196–8), laws are needed to explain the functioning of mechanisms. Even if his
defense of a mechanistic approach is basically an attack on the use of laws in ex-
planations, Elster recognizes that the decomposition of phenomena in ever finer-
grained causal sequences cannot go on indefinitely and must, eventually, bottom
out in some nonmechanical principles. In his own words: “A causal mechanism
has a finite number of links. Each link will have to be described by a general
law, and in that sense by a ’black-box’ about whose internal gears and wheels we
remain ignorant” (Elster, 1990, 7). Hence, the principles underlying the regular
functioning of mechanisms are, similar to the views of Bunge (1997, 2004) and
Glennan (1996, 2002), mechanically-irreducible laws.
For Hedström, in contrast, it is not laws that are needed to explain the inter-
nal workings of mechanisms, but rather actors and actions. In his view, even if
all phenomena may in principle be decomposable into their underlying mecha-
nisms so that the regular functioning of a given mechanism is just the outcome of
some deeper one, this decomposition need not be set forth indefinitely. Instead,
mechanistic decomposition should be confined to disciplinary limits based on
some “stopping rules” of substantive relevance. In sociology, he contends, such
bottom-lines of mechanistic decomposition are individuals and their actions, the
irreducible ontological starting point of all social phenomena (Hedström, 2005,
19). Consequently, even if it were possible to further decompose individual ac-
tions into deeper mechanisms (e. g., neuroscience) or into some deeper laws of
nature, it would be, in his opinion, sociological irrelevant (Hedström, 2005, 25–6).
Types of mechanisms. Beyond the metaphysical aspects of defining mechanisms
and the nature of their internal functioning, which, as will be shown below, are
far from settled in the literature on the subject, Elster and Hedström provide very
down-to-earth instances of social mechanisms, identifying both concrete and gen-
eral types.
According to Elster (1999), mechanisms can be classified as either “atomic,”
which are psychological mechanisms capturing very concrete patterns of indi-
vidual action (p. 20), or “molecular,” which constitute arrays of combined atomic
mechanisms explaining more complex psychic or social phenomena (p. 32). These
mechanisms are not independent of each other; rather, they interact to produce
the same outcome in ways that are mutually exclusive or reinforcing, depending
on the triggering conditions of each (Elster, 1999, 7–8). To capture this interac-
tion between mechanisms, Elster proposed a general typology: type A mecha-
nisms refer to mutually exclusive mechanisms with unknown triggers, while type
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B mechanisms refer to those with known triggers but unpredictable net effects;
these can be further classified into type B1 (if simultaneously triggered) and type
B2 (if successively triggered).
In his work, Elster provides a fairly comprehensive collection of examples of
atomic (or psychological) mechanisms. Unfortunately, this is not the case for
molecular mechanisms, which he does not elaborate in depth. Just to mention
one example of the former, an individual’s inability to have some desired ob-
ject may trigger two competing atomic mechanisms that affect preferences: the
“sour-grapes mechanism” (an adaptive preference to stop desiring what is not
attainable) and the “forbidden-fruit mechanism” (an adaptive preference to de-
sire something even more because it is forbidden or unattainable). Still other
psychological mechanisms include spillover, compensation and crowding-out ef-
fects, contrast and endowment effects, and wishful-thinking (Elster, 1999, 20–32).
All of them describe individual behavioral tendencies as a function of changes in
desires, beliefs, and preferences.
Mirroring Elster’s classification, Hedström distinguishes between “elementary”
and “molecular” mechanisms. According to him, these two types of mechanisms
denote differences not only in their constitutive entities and activities, but also in
the phenomena they explain. Thus, while the entities constitutive of elementary
mechanisms are beliefs, desires, and opportunities, the entities underlying molec-
ular mechanisms are individuals. For elementary mechanisms, he does not define
activities; for molecular mechanisms, activities are individual actions.22 Accord-
ingly, whereas elementary mechanisms can be used to explain different individ-
ual actions, molecular mechanisms explain configurations of actors (Hedström,
2005, 26–7). Examples of molecular and elementary mechanisms are mostly pro-
vided in Hedström’s book on analytical sociology (Hedström, 2005), particularly
in Chapters 3 and 4. Like Elster’s examples of mechanisms, the examples pro-
vided by Hedström mostly illustrate elementary mechanisms in the form of psy-
chological patterns that underlie different behaviors, rather than molecular mech-
anisms that produce some configuration of actors. In fact, several of the concrete
instances of mechanisms provided by Hedström, such as dissonance-driven or
adaptive desire formation, are exactly the same mechanisms discussed by Elster
(cf. Hedström, 2005, 59).
In addition to the distinction between elementary and molecular mechanisms,
and departing from Elster’s categorization of mechanisms in types A, B1, and B2,
Hedström introduces three general types of mechanisms: situational mechanisms
(macro to micro), action formation mechanisms (micro to micro), and transforma-
22 That Hedström does not specify the activities constitutive of elementary mechanisms and de-
fines them solely in terms of their entities is surprising, to say the least, for it omits without any
justification a central category of his own definition of mechanisms as constituted by activities
and entities.
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tional mechanisms (micro to macro). These three types of mechanisms are in line
with Coleman’s well-known macro-micro-macro model of explanation (Coleman,
1986). According to Hedström, situational mechanisms explain the reaction of an
individual to specific social situations, action formation mechanisms account for
the way individuals make decisions and interact among themselves, and trans-
formational mechanisms aggregate individual actions into collective outcomes.
In the light of this discussion about the definition and classification of social
mechanisms by Elster and Hedström, two additional relevant points should be
briefly made. First, as may be evident already, both authors place individuals at
the center of social mechanisms, so looking inside the black box of the covering-
law model is the same as going to the level of individual action. This is hardly
surprising given Elster’s and Hedström’s explicit adherence to the principles of
methodological individualism and hence to the conviction that all social phenom-
ena can be reduced to individuals and their actions (Elster, 2007, 13; Hedström &
Swedberg, 1998b, 12-13). Hedström is especially emphatic in making clear that
there are no mechanisms beyond individuals and thus no macro-level mecha-
nisms (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998b, 24; Hedström, 2005, 28–9). To be sure, this
emphasis on action does not necessarily imply a commitment to rational choice,
from which both authors try to distance themselves. However, it certainly as-
sumes a theory of action: the desire-belief-opportunity (DBO) theory in the case
of Hedström (Hedström, 2005, ch. 3) and some sort of motivation-based, weak
rational-choice theory in the case of Elster (Elster, 2007, ch. 3).
Second, it is also important to note how both authors draw the line between
concrete and abstract mechanisms, that is, between real existing phenomena and
abstractions of similar phenomena. Here a noteworthy difference can be ob-
served. While Elster sticks to his definition of mechanisms as concrete and ob-
servable causal chains, Hedström makes a plea to depart from the concreteness
of mechanisms, particularly in his earlier publications, in which he characterizes
mechanisms as analytical constructs (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998b, 13). In later
publications, although Hedström tends to characterize mechanisms as concrete
phenomena (existing constellations of entities and activities), he still insists on
abstraction as one central principle of his analytical sociology (Hedström, 2005,
2–3) and as a direct response to Elster, he doubts that mechanisms are always
easily recognizable (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, 56).
Generality of mechanisms; laws and mechanisms. As concrete causal chains or
constellations of entities and activities, the regularities produced by mechanisms
are confined to their own concreteness. However, as discussed in Section 1.1
on the philosophical literature on the subject, some degree of generality may be
achieved beyond the mere observational level of particular instances by means of
abstraction.
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As already mentioned, it is Hedström who most explicitly advocates searching
for analytical mechanisms of some generality. In his view, mechanistic expla-
nations without generality would turn into mere ad-hoc story-telling limited to
reconstructing contingent phenomena (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998b, 10). Yet,
despite this plea for mechanisms of some generality, Hedström is not hoping to
elevate mechanisms to the level of laws. Rather, his chief aim is to produce gener-
alizations of a limited scope, much in the spirit of Merton’s middle range theories
(Hedström & Swedberg, 1998b, 25).
Unlike Hedström, Elster’s position on laws is rather ambiguous and unstable
throughout his writings, notably changing from one publication to the next. At
times he argues that a mechanism is the decomposition of a law in its “cogs and
wheels” (Elster, 1983), insisting that “In this context, the antonym of a mechanism
is a scientific law” (Elster, 1999, p 5). Later, however, he describes the transition
from laws into mechanisms as going from general laws at higher levels of ab-
straction to laws at lower levels of abstraction (Elster, 2007, 35), arguing that if the
triggering conditions of mechanisms are identified (situations, individual traits,
or previous outcomes), and if spurious mechanisms are sorted out, mechanisms
may be transformed into laws of some restricted generality (Elster, 1999, 36–44;
Elster, 2007, 44). However, still other passages reveal his indecision about mech-
anisms and laws: “To repeat, I am not advancing explanation by mechanisms as
an ideal or norm. Explanation by laws is better—but also more difficult, often
too difficult” (Elster, 1999, 10). All these changes considered, as Gorski (2009,
173–5) contends, Elster begins by trying to overcome positivism and laws, but he
ends up recognizing their superiority, resorting to mechanisms as a second-best
strategy needed to bypass the unsuccessful search for laws in the social sciences.
Thus, one may conclude that what Elster initially presents as a fight between
mechanisms and laws, with no quarter given, turns out to be, upon closer exami-
nation, a minor quarrel with a potentially amicable ending in which laws are not
entirely dismissed but simply replaced by new ones of lower generality.
Table 1.4 summarizes the differences and similarities between Elster’s and Hed-
ström’s treatment of social mechanisms. In a nutshell, while it is true that the
reception of social mechanisms as put forward by the two authors share several
aspects, such as methodological individualism and optimism about relying on
mechanisms and mechanistic explanations to solve the limitations of black-box
explanations and correlation-based causal inference, they differ in some other re-
spects, in particular in the nature of the regularities underlying mechanisms, the
classification of mechanisms, and the emphasis on concrete versus abstract mech-
anisms.
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To improve causal inference, in-
telligibility of explanations, and
understanding of phenomena; to
bypass search for laws.
To improve causal inference,
intelligibility of explanations, and
understanding of phenomena;
to find middle course between






Laws connect links in causal
chains.
Individual actions (stopping rule
in sociology).
Types of mechanisms I Atomic (psychological) and molec-
ular (combination of atomic
mechanisms).
Elemental (beliefs, desires, and op-
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Generality and laws Mechanisms are easily recogniz-
able causal patterns of restricted
generality; however, they can
be transformed into weak laws
when triggers are identified.
Mechanisms are constellations of
entities and activities that can
be abstracted up to the level of
middle-range generalizations.
1.2.2 Difficulties in implementing a mechanistic approach
Now that the central ideas of the debate on social mechanisms and mechanistic
explanations have been extracted from the works of Elster and Hedström, this
section addresses the difficulties of putting the mechanistic agenda into practice.
Among the many challenges facing a mechanistic approach in sociology, three
main issues have been selected for discussion: first, and the one most urgently
calling for a solution, is the lack of consensus about the definition of social mech-
anisms; second, and closely related to the former, are the major hurdles that must
be overcome to arrive at such consensus about the nature of mechanisms; and
third, uncertainty about the appropriate way to identify, model, and test social
mechanisms. To examine these three groups of issues, both specific articles on
social mechanisms and reviews surveying the existing literature on social mech-
anisms will selectively be drawn upon where appropriate.
The selection of these topics for discussion reflects the fact that much of the
doubt cast on a mechanistic approach in sociology refers to the problematic char-
acterization of social mechanisms as existing phenomena, rather than to the po-
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tential advantages of mechanism-based research as a way to produce more robust
causal inferences, better explanations, and better theories. In other words, meta-
physical controversies about the nature of social mechanisms have prevented a
fruitful epistemological discussion about the type of theorizing and research that
can be developed based on a mechanistic perspective.
Lack of consensus about what social mechanisms are. Anyone acquainted with
the discussion on social mechanisms would readily agree that two of the most
notorious difficulties hindering the implementation of the mechanistic approach
in sociology are the widespread confusion about the definition of social mech-
anisms, and the resulting lack of rigor in employing the concept found in the
literature.
(i) Far from making a mechanistic approach appealing for sociological research,
the task of defining social mechanisms has proved to be rather self-defeating, so
that anyone following the discussion will wonder whether the concept has any
substance at all. As Mayntz (2004) remarks, “[...] a survey of the relevant empiri-
cal and methodological literature soon bogs down in a mire of loose talk and se-
mantic confusion about what ’mechanisms’ are” (p. 239). Some years later Brante
(2008) confirmed this view by adding, “There are already embarrassingly large
amounts of definitions, some of which even contradict one another” (p. 276). Af-
ter reviewing the literature on social mechanisms Gerring (2007) is more perni-
cious in his comments, suggesting the possibility that “[...] since ’mechanism’
means so many different things—often quite contradictory to one another—it
means nothing at all” (p. 178).
This precarious situation in defining social mechanisms is hardly improved by
the fact that central figures of the mechanistic approach, such as Elster and Hed-
ström, have changed their definition of mechanisms more than once. In other
words, it is not only the diversity of the many definitions of mechanisms so far
produced but also their individual instability that makes the issue particularly
worrisome. As a consequence of this definitional inflation and fluctuation there
are currently more definitions than authors writing on the subject. In his first
survey of the different definitions of social mechanisms in the social sciences (not
only sociology), Mahoney (2001) counted a total of 24 different formulations from
among 21 authors (see Mahoney, 2001, Table 1, pp. 579–80). In a later article,
Mahoney (2003) once again reviewed the definitions of social mechanisms in the
social sciences, but this time he grouped them according to their similarity, dis-
cerning a total of five different categories, some of which are barely comparable
with the rest. Likewise, some 4 years later, Gerring (2007) found that social mech-
anisms are referred to in at least nine different, though not mutually exclusive
ways. Most recently, Gross (2009) devised his own classification of the definitions
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of social mechanisms and like Mahoney, came up with five different categories.
Table 1.5 summarizes the categories to classify the definitions of social mech-
anisms suggested by these three authors and shows the considerable disparity
and diversity in the uses of this concept.23
Table 1.5: Social mechanisms: Different groups of definitions
Mahoney (2003) Gerring (2007) Gross (2009)





4. Unobserved entity that
generates outcome.
5. Other definitions.
1. Pathway or process by









5. Universal (i.e., highly
general) explanation.













nation for a causal
phenomenon.
1. Not necessarily observ-
ables structures or pro-
cesses.
2. Observable processes







Source: Mahoney (2001, Table 1, pp. 579–80); Gerring (2007, 177); Gross (2009, 360–2).
By the same token, and consonant with the diversity of definitions, there is al-
ready a long list of additional characteristics associated with social mechanisms.
As reviewed by the same three authors in the publications cited in Table 1.5,
23 In the case of Gerring (2007), categories 4 to 9 refer to mechanistic explanations or the mech-
anistic approach in general rather than to the definition of social mechanisms. To be sure, the
author is not to blame for this confusion; it simply reflects the tendency found in the sociolog-
ical literature to use the concept “social mechanism” indiscriminately to refer to mechanism
(an ontologically distinct phenomena), mechanistic explanation (an explanation using social
mechanisms to explain observed outcomes), and a mechanistic approach (the approach to sci-
ence promoting the search for mechanisms and the formulation of mechanistic explanations).
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mechanisms have been ascribed the most disparate attributes: they have been
depicted among other things as both observable and unobservable, deterministic
and probabilistic, macro and micro, hierarchical and non-hierarchical, reducible
and non-reducible to lower levels, action based and non-action-based, and refer-
ring to concrete phenomena in bounded contexts or representing universal phe-
nomena in a way similar to laws. Yet, if social mechanisms exist in the social
world, they obviously cannot display all these attributes at the same time, for
most of the pairs of attributes mentioned are mutually exclusive.
(ii) Aggravating this conceptual confusion, the diversity of views on social
mechanisms and their properties has been accompanied by a pervasive careless-
ness in the use of the concept. The lack of conceptual rigor found in the literature
on social mechanisms ranges from a more or less tolerable level of ambiguity
to an outright negligent use of the word. Just to mention one example of the
latter case, in his categorization of the social mechanisms underlying inequality,
Therborn (2006) defines mechanisms as “a kind of social interaction that yields a
certain distributive outcome” (p. 11). Having said that, on the page immediately
following this, he describes the first of these mechanisms, “distantiation,” as a
process that operates independent of interaction, interaction being the supposedly
constitutive feature of his definition of social mechanisms (pp. 11–2).
Apart from such acute cases of conceptual imprecision, which probably per-
tain to only a small group of publications, a second, more widespread lack of
rigor in employing the concept of social mechanism can be observed when so-
ciologists try to identify or formulate concrete instances of mechanisms. As an
example, when Tilly (2004) formulated his bundle of nine mechanisms “causing
boundary change” and “constituting boundary change,” he not starts from an
exceptionally obscure definition of mechanisms, which refers among other ele-
ments to the “transfer of energy among stipulated social entities” (p. 217), he also
fails to provide a detailed definition of these “boundary change” mechanisms, let
alone include any empirical evidence that differs from rather anecdotal remarks
proving their existence or illustrating their functioning.
Tilly himself is aware of this criticism and openly concedes that his bound-
ary mechanisms require further critical examination and empirical verification
(p. 216). His article, however, was published and is now part of the literature on
social mechanisms, adding to the general confusion surrounding the subject. In-
deed, and confirming how harmful the mindless use of the word “mechanism”
in published papers may be, Pickel (2006) adopted this disputable, if not merely
preliminary, terminology from Tilly and defines a new set of “mechanisms caus-
ing property transformation” and “mechanisms constituting property transfor-
mation” (p. 37), which he then uses to explain post-communist transformation
and globalization.
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In short, when sociologists try to define social mechanisms as distinct social
phenomena, they are evidently referring to something different. Although con-
ceptual diversity itself is not necessarily negative, the lack of an even minimal
consensus about the nature of social mechanisms and the careless use of the word
may seriously impair the prospects of a mechanistic approach in sociology.
Factors making a consensus about the nature of social mechanisms difficult.
The many attempts so far undertaken to define social mechanisms show how
difficult it is to arrive at a minimal consensus about some basic assumptions un-
derlying the concept. As Gross (2009, 364) observes, authors writing on social
mechanisms tend to avoid this minimal characterization of mechanisms, adopt-
ing rather abstract definitions without having to make any compromises about
the concrete nature of social mechanisms. To be sure, the task of formulating a
clear set of basic assumptions about social mechanisms is not a matter of philo-
sophical whim or a capricious obsession with metaphysical questions. Quite the
contrary; it responds to the logical necessity that only after having agreed upon
a common understanding of the core elements describing social mechanisms is it
possible to embark on the project of conducting mechanism-based research (Ger-
ring, 2007, 178).24
The difficulty of arriving at a minimal understanding of social mechanisms
seems to be the consequence of two features of the mechanistic approach: first,
the use of categories imported from the natural sciences, and second, the instru-
mentalization of the discussion on social mechanism as a way to put forward
personal theoretical agendas that merely reproduce old and known debates in
sociology without making any true contribution.
(i) Definitions of mechanisms frequently include ontological categories import-
ed from other scientific disciplines that are difficult to translate into sociology in a
meaningful way or without loss. This practice of borrowing categories that origi-
nally stemmed from other disciplines is hardly surprising for Gorski (2009, 166),
who sees in the appeal to mechanisms in sociology nothing more than indulgence
in a new form of scientism, one that has given up the search for laws as prescribed
by physics and has turned instead to contemporary biology and their successful
search for mechanism as the new role model to follow.
It is Hedström, who in his own work, most clearly exemplifies how problem-
atic it can be to transfer categories from biology to sociology. While he defends an
ontological individualism and defines mechanisms as a constellation of individ-
uals and actions, he does not resist the temptation to introduce in his definition
the categories of “entity” and “activity,” borrowed in a rather ad-hoc manner and
24 An attempt to spell out these core assumption about social mechanism is found in Sec-
tion 1.3.2.
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with no further justification from the works of Machamer et al. (2000), which orig-
inate from biology and neuroscience. What makes the smuggling of conceptual
contraband into sociology even more questionable, is Hedström’s silence as to
why it is necessary at all to endorse these concepts in order to understand social
mechanisms. In fact, as already mentioned above, he even leaves out “activities”
from his own definition of “elemental mechanisms,” characterizing them only in
terms of “entities” and giving the impression that his borrowed categories are
mere accessories to be disposed of if necessary.
(ii) Further exacerbating the lack of a set of core features describing the na-
ture of social mechanisms, the reception of mechanisms in sociology seems to be
permeated by individual efforts to put forward personal theoretical agendas not
necessarily bound to a general characterization of social mechanisms. This pro-
grammatic character of prominent contemporary views on social mechanisms in
sociology makes it difficult to disentangle the essence of social mechanisms from
other accessory assumptions reflecting individual theoretical or methodological
orientations. As an example, both Elster and Hedström equate the mechanistic
approach in sociology to methodological individualism. This must not necessar-
ily be the case; on the contrary, as Mayntz (2004, 246ff.) argues in her justification
of macro-level mechanisms, there may be corporate actors or structures whose
complexity makes it misleading, if not impossible, to reduce them to individ-
ual actions. Others, like Sawyer (2004), defend a middle position between indi-
vidualism and holism, which he calls “nonreductive individualism.” Although
Sawyer accepts (contrary to individualism) the existence of emergent proper-
ties with causal powers independent of individuals, he recognizes (contrary to
holism) that those emergent properties are not ontologically autonomous but still
composed of individuals; in other words, there is no primacy of individualism
over holism or vice versa (pp. 266–7).25
Still others, like many of the authors taking part in the essays collected by Hed-
ström and Swedberg (1998a), condition the viability of the mechanism approach
in sociology to some form of rational-choice theory. As an example, according to
Boudon (1998, 172–3), the only way to make mechanistic explanations final, that
is, to construct them in a way to avoid new unanswered questions or black boxes,
25 The irreducibility of some social phenomena to the level of individuals is, according to Sawyer
(2004, 266–9), due not only to emergence (higher-order properties not fully explicable by lower-
order properties), but also to supervenience (the relation of higher-order properties to specific
configurations of lower-order properties). In particular, two forms of supervenience are of rel-
evance: multiple realizability (same higher-order properties produced, each time, by disparate
combinations of lower-order properties, and wild disjunction (multiply realized lower-order
properties that are not systematically related and yet produce the same higher-order proper-
ties). In all cases in which higher-order phenomena cannot be reduced to lower-orders, they
possess equal causal efficacy as the one attributed to individual actions, or what Sawyer calls
supervenient causation (p. 269).
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is to resort to rational choice theory. This insistence on rational choice has been
so consistent that many critics associate the mechanistic approach with this very
particular theory of action (e. g., Abbott, 2007; Gorski, 2009). Not surprisingly,
others have made similar strong cases in combination with social mechanisms
for other theories of action. For instance, Hedström (2005, ch. 3) favors the DBO
theory and Gross (2009, 366–9) a pragmatist theory of action.
So it seems like the discussion on social mechanisms has been, perhaps inad-
vertently, instrumentalized to fight numerous theoretical struggles not directly
related to the mechanistic approach and, above all, not new in sociology.26 Fol-
lowing this line of thought, Norkus (2005, 351) has pointed out that the discussion
on mechanisms is but the mere reproduction of old debates in sociology and the
social sciences in general, a restatement of known theoretical and methodological
oppositions under a new “mechanistic talk.”27 This is particularly evident in the
discussion on individualism and holism, reductionism and hierarchies, and the-
ories of action, topics that can be traced back to the beginnings of the discipline
and are present in all major sociological works.28
In short, defining away the discussion on the nature of social mechanisms by
simple importing categories from other sciences will not do. Equally vain is the
conflation of particular theoretical preferences with the definition of mechanisms,
something which, at best, reduces the mechanistic approach to mere “mechanistic
talk” that has no substance at all (Norkus, 2005).
Uncertainty about identifying, modeling, and testing social mechanisms. The
ability to formulate mechanism-based explanations assumes that mechanisms
are known, representable in some intelligible way, and empirically testable. The
question thus arises: are there any methodological particularities that may be im-
portant to bear in mind in discovering, modeling, and testing mechanisms?
The mechanistic program in cell biology and neuroscience, as discussed in Sec-
tion 1.1, offers an instructive example of how these three stages of mechanism-
based research can be carried out.29 To begin with, and before starting with the
26 Still more theoretical and methodological oppositions in the mechanism debate in social sci-
ences are discussed in Gerring (2007).
27 Norkus makes this remark quoting the fractal theory of the evolution of scientific ideas pro-
posed by Abbott, according to which disciplinary struggles around new ideas unfold in way
that can be described as a “fractal distinction,” that is, the reproduction of existing opposi-
tions along the same lines but using a new terminology or simply extended to a new context
(Abbott, 2001, 10–15).
28 For a general review of methodological individualism in social sciences, see Udehn (2001); a
similar review on holism can be found in Phillips (1976).
29 The text here provides a deliberately oversimplified account of the issues of discovery, mod-
eling, and testing of mechanisms in neuroscience and cell biology and should be read merely
as an illustration of what are meant to be methods for mechanistic research. More detailed
discussions can be found in Bechtel (2006) and Craver (2007).
46 1.2 The sociological reception
modeling, scientists in these disciplines must first discover mechanisms. This is
usually done by observation and experimentation (Machamer, 2004, 28; Bechtel
& Abrahamsen, 2005, 435), which primarily consists of localizing and identifying
the constitutive parts of mechanisms (structural decomposition), their respective
functions (functional decomposition), the interaction of both parts and functions,
and the outcomes they produce (Glennan, 1996, 64; Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005,
432–6).
Once unveiled, the configuration of parts and functions, components and op-
erations, or entities and activities (depending on the definition used; see Ta-
ble 1.1 in the previous section) that constitute a mechanism can then be repre-
sented or modeled in three different ways (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005, 426ff.):
(i) using a linguistic or propositional description of how mechanisms function;
(ii) graphically representing parts, functions, and their interaction with the help
of diagrams;30 or (iii) recreating the system based on mathematical models and
computer simulations. After choosing an appropriate model to represent mech-
anisms, their functioning can then be tested, usually through experimentation
(Machamer et al., 2000, 17; Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005, 436–7), and the model
can then be corrected if necessary. Finally, as Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005, 436)
point out, testing hypotheses resulting from a mechanistic model is no different
from testing any other type of hypothesis, law-like or otherwise; it should follow
the same rules and avoid the same pitfalls of confirmation and falsification as it
is standard practice in science.
In sociology, these same three stages of mechanism-based research—identifica-
tion, modeling, and testing—may not work in as straightforward as they do cell-
biology and neuroscience. While the task of defining social mechanisms has re-
ceived the most attention in the sociological debate on mechanisms and mecha-
nistic explanation, methodological issues have, as Mayntz (2004, 256) puts it, been
“sadly neglected”.
(i) Identification. So far, the methods used in mechanism-related sociological
research are very diverse, and, in contrast to the natural sciences, usually non-
experimental. That experimentation is not that common in sociology has cer-
tainly nothing to do with social mechanisms in particular; rather, its rarity is a
consequence of the general difficulties and ethical restraints imposed on socio-
logical experiments by the very object of study. Moreover, social mechanisms,
30 As Machamer et al. (2000) remark, a diagrammatic representation of mechanisms is most com-
monly chosen. A diagram of a mechanism displays some setup or initial conditions, interme-
diate stages showing the functioning of the mechanism, and termination conditions indicating
the production of a certain output (pp. 8–13). Two types of mechanism diagrams may be dis-
tinguished: a mechanism schema or a complete model of the functioning of a mechanism based
on known properties and activities, and a mechanism sketch or a simplified and incomplete rep-
resentation of a mechanism that contain black boxes or unknown properties and activities yet
to be found (pp. 15–8).
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however defined, are far from those dissectible objects that Glennan (1996, 2002),
Machamer et al. (2000), Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005), and Craver (2007) work
with in their laboratories.
As to the diversity of methods associated with the identification of mecha-
nisms, nothing different could have been expected given the numerous approach-
es to social mechanisms that have been taken and the highly disparate fields in
which researchers are currently seeking such mechanisms. For instance, McAdam,
Tarrow, and Tilly (2008, 310–11) have recently worked out a battery of four dif-
ferent types of methods to measure the presence or absence of mechanisms in the
field of “contentious politics,” combining analytic tools that are both quantita-
tive (e. g., statistical analysis) and qualitative (e. g., field ethnographic methods).
Others like Steel (2004, 67–75) advocate “process tracing” as a qualitative way
to uncover causality and mechanisms by sorting out spurious from valid causes
and preparing the groundwork for statistical analysis. Still others, like Hedström
(2005, ch. 6), champion the use of agent-based modeling or computer simulations.
In keeping with Gerring (2007, 171–3) and his recent review of the methods
employed in mechanistic research in social sciences, the conclusion may be that
the search for social mechanisms does not call for, nor is necessarily bound to,
any particular methods beyond those quantitative and qualitative tools already
being used in those same research fields that are now turning to mechanism. This
should not imply that it is impossible or undesirable to develop methods tailored
to the discovery of social mechanisms; these, however, have not yet been devised.
(ii) Modeling. After the social mechanisms have been identified, the next step
is to represent their functioning, something on which the assumed definition of
social mechanisms has no bearing at all. Indeed, because of their generality, the
three alternatives discussed by Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005)—propositional or
linguistic descriptions, diagrammatic representations, and mathematical model-
ing combined with computer simulations—pretty much exhaust the possibilities
of modeling any of the approaches to mechanisms discussed in sociology. There
are, however, some differences among these three ways of representing mecha-
nisms that may be important to bear in mind. According to Bechtel and Abraham-
sen (2005, 428–32), diagrams are better suited than prepositional descriptions to
represent space, time, and the interconnectedness of various parts and functions
of mechanisms. In addition, diagrams are much more intuitive to grasp than
linguistic descriptions and thus advantageous for expositional reasons; they are,
nonetheless, static pictures unable to show the dynamics of the mechanism and
fairly limited when representing complex systems. Putting aside the possibility of
animating diagrams, which would allow them to depict movement, representing
both dynamics and complexity may be achieved most appropriately by means of
mathematical modeling and computer simulations.
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All this considered, diagrams may be preferable to linguistic descriptions to
represent social mechanisms, unless of course dynamics are relevant or complex-
ity is too high, in which case mathematical models and computer simulations
may be the right modeling strategy. This conclusion may seem trivial, since this
is what has already happened in sociology anyway: not only is the use of di-
agrams widespread, but some central figures in the discussion on social mech-
anisms, like Hedström, are making a plea for the use of computer simulations
(e. g., Hedström, 2005, ch. 6).31
(iii) Testing. The last step in mechanism-based research is testing. Here, as in the
natural sciences, the discussion can be keep short. In one word, there is no reason
why testing mechanisms may differ from testing any other causal hypotheses. A
model of a mechanism is simply a list of prepositions about social phenomena
and as such may be tested in exactly the same way as other theoretical preposi-
tions are usually tested.
To sum up this discussion on the methodological aspects of social mechanisms
it can be said that first, there is no reason to bind the identification of social mecha-
nisms to specific methodological tools; second, the best way to formally represent
mechanisms may be diagrammatically, although dynamics and complexity may
call for mathematical models and computer simulations; and third, the methods
used to test hypotheses about mechanisms are the same as those used to test any
other hypotheses. Thus, apparently, only the modeling of mechanisms poses an
additional methodological challenge; the other two stages of mechanism-based
research—identification and testing—seem to rely on the methodological prac-
tices already being used in sociology.
1.3 Taking stock: why and how mechanisms in
sociology?
After reading the foregoing section on the difficulties of introducing mechanisms
and mechanistic explanations into sociology, one may wonder about the perti-
nence of a mechanistic approach to the study of social phenomena in the face of
its current fundamental shortcomings: there is no consensus about what mech-
anisms are or what their distinguishing characteristics are; no specific methods
have been devised to identify or test them that differ from the ones already used
in sociology; a covert programmatic character of mechanistic theorizing seems
to be at work, furtively serving theoretical interests of particular authors and in-
advertently reproducing old debates. All these things considered, it is difficult
31 For a review of the past, present and prospects of computer simulations as a methodological
tool in sociology see Halpin (1999). See also Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of the present study for
examples of simulation-based modeling of social mechanisms.
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to disagree with Norkus (2005) in the suspicion that the mechanistic approach
to sociology has turned into innocuous “mechanistic talk,” barely accounting for
something substantially new to address the issues it has set out to solve.
In view of these criticisms, it may seem rather adventurous to blindly vindicate
the optimism shared by Elster, Hedström, and other champions of the mechanis-
tic approach about the novelty and advantages of social mechanisms and mecha-
nistic explanations in sociology . Instead, a more cautious position will be taken,
one that focuses on core, substantive aspects of the mechanistic approach that can
be safely defended irrespective of individual theoretical orientations. In the pro-
cess of presenting this position, the two questions raised at the beginning of this
chapter will be answered.
1.3.1 Which are the advantages of adopting a mechanistic
approach?
Let us recall the alleged advantages of a mechanistic perspective in sociology
as contended by Elster and Hedström: (i) making causal inference more reliable
by minimizing the risks of spurious correlations, confounders, and endogene-
ity; (ii) improving causal explanations and deepening our understanding of so-
cial phenomena by abandoning laws and making explanations more transparent;
and (iii) favoring interdisciplinary work, reducing theoretical fragmentation, and
overcoming empiricism and the search for grand theories by concentrating on
theories of some middle level of generality. In short, mechanisms and mechanis-
tic explanations may improve the quality of causal inference, explanation, and
theorizing in sociology.
As discussed in Section 1.1, the claims made based on the first of these alleged
advantages (i) are highly contested issues in the philosophy of science. A mech-
anistic theory of causation seems to be limited in scope and not clearly superior
to other ways of understanding causality, such as manipulation or counterfac-
tual theories. It is also unclear to what extent the use of mechanisms can solve
the problems of causal inference, making the risks of spurious correlations, con-
founders, and endogeneity disappear. After all, the search for mechanisms is as
exposed to the methodological pitfalls that attend correlational analysis as any
other attempt to uncover causality using statistical methods.
So leaving aside (i), the most plausible promises of the mechanistic approach
appear to be the alleged advantages (ii) and (iii), that is, respectively, providing
deeper explanations than those derived from law-based explanations, thereby
improving our understanding of phenomena, and making theory building in
sociology more productive and interdisciplinary by doing away with variable-
based sociology and the search for grand theories. However, without being clear
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about what a mechanistic approach exactly encompasses these promises are sim-
ply that, promises. This conclusion leads to the next question.
1.3.2 Which are the core elements of the mechanistic approach
and how should they be put into practice?
Perhaps the most effective way to protect the mechanistic approach from its critics
would be to show that beyond reproducing old debates, and on top of any partic-
ular assumptions made by different authors writing on social mechanisms, there
still is a core of elements that positively identify the mechanism-based agenda
and clearly distinguish it from other forms of theorizing and conducting socio-
logical research.
As I will argue next, after extensively reviewing the literature on mechanisms
and social mechanisms, there seem to be two alternative ways to characterize the
mechanistic approach in sociology in a distinctive and substantive fashion. The
first may be called a mechanistic approach without mechanisms and consists of
thinking about mechanism-based research as a ’style of theorizing’ committed to
some principles of how to conduct research and develop theory. Such a solution
is ‘without mechanisms’ because it is not necessary to define social mechanisms
beyond a loose metaphor. By contrast, and articulating those same principles, a
second alternative insists on the existence of social mechanisms, which implies
that a mechanistic approach be considered not simply a metaphor signaling the
commitment to some principles, but that social mechanisms be conceived of as
distinguishable and existing phenomena. In this latter case, the mechanistic ap-
proach is not just a style of theorizing but rather the consequence of taking seri-
ously the existence and prevalence of those very concrete parts of social reality,
namely the mechanisms, that call for a style of theorizing. Only this second alter-
native requires a definition of social mechanisms.
After the two alternative approaches to a mechanistic agenda in sociology have
been presented, a few words about the appropriate methodological tools to iden-
tify, model, and test social mechanisms will be offered before closing this chapter.
A mechanistic approach without mechanisms In his most recent publication,
and after having provided a total of three different definitions throughout his
works, Peter Hedström seems to have given up the whole project of defining so-
cial mechanisms. As though in despair, or simply realizing the philosophical dif-
ficulties that would have to be overcome in order to provide a positive account of
social mechanisms, he concludes by withdrawing into the safety of his analytical
sociology: “The key to future progress is the development of good exemplars of
analytical sociology rather than, say, engaging in debates about the proper defini-
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tion of mechanism” (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, 64). Surprising as it is that this
claim comes from the very champion of the mechanistic approach in sociology,
it shows how hopeless it seems to many, like Hedström himself, to find a quick
fix for the introduction of mechanisms into sociology. In addition to that, it also
confirms the suspicion that for Hedström the plea for mechanisms was nothing
more than a prelude to, and a subordinate concept in his analytical sociology.
This reticence to define social mechanisms can be understood only if we take
seriously Hedström’s final remark, which can be found in one of his first and
most quoted articles on mechanisms. There he contends that “[...] the essence of
the mechanisms approach is to be found in a special style of theorizing rather than
in any specific definition of what a social mechanism is” (Hedström & Swedberg,
1998b, p. 25; italics in original). To be sure, those principles Hedström is referring
to are his own principles of analytical sociology: middle-range puzzles as well
as action-based, abstract, and fine-grained explanations (Hedström & Swedberg,
1998b, 24–5). However, and irrespective of which principles are chosen, the idea
of conceiving the mechanistic approach to sociology as a “style of theorizing” is
a very clear statement. It resolves the confusion surrounding the definition of
social mechanisms. Indeed, according to this view, social mechanisms cannot be
defined simply because they are not a part of the social reality, they are not social
phenomena sui generis, but a metaphor used to designate the commitment to some
principles of conducting social research.
How can those principles be described without having to endorse Hedström’s
very particular approach to analytical sociology? As I argue next, the answer to
this question consists of a bundle of three principles: deeper causal explanations,
generative causality, and middle-range theorizing—all of which are implicit in the
discussion on social mechanisms and mechanistic explanations. Of these three,
only the first fully coincides with Hedström’s idea of fine-grained explanations.
The third one, middle-range theorizing, is partially compatible with Hedström’s
middle-range puzzles, but as will be seen, only partially. The second one, gener-
ative causality, is constitutive to the very idea of mechanism. To be clear what is
here meant by these three constitutive elements of a mechanistic perspective in
sociology, a short description of each will be provided, as follows.
(i) Causal explanations. The main thing driving the mechanistic approach to so-
ciology is the conviction that improving the quality of causal explanations is the
ultimate goal of sociology and the best way to deepen our understanding of so-
cial phenomena. This is to be achieved by formulating fine-grained explanations,
or explanations that explicitly show how phenomena come about. The opposite
of those explanations are “black boxes” or incomplete ways to explain these phe-
nomena.
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To be sure, explaining social phenomena is by no means the only possible ap-
proach to sociology. Reiss (2007, 171–3) is right when he criticizes the neglect
of other relevant goals of social science, such as prediction or description, when
promoting such narrow goals for sociology as improving causal explanations.
However, this emphasis found in the mechanistic approach should best be under-
stood, as Brante (2008) remarks, as ultimate and not as unique. The formulation of
deeper causal explanations leaves room for other important aspects of sociology,
like description or prediction.
Moreover, not only is it true that explanation must not necessarily be the goal
of sociology, but explaining itself need not be causal. Committing to causal expla-
nations puts the mechanistic approach nearer to the nomothetic, positivistic tradi-
tion in the social sciences, opposing it most directly to the ideographic, hermeneu-
tical (verstehende) approach but also to the teleological tradition of functionalism
(Bunge, 1997, 411–4).32 To say that the type of causal explanation championed
by the mechanistic approach is rather positivistic does not imply a full commit-
ment to other principles regarded as positivistic such as methodological monism
or the belief in the existence of laws of nature (von Wright, 1971, 9). In fact, the
mechanistic approach is fighting the positivistic or neopositivistic practice (as the
covering-law model is labeled) of using laws to explain social phenomena, ad-
vocating instead for deep, transparent, and fine-grained causal explanations that
show how social phenomena come about.
(ii) Generative causality. The commitment to transparent causal explanations
calls for a deeper understanding of causality. As discussed in Section 1.1 on
the philosophy of mechanisms, even though mechanisms are not wedded to a
specific theory of causation, they are consonant to a generative or productive un-
derstanding of causality that is diametrically opposed to Humean-type causation
(constant conjunction).33 In other words, according to the mechanistic approach,
cause and effect are not merely cojoined, as correlational analysis suggests; rather,
causes actively produce or effectively bring about their effects.
It is important to observe that a generative view of causation is defined without
making any reference to mechanisms. In particular, and as mentioned already
in Section 1.1, a generative view of causality is independent of a mechanistic
theory of causation, which claims that a cause produces an effect only through a
mechanism (cf. Glennan, 1996, 2002).
32 For a summary of the main traditions in social scientific explanations see von Wright (1971,
ch.1).
33 Goldthorpe (2001) offers a thorough justification of the advantages of generative causality
over alternative views on causation in sociology. For a short history of causality in sociological
research, see Abbott (1998). A comprehensive collection of articles surveying the most relevant
conceptions of causality in philosophy and science, in both the natural and the social sciences,
can be found in Beebee et al. (2009).
Chapter 1 Social mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in sociology 53
(iii) Middle-range theorizing. On top of causal explanation and generative causa-
tion, the mechanistic approach seems to advocate a type of theorizing that closely
resembles Merton’s idea of theories of the middle range. The reason for this affin-
ity to Merton is not because of the limited generality of mechanistic explanations,
as many argue, but rather because of their potential use as building blocks for
more general theories.
In his widely quoted article of 1949, Robert Merton (1965) defines middle-range
or special theories as those theoretical generalizations which are “intermediate to
general theories of social systems [...] and those detailed orderly descriptions
of particulars that are not generalized at all” (p. 39); moreover, they “enable us
to transcend the mock problem of a theoretical conflict between the nomothetic
and the idiothetic, between the general and the altogether particular, between
generalizing social theory and historicism” (p. 44).
Normally the references found in the literature on social mechanism about
middle-range theories stop here, suggesting that theories of middle range or lim-
ited scope of generalization are ends in themselves, making it undesirable to
move further in the direction of greater levels of abstraction or grand theories
(e. g., Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, 61). However, that is not quite the complete
story. Indeed, Merton’s criticism is not directed against grand theories per se, but
rather against prematurely attempting to produce such theories without having
provided the pertinent building blocks. For this preparatory work he envisions
middle-range theories arguing for “a developmental orientation” (p. 50), com-
pelling sociologists to “look [...] toward progressively comprehensive sociologi-
cal theory which [...] gradually consolidates theories of the middle range, so that
these become special cases of more general formulations” (p. 51). To fulfill this
task, middle-range theories must be compatible with different general theories
(p. 43). His conclusion is worth quoting in full:34
“Which shall have the greater share of our collective energies and resource:
the search for confirmed theories of the middle range or the search for an
all-inclusive conceptual scheme? I believe—and beliefs are of course noto-
riously subject to error—that theories of the middle range hold the largest
promise, provided that the search for them is coupled with a pervasive con-
cern with consolidating special theories into more general sets of concepts
and mutually consistent propositions” (Merton, 1965, 52, italics in original).
Hence Merton is not pleading solely for the search for special theories of middle
scope to replace the formulation of very general theories; instead, he is making a
case for the articulation of such grand theories based on middle-range theories.
34 All these quotes are needed, because it seems like many authors who refer to Merton when
discussing social mechanisms have omitted these very central passages, thus changing the
whole notion of middle-range theories to mean theories of narrow scope without any reference
to more general theories.
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It is not difficult to see how Merton’s criticism to the premature formulation
of grand theories resembles the criticism to the search for laws behind the mech-
anistic approach. It is also easy to imagine the role of mechanistic explanations
in Merton’s bottom-up strategy of theory building. Mechanism-based explana-
tions could be those special theories of limited scope compatible with different
general theories of society; they are indispensable to be used as building blocks,
articulating and gradually constructing those general theories.
In a nutshell, a mechanistic approach without mechanisms is nothing more than
the commitment to three core principles: transparent and deep causal explana-
tions, generative causality, and middle-range theorizing. To be sure, these ideas
existed before the mechanistic approach bundled them under a single name and
have been pursued in the past without any reference to social mechanisms.
A mechanistic approach based on mechanisms: a core definition of mechanisms.
Besides endorsing the principles mentioned, and Hedström’s opinion notwith-
standing, defining social mechanisms still is the logical, if not fundamental, first
step toward conducting mechanism-based research. Then, how can we explain
social phenomena and construct theories labeled “mechanistic” without commit-
ting to the existence of social mechanisms?
The need for a minimal consensus about the definition of social mechanisms
is justified by Gerring (2007), after thoroughly reviewing the literature on social
mechanisms, as follows: “[...] for general methodological purposes it is important
that a key word like mechanism be employed in a recognizable fashion. There
must be some degree of consensus; otherwise, the term serves to confuse, rather
than clarify, methodological issues—as has happened, arguably, over the past sev-
eral decades of this term’s ascendance” (p. 178). What Gerring pleads for is a
“core definition,” a common starting point about the nature of mechanisms from
which specific approaches or sub-types can eventually be derived or ‘branched
out’ by means of additional assumptions.
But, one may ask, how do we formulate a core definition of mechanisms with-
out making problematic ontological assumptions and, at the same, avoiding the
shortcomings of previous definitions in being unclear about their underlying on-
tology? In other words, how do we describe a social mechanism without referring
in any way to systems, processes, individual actions, or any other particular so-
cial ontology used in the literature to define social mechanisms and nonetheless
provide a clear account of the nature of social mechanisms? Simply adhering to
an existing definition of mechanism would certainly not do, since most of these
definitions seem to carry additional accessory assumptions that merely reflect the
theoretical or methodological preferences of the authors who advocate them.
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A pragmatic solution to this definitional problem was recently suggested by
Demetriou (2009). While his argument most directly refers to the branch of the
philosophy of science known as critical realism, the solution he suggests can be
restated in more general terms so as to be applied to the reception of mechanisms
in sociology as a whole.35 According to Demetriou (2009), two different research
programs may be developed around the notion of mechanisms as actual existing
phenomena from a philosophical, critical realist perspective (pp. 447–51): a strong
program with the goal of articulating a complete ontology of mechanisms and the
social world, and a weak program committed to explain concrete social phenom-
ena using mechanism-based models but refraining from any discussion about the
ontology of mechanisms as real phenomena.
Demetriou is suspicious of both programs. While he fears that a strong pro-
gram may compromise the credibility of any premature reference to social mech-
anisms if it takes too long to fully materialize, a weak program alone without
any clear ontology may most likely run astray of the very idea of the existence
of mechanisms. In view of this dilemma, he advocates for a pragmatic middle
course that reconciles the limitations of both the strong and the weak programs
(pp. 456–7). Accordingly, the strong program should be pursued and the formula-
tion of a complete ontology of the social world and of social mechanisms should
remain the chief goal of the mechanistic program, although the results will not be-
come evident right away; it is a long-run project. In the meantime, and oriented
by that long-term commitment to the articulation of social ontology that includes
mechanisms as a constitutive part, the weak program may further be advanced
to inform research and explain social phenomena in terms of a heuristic.36 Hence
social mechanisms can safely be used in a loose, heuristic way to explain social
phenomena until a full-fledged social ontology has been spelled out describing
their real nature.
It is not difficult to see how Demetriou’s solution can be extended beyond crit-
ical realism to solve the problem of defining social mechanisms in sociology. Tak-
ing sociology as a whole, the question is not how much mechanism-based re-
search can be conducted without a fully developed ontology of the social world
and of social mechanisms, but instead how can we make sense of mechanisms
given the diversity of competing social ontologies available—e. g., individuals
and their actions (Hedström, 2005), processes (Reskin, 2003), processes in sys-
tems (Bunge, 1997, 2004), parts of processes (Tilly, 2001), or entities in systems
(Gorski, 2009). For, taken as a whole, the problem of the mechanistic approach
in sociology is not the lack but rather the abundance of ontologies underlying so-
35 For a general overview of critical realism see Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, and Lawson (1998).
36 Following Kuorikoski (2009), a heuristic can be defined as “an informal method or rule of
thumb for how to carry out research in some loosely defined context” (p. 146).
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cial mechanisms. To be sure, the middle course traced by Demetriou for critical
realism still applies to each of the distinct social ontologies taken separately. Put
differently, to say that there are many ontologies does not exclude the possibility
that each of them is still underdeveloped, as Demetriou contends in the case of
critical realism.
The middle way charted by Demetriou as a critical realist approach to mecha-
nisms reconciled the lack of a clear ontology of mechanisms with their use as a
heuristic for explanatory purposes. This approach can be restated to apply to so-
ciology in general as follows. Since there is more than one ontology of the social
world and of social mechanisms, the possibility of reaching an agreement about
the nature of social mechanisms is remote; on the other hand, given that a weak
program alone, with no clear ontology, may run astray of the very idea of the ex-
istence of mechanisms, a middle course may be taken to find a core definition of
mechanisms that can be used irrespective of single ontologies. Accordingly, while
everyone is free to choose and develop any particular ontology of the social world
and of social mechanisms, a heuristic conception of social mechanisms is needed
that will inform research that is independent of ontological controversies or, by
the same token, research that is compatible with different social ontologies.
Understood in these terms, a heuristic definition of social mechanisms is not
merely a pragmatic solution to overcome the immature stage of any particular so-
cial ontology but a way to cope with the theoretical plurality of sociology without
having to give up the whole project of defining social mechanisms, as Hedström
has suggested with his mechanistic approach as a “style of theorizing.” Thus, the
question of whether mechanism are, for example, constellations of individuals
and their actions, processes, processes in systems, parts of processes, or any other
ontological category, must not be answered prior to introducing a heuristic defi-
nition of social mechanisms. Needless to say, as Demetriou (2009, 457) points out,
the strong program or formulation of an ontology of social mechanisms should
be pursued further and orient such a heuristic perspective until agreement con-
cerning an ontology has been achieved. The advantage of this strategy is that
mechanisms may continue to be used as a concept to inform and orient research
irrespective of the controversies over ontological issues.
But how should we define social mechanisms as a heuristic? For Demetriou
(2009), an “explanatory mechanism” is “the concatenation of (pertinent) outcomes,
[i.e.] the way the outcome combines with other outcomes to account for an ex-
planandum” (p. 458). In other words, a (model of a) mechanism is the combina-
tion of outcomes explaining some phenomenon. Demetriou’s definition is fairly
general, capturing some core characteristics of social mechanisms and displaying
some other desirable characteristics:
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• The exact nature of “outcomes” is indeterminate and deliberately ambigu-
ous. This makes it flexible enough to allow for different theoretical under-
pinnings and social ontologies and distinguishable enough to capture the
intuition about mechanisms.
• It avoids making problematic ontological assumptions. In fact, only one
ontological assumption is implied by this definition, namely that regular
phenomena exist that can be described as the result of the concatenation of
outcomes or mechanisms.
• The idea of concatenation captures two defining characteristics of social
mechanisms: they exhibit some extension in time and consist of more than
one intermediate step or more than one single outcome (Mayntz, 2004, 242;
Gross, 2009, 362).
• The principles underlying the inner workings of mechanisms must not be
defined. Demetriou accepts that outcomes constituting mechanisms may
be the result of other mechanisms. This distinction, however, may or may
not be of explanatory relevance and thus need not be spelled out in order
to identify a mechanism.
Demetriou does not mention any of the other characteristics that are usually at-
tributed to mechanisms as found in the literature on social mechanisms and dis-
cussed by critical realists themselves (Gorski, 2009). This is understandable not
only because he is mainly concerned with the use of mechanisms as a heuristic,
but also because he counts on the “strong program” yet to be completed to deliver
precisely that complete characterization of the nature of mechanisms. It is evi-
dent from this short discussion that without the orientation of a strong program,
that is, without some further substantive ontological premises about the nature
of mechanisms, an heuristic definition sounds vague and incomplete. However,
anyone who is not acquainted with any particular social ontology may under-
standably find such a heuristic definition too oversimplified to guide research. In
view of this plausible objection, a further question arises: is it possible to elabo-
rate on Demetriou’s heuristic definition in order to gain more substance without
losing generality or making problematic ontological assumptions? I believe it is.
Even if the different social ontologies used to describe mechanisms are not fully
compatible (e. g., Elster’s individualism and Bunge’s systemism), there may be
some very basic additional features attributable to mechanisms that are not at
odds with any particular ontological position on social phenomena yet help clar-
ify what is meant by this concept. Arguably, and after reviewing the literature on
social mechanisms, including summary articles, there are four core characteris-
tics of mechanisms that everyone seems to agree upon. (1) the idea that mecha-
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nisms produce an outcome; (2) the condition that mechanisms are recurrent, that
is, they produce that same outcome more than once; (3) their functioning is con-
tingent upon some initial conditions; and (4) they are robust despite changing
conditions. It is true that if these elements are added to Demetriou’s definition of
explanatory mechanisms, it could no longer be regarded as purely heuristic. In-
stead, the resulting definition would be a kind of ‘enriched heuristic,’ keeping its
generality and its compatibility with different ontologies of social phenomena but
at the same time including some minimal substantive ontological assumptions
about the nature of mechanisms that seem to be shared by most sociologists and
philosophers who have contributed to the debate on mechanisms and providing
a more precise characterization of the type of phenomena social mechanism are
supposed to be.
These four substantive characteristics of mechanisms mentioned are addressed
by Mayntz (2004) in her account of social mechanisms. She defines mechanisms
as “recurrent processes linking specified initial conditions and a specific out-
come,” or as “sequences of causally linked events that occur repeatedly in re-
ality if certain conditions are given” (p. 241). Compared with Demetriou’s heuris-
tic definition, Mayntz’s account of social mechanisms is more explicit about a
basic ontology of mechanisms (pp. 241–5). First, the idea that the mechanism
is producing the outcome, hence the notion of generative causality, is more evi-
dent. Second, mechanisms are characterized as recurrent phenomena; they are
not unique or contingent, but regularly occurring.37 Indeed, as others have al-
ready remarked, referring to mechanisms as unique sequences of events would
reduce them to “story-telling” (Elster, 2007, 21; Hedström & Swedberg, 1998b,
10). Third, Mayntz stresses that outcomes produced by a given mechanism are
contingent upon different initial conditions and other possible intervening causes
affecting the same outcome, including interactions with other mechanisms. This
implies, on the one hand, that the functioning of mechanisms cannot be sep-
arated from their initial conditions or other intervening factors. Contingency
in the functioning of mechanisms is an important difference between them and
laws. As Gorski (2009, 182) explains, mechanisms differ from laws not so much
in their generality, but rather in the variability of outcomes they produce as a
result of changing conditions and interaction with a complex reality. A logical
consequence of this argument is that in very simple or closed systems, where
conditions are stable and interaction with other factors is limited or otherwise
predictable, a mechanism would behave exactly as a law, always producing the
same outcomes. Fourth, and as a consequence of the previous point, contingency
poses a minimal stability assumption on the structure of a mechanism. Hence,
37 Demetriou (2009) also mentions this issue. However, these are properties of ‘real’ mechanisms
and should not be included in a heuristic definition. It fact, robustness is for him an empirical
question: “[...] the more such concatenations show regularity, the more reason we will have to
suspect that real mechanisms are involved” (p. 459).
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mechanisms not only preserve their structure in the face of changing conditions,
but also consistently bring about a certain outcome provided conditions remain
stable. Although Mayntz does not use any label to refer to this property, one
could think of it as robustness.
One may wonder about the advantage of elaborating on Demetriou’s definition
given Mayntz’s more substantive definition. After all, her description of the na-
ture of mechanisms seems to be everything that is needed to improve Demetriou’s
heuristic account of mechanisms. The reason not to adopt Mayntz’s definition is
fairly simple: she uses the concept of process, a specific social ontology, as part
of the definition. While loosely describing mechanisms as processes is intuitively
appealing and has already been done in the philosophy of science (e. g., Glennan,
2009, 323; Salmon, 1984), the concept of process may be far more complex than
Mayntz’s definition of “sequences of causally linked events” suggests (Rescher,
1996). Moreover, given that the chief goal of formulating a core definition of
mechanisms is precisely to avoid making compromises with any particular social
ontology, the inclusion of the concept of ‘process’ in the definition is likely to pre-
clude alternative ontologies that are not directly compatible with processes. In
other words, although it is entirely valid to use a process ontology to describe the
nature of social mechanisms, processes need not necessarily be included in a gen-
eral definition meant to be broad enough to accommodate different ontological
categories and not limited to any one of them.
By combining the convenient ambiguity of Demetriou’s heuristic definition
with the four core substantive ontological elements described in Mayntz’s work,
it is possible to formulate an enhanced core definition of social mechanism as
a robust and recurrent concatenation of outcomes that, given certain initial conditions,
causally produces the explanandum. This definition exhibits the following character-
istics:
1. Minimal ontological assumptions. While the definition is not strictly heuris-
tic, it makes only a few ontological assumptions that should not be at odds
with any particular social ontology. In addition to accepting the existence of
mechanisms as regular phenomena with some extension in time, the defini-
tion includes only four basic properties of mechanisms: generative causal-
ity, recurrence in time, dependence on initial conditions, and robustness to
these conditions. These four properties provide more substance about the
nature of mechanisms than a simple heuristic can.
2. Open-endedness. The idea of ‘concatenation of outcomes’ is deliberately am-
biguous and open to additional assumptions or interpretations. It may be
qualified as needed and used as place holder to be filled in or replaced with
further substantive categories or additional theoretical assumptions. As
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Gerring (2007) suggested, such general definitions can be “branched out”
to include additional, more specific attributes. In particular, the definition
can be elaborated in terms of regarding four different aspects:
(i) Exact nature of ‘outcomes’ and ‘concatenations of outcomes.’ Outcomes
may be understood as any constituent of sociologically relevant phe-
nomena thought to have any causal efficacy. This can vary depend-
ing on the theoretical preferences of researchers and may range from
somewhat psychological categories, such as desires or beliefs, to in-
dividuals and their actions, or even to holistic social entities or com-
ponents of processes or systems. Perennial controversies in sociol-
ogy regarding, for instance, theories of action or individualism versus
holism, are not addressed by the definition and must therefore be ad-
dressed in the form of additional assumptions. Accordingly, a concate-
nation of outcomes may be as diversely construed as structural config-
urations of individual actions (Hedström, 2005, 26), events changing
some set of relations (Tilly, 2001, 25–6), processes in systems (Bunge,
1997, 414), or related entities within a system (Gorski, 2009, 157–66),
just to mention a few of the different ontologies of social mechanisms
discussed so far in the literature.
(ii) Principles underlying the inner workings of mechanisms. Specifying the
principles governing the inner workings of mechanisms may require
resorting to laws (Elster, 1990, 7; Bunge, 2004, 196–7) or any other al-
ternative mechanically irreducible principle such as those discussed
in the philosophy of science (e. g., Machamer, 2004; Woodward, 2002).
Alternatively, the question about the inner functioning of mechanisms
can be assumed away by drawing upon discipline-specific stopping
rules of mechanistic decomposition (Hedström, 2005, 25–6).
(iii) Generality and stability of mechanisms. As it stands, the definition refers
to robust and recurrent concatenations of outcomes producing phe-
nomena. However, it is left open whether mechanisms are regarded
as immutable or have the ability to change and evolve in time, and
whether they are constrained to some spatial and temporal bound-
aries; in other words, the definition does not fix the temporal or spa-
tial boundaries in which the robustness and recurrence of mechanisms
hold true.38 Similarly, the definition does not indicate how abstract
and general or concrete and specific these concatenations of outcomes
may be construed.
38 Gorski (2009, 165–6), for example attributes to social mechanisms the properties of “mutabil-
ity,” or the capacity to change and evolve, and “time-space dependence,” or their historical
and geographical dependency.
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(iv) Additional attributes. Further properties attributed to social mecha-
nisms that are also not fixed by the definition include, among others,
observability, levels or hierarchies, and interactions between mecha-
nisms and between levels (Gerring, 2007; Gross, 2009; Hedström &
Ylikoski, 2010).
The advantages of such an open-ended definition are many. First, the defini-
tion reflects a minimal consensus on the nature and core elements of social mecha-
nisms, thus offering a solution to Gerring’s concern about making the concept dis-
tinguishable.39 Second, the reduced number of assumptions is compatible with
alternative social ontologies that currently focus on the nature of social mecha-
nisms as well as other theoretical issues already known in sociology such as lev-
els or theories of action. This in turn does justice only to theoretical pluralism,
allowing for a great degree of eclecticism, but also, in the spirit of middle-range
theorizing, opening the door for the accumulation of empirical evidence based
on mechanisms irrespective of particular theoretical orientations. Third, since the
definition is deliberately incomplete, it forces sociologists who make use of it to
be explicit about the additional theoretical assumptions they appeal to. In so do-
ing, it prevents the mechanistic approach to sociology from being associated with
inessential assumptions (e. g., methodological individualism or rational choice)
and forces authors committed to those additional assumptions to be transparent
about them.
Identifying, modeling, and testing social mechanisms. Beyond the definition
of social mechanisms, still other issues regarding the identification, modeling,
and testing of mechanisms must be addressed. However, and in order to keep
these last remarks brief, there is nothing much that can be said about mechanism-
based research that has not already been mentioned. The only particularities of
mechanisms-based research may be the use of diagrams or computer simulations
to represent mechanism. Aside from these two methodological particularities,
no ‘mechanism-based methods’ of research have as yet been devised (or may be
needed) that depart in any significant way from the methodological tools already
used in sociology for causal analysis and causal inference, including both quanti-
tative and qualitative methods.
39 Gerring (2007) has a suggestion of his own on how to define social mechanisms in a minimal
way. His definition is “the pathway or process by which an effect is produced or a purpose is
accomplished” (p. 178). Although the definition captures some of the intuition about mecha-




Based on the review of both the philosophical and the sociological literature on
mechanisms and mechanistic explanations, an essential difference between the
two disciplines in the way they deal with the subject becomes evident. While
philosophers are aware of and actively work to solve the deep metaphysical and
epistemological complexities of characterizing mechanisms as objects sui generis
that produce observed phenomena, some sociologist were quickly seduced by the
idea of a mechanistic approach, and without knowing much about its existence in
the social world, enthusiastically started preaching its virtues for solving various
methodological and theoretical issues. The advantages of such an approach, their
advocates allege, are many: resolving the pitfalls of causal inference; overcoming
black-box, law-based explanations and replacing them with deep, transparent,
fine-grained explanations; and making theorizing more productive than mind-
less variable-based sociology or fruitless efforts to formulate grand theories by
generating theories of narrow scope that reduce theoretical fragmentation and
encourage interdisciplinary work.
However, the initial enthusiasm toward mechanisms in sociology seems to
rest on a rather shaky foundation. The discussion has degenerated into vacu-
ous “mechanistic talk,” one that reproduces old theoretical and methodological
debates and serves individual programmatic interests without being conclusive
about the nature of the very phenomena it is trying to call attention to or the dis-
tinct character of the approach it is promoting. This is why the controversy sur-
rounding the definition of mechanisms is still far from settled. Most advocates
of mechanisms in sociology are sailing without a map, or rather are using an old
map to sail in uncharted waters: the definition of social mechanisms is chiefly
couched in terms of known jargon or along the lines of long-standing theoretical
oppositions in sociology. The paradoxical fact that widespread support for the
advantages of a mechanistic perspective coexist with equally widespread confu-
sion about the nature of social mechanisms best summarizes what the mechanistic
approach to sociology has become.
To be able to give credence to the promises of the mechanistic approach and
to justify the introduction of mechanisms into sociology, a clear characterization
of such a perspective is needed. The two alternatives devised in this chapter are
intended to give the mechanistic approach the substantive foundation it desper-
ately needs. The first alternative, a mechanistic approach without mechanisms, is
conceived as a ‘style of theorizing.’ According to this view, more than defining
mechanisms, the most crucial element of the mechanistic approach is the commit-
ment to deeper and more transparent causal explanations, generative causality,
and middle-range theorizing. The second alternative goes one step further by in-
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sisting that a mechanistic approach in sociology should be committed not only to
a ‘style of theorizing,’ but also to an ontology of social mechanisms. To this end,
an open-ended, minimal definition of social mechanisms, an ’enriched heuris-
tic,’ was provided. According to this definition, social mechanisms are robust
and recurrent concatenation of outcomes that, given certain initial conditions, causally
produces the explanandum. The mechanisms are attributed a core set of character-
istics—extension and recurrence in time, generative causality, and dependence
on and robustness to initial conditions—while at the same time leaving enough
room for further elaborations depending on the preferred social ontology. In the
present work, the second alternative is followed. Therefore, the challenges are
not only to define ‘closure’ in a way that complies with the principles of causal
explanations, generative causality, and middle-range theorizing, but also to iden-
tify those processes, that given initial conditions, causally bring about inequality
across contexts.

II. Defining social closure

Chapter 2
Weber’s definition of closure
The condition that is needed to use closure as a social mechanism to explain so-
cial inequality is conceptual clarity. The present chapter takes the first step in
this direction by reviewing Max Weber’s original definition of closure in its two
meanings as market closure and group closure.1 The next chapter will elaborate
on this concept, expanding the scope of closure while keeping its action-based
character intact.
Given the widespread use of the concept of closure in inequality research, one
could argue that discussing Weber’s definition is redundant. However, the op-
posite is the case. The popularity of the concept and its use in both theoretical
and empirical works have unfortunately been accompanied by conceptual inat-
tention. The problem, pointed out over 30 years ago by Giddens (1980, 887) in
a critical appraisal of the work of Parkin (1979), consists of ignoring the very
distinction drawn by Weber between the collective efforts to close markets by
excluding rivals from competition and the process of closing the group by erect-
ing boundaries against outsiders. Some, like Parkin, have done this knowingly,
claiming that market closure and group closure are the same processes (Parkin,
1980).2 Others, mainly those working with the concept empirically, appear to
have drawn selectively from Weber’s writings on closure, using one of the two
meanings of the word and ignoring the second meaning. For example, while
some use the concept to denote closing the market (e. g., Weeden, 2002), others
refer to closing the group (e. g., Brubaker, 1992; Macdonald, 1985), and still oth-
ers merge both phenomena into one term (e. g., Elliott, 2001; Tomaskovic-Devey,
1993b). This is the reason why revisiting Weber’s original definition is an impor-
tant first step to avert further conceptual confusion.
1 This chapter can be found as part of a working paper in Cardona (2013a).
2 In Parkin’s reply to Giddens’ critical assessment of his Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois
Critique (Giddens, 1980), Parkin concludes: “It simply does not make sense to say, as Giddens
does, that the attempt by one group to monopolize resources to the exclusion of another is a
separate phenomenon from group closure against outsiders. They are merely different ways
of saying the same thing” (Parkin, 1980, 892).
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To begin with, a short summary of Weber’s discussion on open and closed rela-
tionships will be provided (Weber, 1978, 43–6), in which the term closure is intro-
duced to refer to closing group boundaries (Section 2.1). Next, a widely quoted
fragment of his text on the economic relationships of organized groups will be
commented on (Weber, 1978, 339–48), in which he describes closure as strategic
collective efforts to neutralize competition, or market closure (Section 2.2). The
two meanings of the word are illustrated with an example taken from the history
of the professions (Section 2.3). The last two sections briefly discuss the possi-
ble interaction between group closure and market closure (Section 2.4) and some
translation slips between the original German version and the English version
are revealed (Section 2.5).3 The relationship between group closure and market
closure will be further explored in Chapter 4 using an agent-based model.
2.1 Group closure
A social relationship, regardless of whether it is communal or associative in
character, will be spoken of as “open” to outsiders if and insofar as its system
of order does not deny participation to anyone who wishes to join and is ac-
tually in a position to do so. A relationship will, on the other hand, be called
“closed” against outsiders so far as, according to its subjective meaning and
its binding rules, participation of certain persons is excluded, limited, or
subjected to conditions (Weber, 1978, 43).4
The process of closing a relationship, Weber adds, may be driven by tradition,
affectual bonds, or rational considerations.5 Thus, even if, for example, families,
erotic relationships, or economic groups all draw boundaries against outsiders,
the logic underlying the emergence of those boundaries varies. The numerous
motives for relationships to be closed or open (traditional, affectual, or rational)
combines with the wide range of collective phenomena subsumed by Weber un-
der his concept of relationship to produce a myriad of possible conditions of par-
ticipation (p. 45). At one end of the spectrum, formally constituted groups such
3 For the sake of precision and comparability, the English version of Weber’s works referred to
in the following pages (Weber, 1978) is the same as that used by Parkin (1979) and Murphy
(1988).
4 Sørensen (1983) uses this same notion of open and closed relationships to discuss what he calls
‘closed positions.’ Closed positions, such as jobs with tenure, are those to which individuals
have access only when the positions have been vacated by previous incumbents (p. 206). Al-
though Sørensen’s starting point is Weber’s passage on open and closed relationships, the two
definitions should not be confused. While Weber is referring to the emergence and permeabil-
ity of group boundaries, Sørensen is interested in positions in organizations and the dynamics
of vacancy chains in labor markets and educational systems.
5 While communal relationships (Vergemeinschaftung) refer to individuals held together by af-
fectual or traditional bonds, associative relationships (Vergesellschaftung) describe individuals
brought together by rational agreements or mutual consent (Weber, 1978, 40–2).
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as private clubs may screen new members through formal membership rules at-
tached to achieved or ascribed individual characteristics. At the other end, more
diffusely bounded groups might be found, such as “a party rally to which the
largest possible number has been urged to come” (p. 45).
In fact, closing a relationship in the Weberian sense, or, to use a more generic
word, closing a group can be understood as a special case of the more contem-
porary notion of ‘boundary making.’ As Lamont and Molnár (2002) summarize,
boundaries are not only drawn by clearly identifiable groups using formal or in-
formal membership rules to keep unwanted non-members at bay as in the Webe-
rian version; they might also be symbolic. Symbolic boundaries segregate indi-
viduals in diffusely defined categories, such as ethnicity or class, and are con-
stantly renegotiated through ever changing patterns of interaction within and
across boundaries.
2.2 Market closure
As well as in the discussion on group boundaries, Weber also uses the word ‘clo-
sure’ to designate the type of collective, exclusionary action practiced by groups
when pursuing common economic interests. Compared to the process of drawing
boundaries or group closure, which, Weber argues, might follow affectual, tradi-
tional, or rational motives, according to this second definition, ‘closure’ denotes
rationally driven, economically motivated collective behavior. He describes this
very particular form of economic action as follows:
One frequent economic determinant is the competition for a livelihood—offices,
clients and other remunerative opportunities. When the number of competi-
tors increases in relation to the profit span, the participants become inter-
ested in curbing competition. Usually one group of competitors takes some
externally identifiable characteristic of another group of (actual or potential)
competitors—race, language, religion, local or social origin, descent, resi-
dence, etc.—as a pretext for attempting their exclusion. It does not matter
which characteristic is chosen in the individual case: whatever suggests it-
self most easily is seized upon (Weber, 1978, 341-2).
Hence, groups practicing market closure as a strategy for accumulating resour-
ces and economic opportunities may avoid the uncertainties and difficulties of
becoming better competitors by redirecting their efforts to exclude adversaries
from the competition altogether. Not surprisingly, as Weber points out, the best
way to secure group-related preferential access to markets is by mobilizing the
support of the state. This is the case with successful professionalization projects
which grant a small circle of specialists, such as lawyers or doctors, the exclusive
right to offer specialized services. It also applies to trade protectionism driven by
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industry lobbying which excludes foreign competitors from domestic markets by
means of prohibitive tariffs and restrictive non-tariff regulations.
This is not to say, however, that neutralizing competition from a particular
group always requires the support of the state and the legal system. Exclud-
ing rival groups from the market can also be achieved through informal means
such as bad publicity, as in the case of western medical practitioners calling al-
ternative practitioners unscientific. It can also be done by other less subtle yet
highly effective means such as those used by the Sicilian mafia to protect the ter-
ritorial claims of their clients’ businesses from unwanted competition (Gambetta,
1996, ch. 8). In any case, the crucial precondition for market closure practices is
the existence of a group capable of collective action. To speak about closure prac-
tices of bounded groups not capable of concerted action would be to commit the
fallacy of “groupism” (Brubaker, 2004). As Brubaker (2004, ch. 1) warns, not all
groups or categorically bounded collectives, such as those defined along the lines
of ethnicity and religion, can be assumed to act concertedly the way professional
organizations or firms do when pursuing their common economic interests.
Although Weber provides some historical examples of market closure prac-
tices, such as professional organizations lobbying the state for the legal privilege
to offer their services, he does not discuss in any detail the outcome of such acts of
strategic exclusion of competitors. Complementing Weber’s definition of market
closure, two main outcomes can be expected to follow from a group acting col-
lectively to exclude rivals from the market. First, closing the market should, by
definition, lead to a new market situation where market participation is a func-
tion of group membership. To close a market is to change its allocation rules from
a free-for-all contest where the best contender wins, irrespective of group mem-
bership to an administered competition in which some groups but not others, and
certainly not all, have the privilege of participating. Second, and as consequence
of the first, closing a market, if done successfully, should translate into a process
of unequal accumulation of resources and economic opportunities favoring the
excluding party at the expense of those against whom exclusionary action was
directed. Market closure then produces both a closed market and intergroup in-
equality.
It is very important to note that Weber’s second definition of closure refers to
the act of collectively excluding competitors from the market and not to any of its
two outcomes—a closed market or intergroup inequality per se. It would be mis-
leading to assume that the mere existence of inequality in a market, for instance,
the observed dominant position of one group compared to other groups, should
always be attributed to closure practices, a confusion found in prominent works
such as Murphy’s theory of monopolization and exclusion (e. g., Murphy, 1988,
71–2). Just as a group may achieve a dominant position by disrupting compe-
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tition, acting against the market through concerted exclusionary action directed
against rival groups, it can also bring about the same result by being a better
competitor and playing by the rules (Weber, 1978, 936–7). The same caveat ap-
plies to closed markets. The existence of a monopoly benefiting a group should
not be taken at face value as evidence of market closure practices. Legally pro-
tected group monopolies may also result from broader societal processes which
are to a large extent unrelated to the economic interests of the group enjoying the
privilege. For example, even if the state passes laws to regulate certain occupa-
tional groups through exclusionary instruments such as licenses, the capacity of
professional groups to influence the state cannot always be assumed to be the cat-
alyst for such regulations (Adams, 2008). Moreover, a closed market might also
be the result of group-related discrimination, such as racism or sexism, where
categorically-biased cognitive rules of thumb and non-concerted collective action
are responsible for undermining the capacity of individuals to compete in the
market (Roscigno, Garcia, & Bobbitt-Zeher, 2007).
2.3 An example: Accountants in UK between 1957 and
1970
One of the many possible instances of group and market closure that can be cited
is a case study stemming from the history of professions.6 This study was con-
ducted by Walker and Shackleton (1998) and deals with the failed attempt of the
accountancy profession in UK to secure a state-sanctioned monopoly between
1957 and 1970. The main drive behind these efforts was to exclude unqualified
practitioners from the market through the creation of a unified professional body
whose members would hold a legal monopoly on the provision of accounting ser-
vices. For this purpose, proponents of the initiative agreed on two main strategies
(pp. 44ff.):
i) An umbrella organization was to be created to integrate competing profes-
sional bodies and offer standardized training for its members with clearly
defined entry requirements based on several criteria such as education and
training, work experience, employment status, location, and type of service.
Not all accountants were to be included in this unified organization, and
particularly not those regarded as lowering the standards of the profession.
6 The selection of this study was not entirely arbitrary. There are two good reasons for choosing
it: first, the literature on professions is one of the most prolific fields in sociology empirically
applying the concept of closure (see the Summary section, Table 0.1); and second, this particu-
lar case offers a clear example of both group closure and market closure practiced by the same
group.
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ii) With the support of the legislator, the members of this newly formed orga-
nization were to be granted a legal monopoly on accounting services. The
creation of competing accounting organizations in the future was to be pro-
hibited.
With i), accountants expected to unify their organization by setting training re-
quirements and by keeping out unqualified accountancy practitioners from their
group. This, however, would not have stopped non-members from offering ac-
counting services, or prevented the formation of new organizations claiming to
train and certify accountants. In other words, i) would simply have regulated
who could offer his or her services as a certified member of the new organiza-
tion of professional accountants. The market would have still remained formally
open to competitors offering accounting services and would also have allowed
clients to choose freely among alternative practitioners regardless of their creden-
tials. With ii), on the other hand, not only was the new organization to be made
exclusive, but, in addition, taking part in the market would have become the sole
privilege of its members. Had the law been introduced and effectively enforced,
accountants outside the new umbrella organization would not have been able
to offer their services. Even if achieving i) would have granted members of the
group the privileges of membership in a consolidated professional body, access to
the market could only have been closed after having successfully accomplished
ii).
It can easily be seen how each of these two strategies fits into the concepts of
group closure and market closure. While i) can be regarded as rationally driven
group closure, ii) is a prototypical case of attempts at closing the market. Al-
though, as it turned out, accountants did not succeed in convincing state agencies
of the benefits of their plan and abandoned their efforts before seeing any results,
the two intended strategies clearly show the difference between closing the group
through membership rules and closing the market by conditioning market par-
ticipation to group membership.
2.4 Is closing the market independent from closing
the group?
To draw a distinction between market closure and group closure is not to deny
that, under certain conditions, the two processes might respond to the same mo-
tives and reinforce each other. In cases where making the group more exclusive
responds to the same economic considerations pursued through market closure
practices, closing the group might correlate or even be consciously aligned with
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collective attempts to reduce competition from rival groups. Regarding this par-
ticular overlap of market closure with rationally driven group closure, Weber re-
marks:
If the participants [in a relationship] expect that the admission of others will
lead to an improvement of their situation, an improvement in degree, in
kind, in the security or the value of the satisfaction, their interest will be in
keeping the relationship open. If, on the other hand, their expectations are of
improving their position by monopolistic tactics, their interest is in a closed
relationship (Weber, 1978, 43).
Therefore, according to Weber, protecting or enhancing the privileges enjoyed
by a group might indeed be a reason to tighten group boundaries. Religious sects
or craft guilds closing their boundaries with the overt purpose of maintaining
ethical standards or protecting their monopolistic position in the market are two
examples given by Weber to illustrate rationally driven group closure (Weber,
1978, 45).
It would be tempting to conclude that when groups pursue their collective eco-
nomic interests, a combination of market and group closure leads to the most
favorable results. Market closure could be deployed to accelerate the accumula-
tion of resources and economic opportunities, while group closure could be used
to protect accumulated resources. As Weber observes, however, this combined
tactic is neither infallible nor always desirable. Instead, groups may oscillate be-
tween openness and exclusivity depending on their priorities (Weber, 1978, 45).
Keeping group boundaries open might well be necessary to expand the group’s
influence through the effect of sheer size. On the other hand, restricting the num-
ber of members through stronger boundaries becomes essential when the goal
is to keep or increase the value of privileges already accumulated. Hence, even
when group closure complements market closure in securing acquired privileges,
the very process of collective accumulation probably entails periods of expansion
and permeable group boundaries as well as periods of consolidation and tight
group boundaries.
2.5 Why were the two meanings of closure conflated
in the first place?
So far, the two meanings of the word ‘closure’ have been discussed and illustrated
with an historical example. Yet, despite the palpable differences between these
two phenomena, research and theorizing on closure tend to ignore the distinction.
Why is this so?
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There are at least three possible answers to this question. First, Weber’s readers
may be guilty of reading Economy and Society selectively, quoting the passages on
closure without being aware of the two meanings of the word. This also includes
instances in which, as mentioned by Parkin, they were aware of the two mean-
ings of the word but saw no point in differentiating between them. A second
possible explanation for this conceptual confusion is to blame the author, Max
Weber. In fact, he used the word ‘closure’—Schließung in German—in two differ-
ent contexts. As summarized above, in Weber’s original version of the text, the
word Schließung first appears under the heading “open and closed relationships”
(Weber, 1922, 23–5); once to describe the exclusion of outsiders from participating
in a group through membership rules (Schließung nach außen) and again to indi-
cate the exclusion of members from privileges within the group (Schließung nach
innen). In a later chapter, the word Schließung appears once more, this time as
part of the discussion on “open and closed economic relationships” (Weber, 1922,
201–3). But besides Weber and his readers, the third possibility is to blame the
translators of Weber’s original text. The slippery conceptual choice made by We-
ber when using the word ‘closure’ was further obscured by slight inconsistencies
in its translations into English.7 Thus, for instance, in one passage, what Weber
terms “Regulierung und Schließung” was translated as “regulation and exclusion”
(Schließung = exclusion), while “Reguliertheit und Geschlossenheit” became “regula-
tion and closure” (Geschlossenheit = closure). Yet, after introducing the translations
of the two terms, the text refers in a later passage to Schließung no longer as ‘ex-
clusion’ but as ‘closure.’8 As summarized in Table 2.1, while Schließung can mean
both ‘exclusion’ and ‘closure,’ the word ‘closure’ is used in the translation to refer
to both Schließung, the active act of ‘closing,’ and Geschlossenheit, which could be
translated as ‘closedness’ and describes the resulting state of being ‘closed.’
A more reasonable position is to attribute the confusion surrounding the con-
cept of ‘closure’ to the composite effect of readers’ inattention, multiplicity of
meanings in Weber’s original text, and small but consequential inconsistencies in
the English translation of the concept. The result is a word with not only two, but
even three meanings: the first two, as explained above, are genuine distinctions
drawn by Weber between closing the market and closing the group that can be
7 Again, this applies to the English translation of Weber’s Economy and Society by Guenther
Roth and Claus Wittich (Weber, 1978), the version usually quoted in subsequent discussions
on closure and the one used by Parkin (1979) and Murphy (1988).
8 The exact passages referred to here are the following, quoted in German and English, respec-
tively. (i) German:‘‘Das Maß und die Mittel der Regulierung und Schließung nach außen können
sehr verschieden sein, so daß der Übergang von Offenheit zu Reguliertheit und Geschlossenheit flüssig
ist” (Weber, 1922, 24). (i) English: “Both the extent and the methods of regulation and exclu-
sion in relation to outsiders may vary widely, so that the transition from a state of openness to
one of regulation and closure is gradual” (Weber, 1978, 45). (ii) German: “Motiv der Schließung
kann sein...” (Weber, 1922, 24). (ii) English: “The principal motives for closure of a relationship
are..” (Weber, 1978, 46).
Chapter 2 Weber’s definition of closure 75
Table 2.1: Different translations of the words Schließung and ‘closure’
Section in Economy and Society Original text and translations
Open and closed relationships
(Weber, 1922, 23-5; Weber, 1978, 43-6).
Schließung: closure, exclusion.
Geschlossenheit: closure.
Open and closed economic relationships
(Weber, 1922, 201-3; Weber, 1978, 341-3).
Schließung: closure.
traced back to the word Schließung. The third meaning was gained in translation
and refers to the outcome of a group closing its boundaries to outsiders, or inter-
nally for the distribution of privileges within the group. It is termed Geschlossen-
heit by Weber, meaning the state of being closed. The third meaning of closure,
artificially created in translation, must have been a challenge for readers of the
English version of the text who were confronted with the seemingly incompre-
hensible assertion that closure (Schließung; the act of closing) produces closure
(Geschlossenheit; the state of being closed).
To avoid any misunderstandings, Weber’s two forms of closure (Schließung)
can be easily distinguished by explicitly naming the object of the action of ‘clos-
ing,’ as has been done so far in the present chapter: group closure or the collective
exclusion of individuals from the group and market closure or the collective ex-
clusion of rival groups from competition. Furthermore, to improve the inaccurate
translation of the word Geschlossenheit (literally meaning ‘closedness’), the word
‘exclusivity,’ the adjective ‘closed’ or the expression ‘degree of closure’ might be
used instead. The level of exclusivity of a group or its degree of closure is noth-
ing more than the permeability of its boundaries to outsiders. If boundaries are
impenetrable, the group might be described as being ‘closed.’ Moreover, just as
group closure leads to group exclusivity or to a closed group, a market that is
only accessible to members of a certain group can be described as an exclusive
market, a closed market, or a market with a high degree of closure. Arbitrary as
it may seem, ‘exclusivity,’ ‘degree of closure,’ and being ‘closed’ appear to be dis-
tinct enough from ‘closure’ to reduce the risk of confusing the phenomena they
describe. More importantly, making this distinction allows us to refer separately
to the action of closing and the outcome or state following that action.
2.6 Summary
In revisiting Weber, two forms of closure were identified. Market closure denotes
collective action aimed at excluding rival groups from competition, and group
closure refers to groups drawing boundaries against outsiders. The acts of clos-
ing the market and closing the group (Schließung), which necessarily imply the
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existence of collective actors and agency, were in turn distinguished from their
outcomes: the mere existence of a closed market, or a market where allocation
is conditioned by group membership, and a closed group, or the mere existence
of membership rules. To refer to the latter, the concept of degree of closure was
introduced (Geschlossenheit). Table 2.2 summarizes the core aspects of Weber’s
definition of closure and its two meanings as group closure and market closure.
Four dimensions are compared: action, actors, motive of action, and outcome.
Table 2.2: Weber’s two meanings of closure
Group closure Market closure
Action Groups draw boundaries against
outsiders.
Groups influence resource alloca-
tion rules in a market to limit or
eliminate competition from rival
groups.
Actors Any group with clearly defined
boundaries and the capacity to
modify its membership rules.
Group capable of concerted collec-
tive action and the power to mod-
ify market allocation rules. The lat-
ter can also be effected indirectly
through a third party (e. g., the
state).
Motive Economic interests or also shared
values, tradition, and affectual
bonds.
Economic interests.
Outcome Exclusive group. Participation in
the group regulated by member-
ship rules.
Closed market. Market alloca-
tion conditioned by group mem-
bership.
Chapter 3
A new definition: closure as
exclusionary action
The popularity of the two meanings of the Weberian definition of closure in the
study of inequality has been counterproductive in keeping the concept explana-
tory. Attempts to fit the narrow Weberian definitions of group closure and market
closure to a larger set of theoretical propositions, as was the aim of the so-called
neo-Weberian theories of Parkin (1979) and Murphy (1988), or to accommodate
their meaning to a wider collection of empirical phenomena, as was sought by
Tilly (Tilly, 1998) and Roscigno (Roscigno, 2007; Roscigno, Garcia, & Bobbitt-
Zeher, 2007; Roscigno, Hodson, & Lopez, 2009; Roscigno, Karafin, & Tester, 2009;
Roscigno, Mong, et al., 2007), have put too much strain on the concept. In par-
ticular, the overstretching of the scope of closure has diverted much attention
from the importance of agency and the central role played by actors, motives,
and modes of interaction in explaining processes of collective accumulation of
advantage.
The goal of this chapter is therefore twofold. First, it briefly reviews the ex-
tensions of the Weberian concept of closure as found in the theoretical works of
Parkin and Murphy and in the empirically oriented contributions of Tilly and
Roscigno. Second, as a way of synthesis, a general definition of closure as ex-
clusionary action is offered that effectively extends the scope of the concept to
include related phenomena other than market and group closure while keeping
its action-based core intact.
Defining closure at the level of individual action is not just a matter of defini-
tional precision. Above all, it is an attempt to make the concept well-suited for
the study of intergroup inequality from a mechanistic perspective. As discussed
in Chapter 1, the common denominator in the debate on mechanisms, besides a
focus on casual explanation, generative causality, and middle-range theorizing,
has been the goal of identifying concatenated phenomena that are robust to given
initial conditions across contexts and levels of analysis. From this perspective,
and as will be argued below, closure can be understood as a ‘transformational
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mechanism’ (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, 59), a micro-macro link (Raub, Buskens,
& Van Assen, 2011) that causally connects exclusionary action at the level of in-
dividual or collective actors to processes of unequal accumulation of economic
resources and opportunities among groups or categories at the societal level.
In order to keep the argument as tractable as possible, the chapter has been
divided into three main sections. The first two sections deal with the modifica-
tions and extensions of the original Weberian formulation of closure that have
been suggested so far by sociologists. Section 3.1 summarizes the theoretical ef-
forts of Parkin and Murphy to expand the reach of the concept of closure, while
Section 3.2 turns to the mostly empirically oriented works of Tilly and Roscigno
and their attempts to make closure compatible with their findings. Section 3.3
offers a new definition of closure as exclusionary action. Forms of closure are
classified depending on the motives of the excluding party and the form of inter-
action involved. Examples of each form of closure taken from published works
are provided and commented. Further examples of closure in markets, families,
and networks are developed in the third part of this work (Chapters 4, 5 and 6).
3.1 The neo-Weberian conceptual expansion: Parkin
and Murphy
Two of the most influential neo-Weberian extensions to the concept of closure
have been advanced in the works of Parkin (1979) and Murphy (1988) (Manza,
1992). Rather than presenting a comprehensive review of their theories, I will
comment, briefly, Parkin’s and Murphy’s suggested modifications to the defini-
tion of closure.
3.1.1 Parkin: the role of unintended consequences
In his book Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique (Parkin, 1979), Parkin
embarks on the ambitious intellectual enterprise of revising Marxist class the-
ory by developing a comprehensive framework for the study of social inequality
(p. 42). For this purpose, he adopts and further elaborates Weber’s definition of
closure, which he describes as follows:1
[...] the attempt by one group to secure for itself a privileged position at the
expense of some other group through a process of subordination. That is to
say, it is a form of collective social action which, intentionally or otherwise,
gives rise to the social category of ineligibles or outsiders (p. 45).
1 To what extent Parkin’s efforts to build a general theory of stratification successful were is
not the main concern here. Others have already reviewed his work critically and extensively
(Barbalet, 1982; Giddens, 1980; Mackenzie, 1980; Roth, 1980).
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He complements his definition with the related concept of ‘usurpatory closure,’
or:
[...] that type of social closure mounted by a group in response to its outsider
status and the collective experiences of exclusion (p. 74).
To the extent that exclusionary and usurpatory forms of closure are collective
action (p. 108), Parkin’s definition closely resembles Weber’s: a collective actor
excludes outsiders from valued resources. Yet, despite the similarities, Parkin
introduces a novel element to the definition that goes beyond Weber’s original
formulation. He allows closure to emerge as an unintended consequence of col-
lective behavior, lifting the assumption that collective actors behave intentionally
with the purpose of excluding rivals. Thus, what Weber denotes as strategic col-
lective acts of exclusion from the group or the market is reframed by Parkin to
include any form of collective action that gives rise to marginalized groups, even
if only unintentionally.
3.1.2 Murphy: from explanation to mere description
In line with Parkin’s pretension to expand the scope of the concept, Murphy
(1988) stretches the meaning of closure even further (p. 38).2 As part of his theory
of exclusion and monopolization, two concepts that he uses as synonyms for clo-
sure in his works, Murphy introduces the notion of closure “rules,” “codes,” or
“forms,” which are nothing more than dimensions, such as gender or race, along
which exclusion occurs (ch. 4). In general, Murphy claims, the social structure of
any society can be understood as a combination of principal, derivative, and con-
tingent forms of exclusion or closure (pp. 70–2). If, for example, private property
is the principal form of exclusion in a given society (that is, groups are defined by
their control of or exclusion from private property), and if in addition, those in
possession of private property happen to constitute an ethnically homogeneous
collective, then ethnic discrimination could be regarded as deriving from the first,
principal form of closure. Gender, on the other hand, not being directly related to
private property in this hypothetical case, would be contingent upon the princi-
pal form.
Thus, by spelling out his analytical framework Murphy seems to forget about
collective action altogether and gives the concept a descriptive connotation, even
if his starting point remains Weber’s and Parkin’s action-based definition of clo-
sure. His own definition of closure can be inferred from different passages ex-
2 Murphy (1988) presents his previous articles published on the subject in various journals be-
tween 1983 and 1986 (Murphy, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986a, 1986b).
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plaining his theory (ch. 4, in particular). For instance, when describing “deriva-
tive forms of exclusion,” Murphy writes the following:
Derivative forms of exclusion can be formally written into law—as, for ex-
ample, when those who owe their power to the legal guarantees of private
property use that power to enact slavery laws and racial exclusion laws—but
usually, and increasingly, they are not. [...] much of the stratification of racial,
ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups in contemporary capitalist society
does not have a distinct legal basis of racist, ethnic, linguistic, or religious
discrimination. Rather it is based upon their differential historical accumula-
tion of private property (a differential itself having its origin in military con-
quest and migration) and upon resulting monopolization of opportunities in
the market through formation of networks, alliances, and the imposition of
the owners’ language and cultural assumptions concerning competence for
positions and careers (pp. 71-2).
According to this passage, derivative forms of closure are not what explain in-
equality among racial, ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups. Rather, closure
designates the mere existence of inequalities among groups that can be traced
back to other causes: the differential accumulation of property and market op-
portunities due to conquest and migration, differences in network formation, the
imposition of language, and the cultural assumptions of private property owners.
In other words, instead of keeping the definition of closure at the level of collec-
tive action, as groups acting against rivals to exclude them from accessing resour-
ces, Murphy simply redefines categorical inequality as closure and seeks its real
causes in other phenomena. This transforms the idea of closure from an action-
based explanans for group-related inequality into a static explanandum describ-
ing the existence of intergroup inequality.3 Accordingly, instead of looking first
for collective actors and their acts of exclusion, intentional or not, the whole em-
pirical enterprise is turned on its head: if resources and opportunities are found
to be unequally distributed among groups or categories, with some groups or
categories consistently being privileged and others remaining deprived, closure
is assumed to have occurred. This, of course, need not necessarily be the case.
Put briefly, the neo-Weberian modifications of the concept of closure led by
Parkin and Murphy left mixed results. First, and mostly due to Parkin, the con-
cept was extended to the unintended consequences of collective action. This is a
welcome extension of the concept because it provides additional analytical lever-
age for understanding processes of collective accumulation in which the motives
of action are not clearly exclusionary or simply not observable. Unintended forms
of closure are discussed further below. Second, however, and mostly due to Mur-
phy, the concept moved away from an action-based notion and was transformed
3 Manza (1992) already observed this shift in meaning away from explanation and towards de-
scription in the neo-Weberian reception of closure (see p. 288).
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into a mere reconceptualization of inequality as closure, a descriptive restatement
of the phenomenon to be explained. Thus, in terms of explanatory power, the
concept gained in breadth but lost in precision.
3.2 The demands of empirical research on the concept
of closure: Tilly and Roscigno
Aside from the efforts of Parkin and Murphy to give the concept of closure an
extended meaning, two further modifications of the concept have been brewed in
the empirical works of Charles Tilly (Tilly, 1998) and Vincent Roscigno (Roscigno,
2007; Roscigno, Garcia, & Bobbitt-Zeher, 2007; Roscigno, Hodson, & Lopez, 2009;
Roscigno, Karafin, & Tester, 2009; Roscigno, Mong, et al., 2007). In contrast to
the neo-Weberians, who were more interested in expanding the scope of the con-
cept to make it amenable to their theoretical agendas, Tilly and Roscigno were
compelled to modify Weber’s definition to cope with the demands posed by sub-
stantive empirical research on categorical inequality and discrimination.
3.2.1 Tilly’s relaxation of collective actors
In his ambitious book on social inequality (Tilly, 1998), Tilly sets out to under-
stand and explain categorical inequality in all its guises, including gender, ethnic,
and political inequality (p. 6).4 In spelling out his explanatory agenda, and as a
direct extension of Weber’s notion of closure, Tilly advocates two fundamental
changes in thinking about categorical inequality: relaxing the existence of clearly
defined groups and, as Parkin had already suggested years before, lifting the as-
sumption of intentional collective action.
According to Tilly, the creation and maintenance of categorical inequality is not
limited to the action of neatly demarcated groups such as firms or professional
organizations (p. 99). Instead, mechanisms generating inequality operate among
“[...] all sorts of well-bounded clusters of social relations in which occupants of at
least one position have the right to commit resources to activities reaching across
the boundary” (p. 9). Aside from formal organizations, which Weber suggested
would be the likely constitution of collective actors involved in closure (Weber,
1978, 342–3), Tilly’s “bounded networks” include loosely defined collectives such
as “corporate kin groups, households, religious sects, bands of mercenaries, and
many local communities” (p. 9–10). This flexibilization of the definition of col-
lective actor is further accompanied by a broader view of purposeful action in-
4 Laslett (2000), Morris (2000), and Wright (2000) provide a general review and discussion of
Tilly’s Durable Inequality (1998). The main theoretical propositions of the book are summarized
in Tilly (2000).
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volved in the creation of categorical inequality. Contrary to the Weberian version
of closure, in which deliberate exclusionary action drives collective accumulation
processes, Tilly makes a plea for freeing agency from the straitjacket of intention-
ality. In his view, inequality is created by the necessity of bounded networks to
solve organizational problems, such as the creation of a bureaucracy in a newly
created nation-state or the gendered division of labor inside firms (see ch. 5), and
not by the overt purpose of producing inequality.
From this general plea for a broader understanding of collective actors and
actions involved in the production of inequality, Tilly transforms the concept of
closure into the broader notion of ‘opportunity hoarding,’ which he defines as
follows:
When members of a categorically bounded network acquire access to a re-
source that is valuable, renewable, subject to monopoly, supportive of net-
work activities, and enhanced by the network’s modus operandi, network
members regularly hoard their access to resources, creating beliefs and prac-
tices that sustain their control (p. 91; see also p. 154).
According to Tilly, networks can be bounded along categorical lines, including
race, gender, schooling, professional training, and political affiliation (p. 155). Re-
sources may include both material resources, such as access to mineral deposits,
and nonmaterial resources such as shared knowledge, access to clients, or reliable
suppliers (p. 158). As can be taken from this definition, besides the conditions im-
posed on the characteristics of the network and the resources, opportunity hoard-
ing comprises two processes: (i) the accumulation of resources by network mem-
bers, and (ii) the protection of accumulated resources by the network through the
creation of beliefs and practices.
Is opportunity hoarding still closure in the Weberian sense? While opportu-
nity hoarding describes the dual process of collective accumulation and protec-
tion of resources in all its manifestations (Tilly, 1998, p. 91; see also p. 154),
Weber’s market closure and group closure designate concrete strategies followed
by collective actors to set in motion each of those two processes. Hence, acting
collectively to exclude rivals from competition (market closure) is but one possi-
ble strategy among others to collectively accumulate resources, just as excluding
outsiders from the group (group closure) is merely one way to keep control over
accumulated resources. However, according to Tilly’s definition of opportunity
hoarding the collective accumulation of resources can be achieved through means
other than market closure (e. g., market competition), just as the protection of con-
trolled resources can be accomplished by following strategies other than tight-
ening group boundaries through membership rules (e. g., ingroup information
sharing). While these other strategies, such as market competition or ingroup in-
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formation sharing, fall under the broader category of opportunity hoarding, they
go beyond the scope of Weber’s original definitions of market closure and group
closure. As a consequence, the concept of “opportunity hoarding” should not be
used as a synonym for the Weberian notion of closure because the latter can in
fact be subsumed and be understood as a special case of the former.
3.2.2 Roscigno’s emphasis on individual agency and interaction
Recent empirical work on discrimination led by Vincent Roscigno offers further
valuable insights into how Weber’s original concept of closure can be expanded
(Roscigno, 2007; Roscigno, Garcia, & Bobbitt-Zeher, 2007; Roscigno, Hodson, &
Lopez, 2009; Roscigno, Karafin, & Tester, 2009; Roscigno, Mong, et al., 2007). Al-
though discrimination is by no means a new subject in sociological research on
inequality, the data collected and analyzed by Roscigno and his collaborators cer-
tainly are. They consist of thousands of cases of racial and sex discrimination
in labor and housing markets brought to court in one U.S. state during a pe-
riod of 25 years.5 Putting aside the vivid results regarding the reality and con-
sequences of race and gender discrimination in housing and employment in the
U.S. as portrayed in legal disputes, what is relevant for the present discussion are
the theoretical lessons Roscigno draws from his data. As the hundreds of cases
studied illustrate, gender and race discrimination in employment and housing is
performed by individuals who, even if restrained by a specific institutional and
organizational setting and influenced by society-wide beliefs and stereotypes,
bring about an unequal distribution of privileges between groups at the place
of work and residence through their actions (Roscigno, Garcia, & Bobbitt-Zeher,
2007, 214–7). From this finding Roscigno concludes that closure
[...] also comes about, consciously and unconsciously within the context
of everyday interaction—interaction that, through language, symbolic acts,
and/or physical control or force, has as its aim status-hierarchy preserva-
tion and the various advantages/disadvantages it affords (Roscigno, Garcia,
& Bobbitt-Zeher, 2007, 8)
According to this view, individual acts of discrimination against certain out-
group members are enough to produce exclusion and set in motion a similar
process of collective accumulation of privileges favoring the excluding party as
described by Weber. Here, however, closure is not performed by economically
motivated collective actors or aimed at the strategic exclusion of rivals from the
5 Cases were obtained from the Civil Rights Commission of the state of Ohio (OCRC) and
amount to roughly 60,743 cases of employment discrimination and 3,941 cases of housing
discrimination related to gender and race between 1988 and 2003 (Roscigno, Garcia, & Bobbitt-
Zeher, 2007, 14ff).
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market. In contrast, it is practiced by individuals acting nonstrategically who
bring about inequality among groups unintentionally, just as Parkin and Tilly
point out in their works.
In conclusion, the works of Tilly and Roscigno, taken together, suggest two il-
luminating prescriptions on how to expand the concept of closure. First, actors
need not be clearly defined collectives; loosely bound groups and even individ-
uals are capable of excluding rivals from access to valued resources along cate-
gorical boundaries too. Second, and echoing Parkin, exclusionary behavior need
not be conscious or purposeful. Unintended action might be just as effective in
excluding other groups or individuals who belong to a category from accessing
valued resources.
3.3 Closure as exclusionary action
As discussed so far, attempts to stretch the concept of closure have brought both
losses (leaving out agency) and valuable new insights (lifting restrictive assump-
tions about agency). From these attempted revisions of the concept at least two
conclusions can be drawn. First, there is a significant discrepancy between the
narrowness of Weber’s original formulation of closure as market and group clo-
sure and the rather broad uses to which the concept has been put by neo-Weberians
and contemporary empirical researchers. Second, and as a consequence of the
first, fitting the narrow Weberian definition of closure to a larger set of theoretical
propositions and empirical phenomena has put too much strain on the concept
and has threatened to divest closure of much of its explanatory power, which
resides in its emphasis on agency.
A new definition of closure should profit from past efforts to modify the con-
cept by avoiding the pitfalls of reducing it to a description of inequality, while at
the same time being able to accommodate related phenomena in which loosely
defined collectives and even individuals acting non-strategically can bring about
the same outcomes as the collective actors described by Weber in his original
definition. In the following, such a definition of closure is proposed and illus-
trated with examples taken from existing published works and from the articles
belonging to this dissertation (see the Summary section, Table 0.1). In addition, a
‘closure space’ is introduced as a way to categorize different forms of closure and
to orient empirical research.
3.3.1 A general, action-based definition of closure
In order to expand the scope of closure while keeping the core of Weber’s def-
inition intact, the concept can be generalized in terms of I denote ‘exclusionary
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action.’ Irrespective of the type of actor, motives, and forms of interaction, clo-
sure as exclusionary action encompasses all forms of preferential or discriminatory
interactions and transactions among groups or categorically bounded individuals that ac-
crue or secure benefits to one group or category by excluding others, both intentionally
and unintentionally. Closure is ’exclusionary’ in its consequences and not nec-
essarily in its motives. Actors may be aware about the exclusionary character of
their actions and even pursue exclusionary goals consciously. Yet, the marginal-
ization of groups or categories of individuals from accessing desirable resources
and opportunities may also be brought about unintentionally. Thus, to assert that
interaction or transactions are preferential or discriminatory is a mere descrip-
tion of an action and not an assumption about consciously perceived motives of
the actor involved. At the same time, closure crucially depends on action, since
exclusion is brought about through individuals or groups acting to bring about
the marginalization of outgroups or members of other categories. In other words,
closure is not merely about the emergence of ‘outsiders’ as Parkin puts it, but
rather about acts of exclusion by a benefiting group or category of individuals
that actively, though not necessarily purposefully, carve out a gulf between them
and the rest in terms of access to valued resources. This new definition of closure
as exclusionary action incorporates Weber’s original concept of closure as prac-
ticed by a group acting intentionally to exclude rivals from valued resources as a
special case. In addition, it comprises exclusionary acts undertaken for motives
different than exclusion and by actors other than clearly defined collectives, in-
cluding individuals in categories such as gender or ethnicity. To avoid confusion
and to be able to subsume all previous definitions of closure under this new gen-
eral definition, a more detailed characterization of closure as exclusionary action
is provided in the following.
3.3.2 Forms of closure as exclusionary action: motives and forms
of interaction
Actor’s motives are a first dimension that can be used to further typify forms of
closure as exclusionary action. At one end of this dimension, intentional forms
of closure designate instances of exclusionary action in which the motive of ex-
cluding outsiders from accessing resources is explicit and consciously known by
the excluding party. This would be the case for collective actors, such as profes-
sional associations, that act strategically to exclude rivals from the market and
corresponds most directly to Weber’s original definition of closure. At the other
end, unintentional forms, refer to exclusionary action that is not undertaken with
the purpose of excluding a whole category of rivals from accessing resources but
instead emerges as an unintended consequence of individual or collective action.
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For example, individual short-sighted, categorically biased interactions hostile to
outgroups, as in the case of discrimination (Fiske, 1998), may be equally sufficient
to bring about unequal access to resources for whole categories of individuals
(e. g., ’men’) as if these actions were consciously carried out to bring about the
same outcome.
A further dimension besides motives to help characterize exclusionary action
is the form of interaction involved. Preferential or discriminatory interactions and
transactions between groups and individuals can be roughly divided into direct
and mediated. Direct forms of closure are face-to-face. They constitute imme-
diate interaction between the excluding and the excluded party, such as when
landlords ask higher rental prices from ethnic minorities, employers offer lower
salaries depending on the gender of the applicant, or parents give more atten-
tion to the firstborn than to other siblings. Actors involved in direct forms of
closure are individuals, even if some of them act as representatives of a collec-
tive actor, such as gatekeepers controlling entry to an organization. In contrast,
mediated forms of closure regulate direct exclusionary action through institutional
arrangements, including laws, which bring about the same result as direct forms
of closure without the necessity of repeated face-to-face interaction. Thus, instead
of individual landlords asking higher rental prices from ethnic minorities, laws
can be enacted that regulate housing markets in terms of ethnicity, such as those
observed in segregationist regimes like South Africa under apartheid. To some
extent, mediated forms of closure still require some degree of face-to-face inter-
action. This, however, is outsourced to a third party, such as police or judges, to
perform the same exclusionary act otherwise required by a direct form of closure.
When it comes to mediated form of closure, it is critical to note that in order
to classify as exclusionary action, institutional arrangements and laws regulating
closure have to originate in collective action carried on by the excluding party.
Failing to demonstrate the connection between mediated forms of closure and the
party that benefits from them would reduce the concept to a descriptive notion,
a mere characterization of institutional arrangements as benefiting or negatively
affecting the access to resources of groups or categories of people that ignores the
actions that led to those institutional arrangements in the first place. Rules ex-
ist that are exclusionary without necessarily constituting an instance of closure.
For example, age-specific enrollment rules such as those found in organizations
or activities structured around age have been demonstrated to be responsible for
the so-called ’relative age effect’ extensively documented in schools (Sprietsma,
2010) and competitive sports (Musch, 2001). The relative age effect refers to per-
formance gaps between older and younger children inside the same cohort that
can be traced back exclusively to being born closer to the cutoff date, which ex-
plains small but decisive differences in terms of physical and mental development
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at young ages. Thus, even if it is true that younger children in a given cohort tend
to fare worse than older children because of age-based enrollment rules, to call
these rules a mediated form of closure requires an additional condition: it is nec-
essary to show that older children, as a group or as members of the category de-
fined by their age, not only benefit from the rules, which they in fact do, but also
to show that they or someone acting on their behalf was actively involved in the
design and instauration of such particular membership rules, either consciously
with the purpose to benefit older children and exclude younger children or un-
consciously by pursuing other goals other than the exclusion of their younger
peers. Only after providing evidence for agency on the side of the ‘older chil-
dren,’ would the case for a mediated form of closure be credible. In other words,
mediated forms of closure substitute direct interaction and regulate exclusionary
action that would have otherwise been undertaken by the excluding party. They,
however, neither replace agency nor obviate the existence of an actor responsible
for exclusionary action, which by definition underlies all forms of closure, direct
and mediated alike.
It bears emphasizing that despite the differences between intentional and un-
intentional motives and between direct and mediated forms of interaction, all
types of exclusionary action bring about the same outcome: intergroup inequality.
In this sense, closure can be understood as a transformative mechanism, as de-
fined by Hedström and Ylikoski (2010). Exclusionary action translates individual
or group interactions at the microlevel into an unequal distribution of resources
among groups or categories of individuals at the societal level (Figure 3.1). Where
such unequal processes of collective accumulation, set in motion by exclusionary
action, endure, a persistently unequal distribution of economic resources and op-
portunities between groups or categories will necessarily emerge.
To repeat, closure should not be equated with the unequal process of accumu-
lation it engenders. The latter is an outcome of closure, one that can be brought
about by causes different from exclusionary action. For example, processes of
cumulative advantage that produce an unequal distribution of resources among
groups or categories of individuals in which no interaction or transactions among
groups take place and hence no exclusionary action is involved (DiPrete & Eirich,
2006) should not be confused with closure. Also, processes of self-selection into
occupations or place of residence can produce inequality in the form of segre-
gation patterns, such as men-dominated occupations or high-income neighbor-
hoods, which could be wrongly attributed to exclusionary action by men or high-
income individuals, respectively. Closure is interaction.











Figure 3.1: Closure as a transformative mechanism
3.3.3 Further examples
To complement the conceptual distinctions introduced so far, additional examples
of closure are listed and classified along the dimensions of intentional/unintentio-
nal motives and direct/mediated forms of interaction.6
Intentional forms. (i) The exclusion of competitors from the market is a proto-
typical intentional form of closure, practiced in both a direct and a mediated form
by collective actors. Of the many possible instances of market closure that can be
cited, the history of professions offers perhaps the most eloquent examples of con-
scious exclusionary action mediated by market regulations. Lawyers and medi-
cal doctors, but also related professions such as accountants or nurses, have been
shown to practice closure by mobilizing state control to protect their economic in-
terests in the form of licenses or other legal dispositions that restrain competition
(Macdonald, 1995). In those cases where professional bodies enjoy full autonomy
in regulating market entry, closure can even be tuned on short notice according to
the necessities of the profession. For example, as documented by Kidder (2004),
6 Refer to Tilly (1998) and Roscigno (2007) and their list of references for more examples of
exclusionary action.
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bar examination standards for lawyers in the US seem to have been modified sys-
tematically to control wage levels by organized lawyers according to perceived
oversupply of practitioners. To be sure, professional associations are not the
only interest groups trying to gain state support on their side. What professions
do can be subsumed under the more general processes of rent-seeking (Rowley,
1991) and regulatory capture (Dal Bo, 2006), two related phenomena studied by
economists, which encompass all efforts undertaken by interests groups to secure
rents or economic advantages by securing state-sanctioned monopolies or by tilt-
ing market regulation in their favor. A well-known and extensively documented
example is lobbying by agricultural producers of high-income countries to se-
cure subsidies and tariff protections that thwart participation by farmers from
low-income countries in international trade, one of the most blatant distortions
of global agricultural markets (Hoekman, 2004).
Exclusion from the market can also be effected through direct forms of exclu-
sionary action. The study by Hollenberg (2006) of integrated health care hospitals
in Canada demonstrate how biomedical practitioners exclude their alternative
medicine counterparts from fully treating patients in day-to-day interactions by
controlling patient charting, referrals, and access to diagnostic tests. Thus, even
if both groups of specialists are formally supposed to be on equal footing in of-
fering their services, which is the explicit aim of integrated health care centers,
biomedical practitioners manage to turn the playing field in their favor through
direct exclusionary action. Outside hospitals, excluding rivals from the market
can also be achieved directly through illegal means, as demonstrated by the Si-
cilian Mafia and the shady services they offer to their clients. Instead of lobbying
for a law that regulates the market in favor of one’s group, firms resort to intim-
idation and blackmailing with the help of Mafia henchmen to protect territorial
control over businesses by chasing away competitors from the market one at a
time (Gambetta, 1996, ch. 8). The effects on inequality of market and group clo-
sure are illustrated in Chapter 4 using an agent-based model of individual and
group competition in labor markets.
(ii) Exclusion from groups through membership rules is another common in-
tentional form of closure. Membership rules to enter formally constituted col-
lectives such as religious, political, educational, and productive organizations,
unions, and corporate groups, welfare states, or political multinational unions,
are explicitly exclusionary. They are erected with the overt purpose of adminis-
tering group privileges granted to members while at the same time keeping non-
members at bay. While formal membership rules are widespread, group member-
ship can also be regulated through direct forms of exclusionary action. Informal
groups, such as cliques, gangs, and other diffusely bounded groups constituted
around ethnicity, class, political views or any other salient and identity-defining
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category, constantly renegotiate membership through ever changing patterns of
interaction within and across boundaries (Lamont & Molnár, 2002).
(iii) Beyond markets and groups, intentional and direct forms of closure can
also be observed in the intergenerational transmission of resources in the family.
Parents transmit resources to their children not only passively through genes but
also actively through parental investments in the form of time, money, and atten-
tion devoted to their offspring. The fact that parents normally take care of their
own children and not the children of others is a pervasive, certainly not solely hu-
man, form of exclusionary action in the transmission of parental resources with
deep consequences for the production and reproduction of social inequality. The
family is, in fact, the single most important factor in explaining differences in
skill formation even after taking into account the compensating effect of schools
(Heckman, 2006). But exclusionary action takes place even within the family.
Resource allocation among siblings is not uniform. As research on siblings has
shown, children in the same family are not treated the same. The unequal allo-
cation of resources within the family, favoring boys over girls or first-born over
later-borns, explains at least to some extent diverging paths in educational and
occupational attainment among siblings (Conley, 2004).
Gender stereotypes and norms about birth order, or even consciously followed
parental preferences regarding these two dimensions, influence how parental
time, money, and attention are distributed among children (Osmanowski & Car-
dona, 2012). Similarly, class-specific motives of avoiding downward mobility and
the cumulative dynamics of skill growth may lead parents to treat children dif-
ferently according to their skills, thus likely generating persistent inequalities in
skills development over time (Cardona & Diewald, 2014). Finally, parents may
treat children differently without knowing it, through efficiency gains and returns
of scale to parental investments that favor first-borns over later-borns (Osman-
owski & Cardona, 2014). The effect of different forms of egalitarian and nonegali-
tarian parental allocation of resources within the family, intentional or otherwise,
on levels of skill inequality at the societal level both within and across generations
will be further explored in Chapter 5.
Unintentional forms. (i) Assortative network formation is perhaps the clearest
example of an unintentional, direct form of closure. Homophilous tie formation
in personal networks produces networks with high assortativity or positive net-
work autocorrelation. Assortativity in networks may result from socially homo-
geneous contexts, such as place of residence, job, or leisure activities (Feld, 1981),
that present individuals with a constrained opportunity structure for tie forma-
tion. Network autocorrelation can be also the result of individual discriminatory
preferences to form ties with others who share similar characteristics along the
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lines of age, sex, religion, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status (McPherson, Smith-
Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Whether opportunity or choice, the unintended conse-
quences of assortativity in personal networks are segregation and the accumula-
tion of both advantages and disadvantages in the form of access to information
and resources, as well as positive or negative feedback through peer effects, de-
pending on the characteristics of network members.7
In labor markets, network autocorrelation has proved to be decisive in find-
ing a job. Both the information obtained through personal networks and refer-
rals from network members are vital for successfully navigating labor markets
(Elliott, 2001; Fernandez, Castilla, & Moore, 2000; Ioannides & Loury, 2004; Stain-
back, 2009). Aside from information on jobs, research on social capital has doc-
umented similar effects of network autocorrelation along socioeconomic dimen-
sions on access to resources mobilized through personal networks, including both
instrumental and emotional social support (Lin, 2000).
Personal networks may also affect ego’s preferences, attitudes, and behavior
directly. Peer effects have been identified as critical factors in explaining both
positive and negative influence on individuals. Peer effects partially explain the
incidence and prevalence of unhealthy behavior, including smoking, alcohol in-
take, and eating habits (Smith & Christakis, 2008), as well as deviant behavior
such as delinquency (Baerveldt, Völker, & van Rossem, 2008), and suicide (Bear-
man & Moody, 2004). By the same token, positive emotions, such as happiness
(Fowler & Christakis, 2008), and positive performance feedback at school and uni-
versity (Sacerdote, 2011), or place of work (Moretti, 2004), are similarly channeled
through personal networks. Peer effects are present in multiple domains and may
be decisive even early in the life course, as suggested in Chapter 6 in an empiri-
cal analysis of the effect of proficiency of the language used in the kindergarten
on tie formation among preschool children and its possible impact on language
development.
(ii) In addition to network formation, some instances of exclusion from the mar-
ket may classify as unintentional forms of closure. Exclusionary action can have
an impact on the distribution of resources among groups or individuals in a cat-
egory by affecting their capacity to compete in a similar fashion as intentional
forms of closure such as professional licensing but without the conscious exclu-
sionary motives or the concerted action. In contexts where performance is eval-
uated by gatekeepers, such as schools and the work place, unconscious biases
have been shown to affect systematically the perceived competence or perceived
performance of individuals. For example, research on sex stereotypes in organi-
zations suggest that women’s performance tends to be judged more harshly than
7 For a general discussion of the effects of assortativity on inequality, see Bowles, Loury, and
Sethi (2010) and DiMaggio and Garip (2011, 2012).
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men’s (Ridgeway, 1997). In this case, women lose against their peers when it
comes to important transitions such as job promotions, for which performance
evaluations are critical, even if their real performance is equal or superior to
men. Again, to classify as closure, gatekeeper evaluation bias must be enacted
by members of the excluding category, the category that benefits, such as men as
occupants of privileged positions in organizations or teachers as members of the
middle class in schools.
In general, the question of whether direct or mediated forms of closure are in-
tentional or unintentional in their motives should remain empirical. This may
be particularly challenging in the case of intentional forms of closure, where an
explicit exclusionary motive is required. As has been argued by Reskin (2003),
in the context of ascriptive inequality in organizations, agents’ motives usually
remain concealed to the researcher. In those cases where motives remain unclear,
the temptation to assume intentional motives on the side of the group or category
that benefits should be avoided. Failing to do so would lead to speculative story-
telling about agency in which the privileged are regarded as an active agent con-
sciously conspiring against the excluded. Thus, for example, asserting that the
privileged position achieved by men relative to women in organizations is due
to the focused agenda of ‘men,’ consciously designed to outcompete ‘women’
(intentional form), would be fundamentally different from suggesting that dis-
parate discriminatory acts of individuals in gatekeeping positions systematically
deprive individual women of privileges within an organization even if only as an
unintended consequence of individual action. Similarly, arguing that immigrants
end up in low-paying jobs because locals have organized and strategically acted
to exclude them from better jobs collectively (intentional form) is not the same as
showing that the functioning of job information networks driven by homophily
in the creation of ties and ingroup bias in the transmission of information favors
individuals with contacts among those already holding better jobs (unintentional
form).
All in all, aside from differences in motives and forms of interaction, the distri-
bution of resources and opportunities among groups or categories of individuals
affected by exclusionary action, and hence the manifestations of intergroup in-
equality that closure produces, are multiple in nature. Based on the examples
listed above, closure may affect intergroup inequality in terms of
• Access to markets: right to buy/sell goods and services in a market
• Resources conferred by membership to states, organizations, communities,
or networks: civil rights and public goods, instrumental and expressive
support, prestige, know-how, jobs, information, positive behavioral/attitu-
dinal feedback.
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• Favorable performance evaluation: advancement in educational and pro-
ductive organizations.
• Parental resources: time, attention, financial resources.
3.3.4 The ‘closure space’
Given that the two dimensions of closure, intentional/unintentional and direct/
mediated, represent only ideal types of different motives and forms of interaction
expressed in a myriad of concrete exclusionary acts, a ‘closure space’ can be con-
ceived that accommodates all possible combinations of exclusionary action. The
space is two-dimensional; it links a continuum of forms of interaction on the y-
axis with a continuum of motives on the x-axis. Forms of interaction range from
direct to mediated, while motives span two extremes, purely intentional exclu-
sionary motives and entirely unintentional acts. Figure 3.2 depicts the closure
space thus defined, including the examples mentioned so far. Actors can range
from individuals in a category (e. g., gender or ethnicity) to organized collective
actors capable of concerted collective action (e. g., firms or professional organiza-
tions). How densely populated the closure space is, should be explored empiri-
cally.
Figure 3.2: The closure space
Note that phenomena that on the surface appear to be the same form of clo-
sure, may conceal different types of exclusionary action. For example, a landlord
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asking for higher rental prices from ethnic minorities might be either the prey of
statistical discrimination (unintentional forms) or an outright racist (intentional
forms). Similarly, laws to license professional practitioners, such as lawyers or
doctors, may result both from lobby by professional associations acting in their
own economic interest (intentional forms) or acting to protect the health of their
patients from shady practitioners (unintentional forms). In the latter case, even if
doctors are not involved in lobbying for the law with the sole purpose of increas-
ing their economic benefits by excluding rivals from competition, the fact that
the resulting regulation systematically grants them an economic advantage by
securing preferential access to the market (e. g. through licensing), should suffice
to consider those laws unintentional and mediated forms of exclusionary action
comparable to unconscious instances of individual discrimination.
With this new definition of closure as exclusionary action at hand to guide em-
pirical analysis and the ‘closure space’ to help classify different forms of closure,
the next three chapters illustrate in depth how closure brings about inequality.
Chapter 4 explores mediated forms of closure in labor markets, mostly inten-
tional, through membership rules and regulated labor markets. Chapters 5 and 6
turn to direct forms of closure, both intentional and unintentional, analyzing the
role of parental investment decisions on societal levels of skill inequality and the
impact of language homophily on friendship ties among preschool children and
their likely effect on inequalities in language development, respectively.
3.4 Summary
Interest in the concept of closure has come at a cost. The concept lost much of its
precision and explanatory power through modifications by neo-Weberians and
empirical inequality researchers. Extending the meaning of closure beyond col-
lective actors and intentional action without sacrificing its action-based core has
been the main goal of this chapter.
To avoid the risks of overstretching Weber’s original definition of the concept,
while acknowledging the complexity of the phenomenon it pretends to describe,
closure was generalized as exclusionary action. According to this new definition,
closure encompasses not only the concerted actions of groups to secure privi-
leges but entails all forms of preferential or discriminatory interactions and transactions
among groups or categorically bounded individuals that accrue or secure benefits to one
group or category by actively excluding others. Forms of exclusionary action were
spelled out along two dimensions: motives (intentional or unintentional) and
forms of interaction (direct or mediated). Accordingly, while closure is always
exclusionary in its consequences, it can be either intentional or unintentional in
its advantage-seeking exclusionary motives and either face-to-face or channeled
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through institutional or legal channels in its form of interaction.
Although this new definition of closure goes beyond Weber’s initial formula-
tion, it preserves its original action-based character while enlarging its scope in
the form of a transformational, micro-to-macro mechanism evident in multiple
domains. These multiple contexts where closure can be found include but are not
restricted to exclusion of competitors from the market through rent-seeking and
regulatory capture, exclusion from groups through membership rules, parental
investments and intrahousehold allocation of resources in the family, assortativ-
ity in network formation, and gatekeeper evaluation bias. As exclusionary action,
closure explains the emergence of intergroup inequality by connecting the ac-
tion realm, consisting of group and individual interaction and transactions, with
macro processes of collective accumulation of resources.






Closure in markets: closing the group
or the market?
The rise of income inequality seems to have become the common denomina-
tor in industrialized countries since the 1980s and in particular since the 1990s
(OECD, 2011). One of the most widely accepted explanations of the increased
wage disparities in labor markets, especially among economists, is the so-called
skill-biased technical change (SBTC). According to this thesis, the greater disper-
sion of income in industrialized economies is due to a shift in demand favoring
qualified over non-qualified workers, precipitated by technological advances in
agricultural, industrial, and services sectors alike (Berman, Bound, & Machin,
1997). Giving credence to this explanation are two additional phenomena also
documented in those same countries where income inequality has grown: job po-
larization, or the increase in demand at the top and at the bottom but not in the
middle of the skills distribution (Autor, Katz, & Kearney, 2008; Goos, Manning,
& Salomons, 2009), and a much more pronounced growth in wage inequality be-
tween occupations than within them (Mouw & Kalleberg, 2010).
For sociologists, however, SBTC is not the whole story. As argued by Weeden
and Grusky (2014), market failure in the form of rents, in particular those enjoyed
by occupational groups, explains some of the growing inequality found in labor
markets. According to this view, occupations are active collective actors who
strategically attempt to increase demand for their services and constrain supply
by controlling access to their ranks and regulating market entry, thus increasing
their earnings above what could have been expected in a free market (Weeden,
2002). In other words, inequality rises through the combined effect of market and
group closure as practiced by occupational groups.
In this chapter an agent-based simulation model (ABM) is designed and im-
plemented to illustrate how the combined dynamics of market closure and group
closure produce inequality.1 Computer-based simulation models are a powerful
and versatile method relatively underused in the social sciences as compared with
1 This chapter can be found as part of a working paper in Cardona (2013a).
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the physical and life sciences. Among the many uses of computer models to assist
social scientists—including explanation, prediction, experimentation, and policy
formulation (Grüne-Yanoff & Weirich, 2010)—theory development costs the least
and is relatively less controversial in a discipline still distrustful of the advantages
of computer simulation techniques. Instead of gaining theoretical insights th-
rough sheer introspection, computer-based simulations applied to theory devel-
opment provide the option of running virtual thought experiments to extensively
explore the internal consistency and hidden complex implications of interacting
theoretical premises. Simulation is then, as some have argued, a third symbol
system available to scientists for formulating theories in addition to mathemat-
ics and natural language and an ideal tool for theory development (Hanneman,
Collins, & Mordt, 1995; Ostrom, 1988). Of the various existing simulation tech-
niques such as microsimulation, system dynamics, or cellular automata, agent-
based models (ABM) stand out as the preferred choice when simulated entities
are thought to be heterogeneous, embedded in an environment, and expected
to interact autonomously to reproduce nonlinear and out-of-equilibrium system
dynamics (Gilbert, 2008). These properties, combined with increasing comput-
ing power, object-oriented programming, and advances in distributed artificial
intelligence, have given ABM the edge in the vibrant and rapidly growing field
of social computational modeling (Gilbert, 2008; Miller & Page, 2007; Squazzoni,
2012).
In the simulation developed in this chapter, a simplified labor market for pro-
fessional services is assumed. The model represents an stylized labor market in
which individuals compete for group membership and groups compete for mar-
ket share by closing group boundaries and attempting to close the market in their
favor. The purpose of the simulation is not to model realistically how individu-
als and groups compete in a particular market. Instead, the goal is to conduct a
virtual experiment based on the theoretical premises implicit in the definition of
closure and to explore how they interact to bring about inequality under simpli-
fied assumptions. Perhaps most importantly, the model reconstructs the causal
paths through which the mechanism of closure operates in markets to produce
inequality. Two main modeling decisions underlie the simulation:
i) While allocation in markets for professional services can be affected both
by self-employed practitioners who administer the conditions under which
services are offered as well as by employers who hire those professionals as
salaried labor, only the latter case was chosen for the simulation as it sepa-
rates more clearly supply from demand on the one hand, and distinguishes
between group and market closure on the other. In labor markets for pro-
fessional services, professional groups (demand) can open and close their
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group boundaries independently from hiring decisions by employers (sup-
ply), who in turn can decide independently from group closure to close the
market by favoring one group over the rest in the hiring process (Haupt,
2012).
ii) Although inequality in labor markets is usually measured at the level of in-
dividuals—higher pay, shorter working hours, more stable jobs—the sim-
ulation focuses on differences between groups. In particular, it is assumed
that groups compete for market share by attracting skilled workers in a
market niche where the number of jobs is fixed and where worker skills are
influenced by group average skills, a form of peer effects that is similar to
the one discussed in Chapter 6 for friendship networks among preschool
children and for language development. Thus, high intergroup inequality
is reached if a group dominates the market by hoarding workers with high
skills while at the same time preventing workers with low skills from enter-
ing the group.
Additional model assumptions and their implementation in the model are ex-
plained below.
Building on the discussion about the two meanings of the Weberian definition
of closure in Chapter 2, this chapter starts by spelling out four distinct causal
paths that may lead to inequality among groups in a market for professional ser-
vices (Section 4.1). Next, Section 4.2 presents the design and implementation of
the simulation, while Section 4.3 presents the experimental design. Results are
discussed in Section 4.4.
4.1 Individual and group competition: four causal
paths
Implied in the Weberian notion of closure is the idea that competition for eco-
nomic resources and opportunities can take the form of individuals going up
against each other in a free-for-all market or of groups acting strategically by
tightening their boundaries or attempting to exclude competitors with the pur-
pose of raising the market success of its members. Abstracting from these dynam-
ics of individual and group competition, four causal paths connecting individuals
and groups to intergroup inequality can be spelled out.
i) Pure individual competition. The definition of closure suggests that without
group intervention in the free flow of the market, those best suited for com-
petition end up better off than others not equally well equipped. Hence, the
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first causal path connects individual attributes to market outcomes directly,
independently of group membership.
ii) Individual competition through group membership. The definition of group clo-
sure implies the possibility that groups confer advantages to their mem-
bers which enhance their capacity to compete for resources. If belonging
to a group furthers individual market chances by improving their market-
relevant attributes, for example, by having access to group-specific exper-
tise, then group membership may be causally connected to market out-
comes. Individuals still compete against each other in the market but they
also compete for group membership. This competition for group access
makes other attributes (not those necessary to be successful in the market)
equally important. Thus, gender, age, ethnicity, or any other individual trait
may indirectly affect market success insofar as these condition access to a
group that increases individual market opportunities, even if taken alone
those attributes do not affect market performance.
iii) Group competition through group closure. Intimately related to the latter, when
groups have an impact on individual outcomes, they may act strategically
by modifying their boundaries to enhance accumulated advantages by mem-
bers. This is the case with rationally driven group closure. Membership
rules are enacted and group advantages protected from outsiders. Groups
that are more successful in protecting valued resources and opportunities
will prevail in competition. Yet, even if groups compete to protect their
assets, their advantage still depends on the attributes of their members. If
group members fail in the market as individual competitors - for example, if
the expertise hoarded by a professional group is no longer advantageous in
the eyes of clients - group closure in itself cannot do much to curve market
outcomes in favor of its members.
iv) Pure group competition through market closure. A fourth causal path draws
a direct line between group membership and market outcomes, bypassing
individual attributes. In a closed market, group affiliation exerts an inde-
pendent effect on market access, hampering allocation rules based solely
on individual attributes. If a group completely closes a market for itself,
individual competition might still exist but only for members of the group
that closed the market. All other potential contenders are not allowed to
compete.
Needless to say, these four causal paths are mere analytical distinctions dis-
tilled from the very particular scenario depicted by the Weberian concept of clo-
sure where individuals and groups compete against each other with the sole pur-
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pose of securing economic advantages. In the following, it will be shown using
a simple ABM how these four mechanisms, individually or in combination, are
sufficient to produce comparable levels of inequality among groups.
4.2 Model description
ODD stands for Overview, Design concepts and Details. It is a standard proto-
col developed by agent-based modelers in the field of ecology to overcome the
difficulties of documenting, communicating, and replicating simulation models,
which so far have mostly lacked standardized guidelines (Grimm et al., 2006,
2010). The purpose of the ODD protocol is to provide readers with the necessary
general information to understand any simulation model as well as detailed tech-
nical information to replicate it in later independent simulation studies. Since its
publication and subsequent update, the protocol has gradually won adepts not
only among ABM modelers in ecology but also in other disciplines, including the
social sciences (Janssen, Alessa, Barton, Bergin, & Lee, 2008).
Reading the “overview” section should be enough to get a general idea of the
model. If readers are interested in understanding the inner workings of the model
and how each process was designed and implemented, going through the “de-
sign concepts” and “details” sections is indispensable. Otherwise, these sections
can be skipped.
4.2.1 Overview
Purpose. The purpose of the model is to illustrate how individual competition,
group closure, and market closure separately or in combination are causally suf-
ficient to produce inter-group inequality. The model does not attempt to realis-
tically replicate any empirically observable system, but instead aims at revealing
the distinct causal paths by which each of these processes affect the distribution
of resources among groups. It simulates a simplified labor market with different
degrees of market and group closure. Individual workers compete for a fixed
number of jobs offered by a unique employer by choosing group membership,
while groups compete for market share by closing or opening their boundaries
and letting in more or fewer workers with different skill levels. The degree of
market closure is given exogenously and benefits only one group.
Entities, State Variables, and Scales. The simulated market consists of three
types of agents: workers, groups, and an employer. The only scale the model
has is time, which is defined on a positive discrete scale starting at t=0. Since the
time scale serves only to coordinate the decisions of the employer, workers, and
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groups, its exact meaning is irrelevant. States variables and scales are summa-
rized in Table 4.1
• Hiring decisions are made by a unique employer. There are three state vari-
ables: a fixed number of available jobs, group-specific hiring probabilities,
and a hiring bias coefficient, which captures the degree to which a market
is closed by modifying hiring probabilities of workers belonging to a par-
ticular group. The hiring bias coefficient is activated by default at t=1 and
favors one group only.
• Workers belong to a particular group. They possess observable skills and
a binary employment status (employed/unemployed). Workers’ skills im-
prove as a function of the average group skills of the group they belong to.
There are no wages.
• Group size, potential size growth, market share, average skills, and em-
ployment rate are group-level auxiliary variables computed from worker
variables. Market share differences are the main indicator of intergroup in-
equality. As agents, groups have only one state variable, a protection/expan-
sion coefficient that indicates the group’s preference for present and future
market share. The coefficient is used to compute the degree of group closure
in the form of an exclusivity factor or the probability that a group rejects a
new member.
Table 4.1: State and auxiliary variables
Agents State Variables Auxiliary Variables
Employer Number of jobs (demand)





Number of workers (supply)






Process Overview and Scheduling. Time t is discrete. Each t can be divided into
three stages: before hiring, hiring, and after hiring. Before hiring, workers take
Chapter 4 Closure in markets: closing the group or the market? 105
actions aimed at enhancing their market chances in t. During hiring, the employer
hires workers. After hiring, groups adapt to the resulting market conditions by
closing or opening their boundaries and prepare for t+1.
• Before hiring: At the beginning of each t, workers observe their own em-
ployment status and, if unemployed, they move to a group with a higher
employment rate. A group’s degree of closure determines whether these
attempts are successful. If unemployed workers fail to enter the new group
because of a high degree of group closure, they stay in their current group
until t+1. Only after all workers have had the chance to move to a new
group do groups compute their average skills, group size, and potential
size growth. Workers then update their skills as a function of group aver-
age skills. Finally, groups update their average skills.
• Hiring:The employer observes the updated distribution of skills after some
unemployed workers have moved to a new group and, given a certain de-
gree of market closure, hires workers until the fixed number of jobs de-
manded is reached. All workers are hired again at each t.
• After hiring: Given the new distribution of employed and unemployed work-
ers, groups update their market share and employment rate. They also de-
cide whether to open or close their boundaries by modifying their exclusiv-
ity factor, which determines the probability of a worker being rejected when
attempting to enter the group at t+1.
At the end of each t, time is increased by one unit and market share inequality
is computed. The sequence of processes can be summarized as follows:
(Before hiring)
1. Workers [simultaneously]: Change group.
2. Groups [simultaneously]: Compute group size, average skills, and potential
size growth.
3. Workers [simultaneously]: Update skills as a function of group average
skills.
4. Groups [simultaneously]: Update group average skills.
(Hiring)
5. Employer: Hire workers.
(After Hiring)
6. Groups [simultaneously]: Compute group market share and employment
rate.
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7. Groups [simultaneously]: Close/open group.
8. Increase time by one unit. Compute market share inequality.
4.2.2 Design concepts
Basic principles. The basic processes modeled are pure individual competition,
individual competition through group membership, and group competition th-
rough group closure under varying degrees of market closure. Implicit in these
processes are four basic premises:
i) Individual attributes are of importance for the allocation of resources (pure
individual competition). Skills determine access to jobs.
ii) When a group offer advantages to its members, individuals have an in-
centive to enter the group (individual competition through group member-
ship). Workers skills grow as a function of group average skills.
iii) Groups have an incentive to close their boundaries to protect the resources
held by their members (group competition through group closure). Work-
ers with low skills are left out of the group.
iv) Groups benefit from closing the market and excluding rival groups from
competition (pure group competition through market closure). All workers
in one group benefit from higher hiring probabilities.
In the model, individuals compete for jobs either directly by offering their skills
to the employer or indirectly by choosing group membership and benefiting from
future skill upgrades. In the case of group closure, the model concentrates on
strategic boundary making driven by shared economic interests, operationalized
as behavioral rules which are sensitive to market share and potential size growth,
depending on the preferences of the group for present or future market share.
No other motives for group closure are modeled. Market closure is not explic-
itly modeled as a collective action. Instead, only the effect of closing the market,
namely the degree of market closure (Geschlossenheit), and not the process itself
(Schließung) was implemented as a simplification of pure group competition th-
rough market closure. As discussed in Chapter 2, strategically closing a market
to favor one’s group requires some form of concerted action aimed at modify-
ing the allocation rules of the market (e. g., the employer), which in turn pre-
supposes a direct intervention of the state or other entity capable of regulating
market transactions. Developing an explicit model for market closure that takes
into account these complexities exceeds the analytical simplicity sought with the
present model and therefore this was not implemented.
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Emergence. Intergroup inequality is the most interesting emergent property of
the model and is a direct result of the combined effect of individual and group
competition. Differences in market share are the clearest indicator of inequality.
The higher the difference, the higher intergroup inequality will be (see Index of
market share inequality in the Submodels on page 113).
Adaptation. Unemployed workers adapt to market conditions by moving to a
group with a higher employment rate. At the same time, groups adapt to market
conditions by opening or closing group boundaries in an attempt to protect or
increase market share in the next period by keeping workers with lower skills at
bay. To do so, they have to decide between tightening group boundaries, which
protects group average skills and secures current market share, or making bound-
aries more permeable, which increases group size and may secure a larger por-
tion of the market in the longer term at the cost of lowering average skill levels
in the short run. Whether protection of accumulated resources or expansion is
preferred depends on the group’s protection/expansion coefficient as well as on
their current market share and potential size growth. By contrast, since the de-
gree of market closure is exogenous and fixed at t=1, it is insensitive to market
conditions. All decisions in the model are rule based and involve no costs.
Objectives. Neither workers nor groups have an explicit objective function to
maximize. However, both groups’ and workers’ rule-based adaptive behavior
assumes an implicit objective. Groups strive to increase their market share, while
workers aim at increasing the probability of getting a job. Adaptive behavior is
heuristic and does not guarantee obtaining the expected results.
Prediction. A form of prediction is implied by the behavioral rules that groups
and workers follow to adapt to market conditions. When a group closes its
boundaries, it behaves as if it knew that by doing so the level of skills, and with
it its market share, will be safeguarded against new members with low skills in
the future. Similarly, when a group opens its boundaries, it acts as if it could fore-
see the higher market share that could be achieved later if the group grew in size
by admitting new members. By the same token, unemployed workers move to
groups with a higher employment rate as if they could estimate the probability of
getting a job in t+1. This predictive behavior is, again, ruled based and does not
follow from the maximization of any explicit objective function.
Sensing. The model assumes a market with perfect information. Sensing is
global and information is observed without error. The employer observes the
skills of all workers. Workers observe their own skills and employment rates of
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all groups. Groups observe their average skills, group size, market share, and
total number of workers in the market.
Interaction. Individual and group competition for jobs is the main form of in-
teraction in the model. Competition is not direct but mediated. In the case of
workers, they compete against each other for jobs and for group membership.
Job competition is mediated by the employer, who has the power to change the
employment status of workers. Group membership competition is in turn medi-
ated by groups and their decision to accept or reject new group members based
on their exclusivity factor. Similarly, group competition does not involve a di-
rect interaction among groups. Rather, it is mediated by the degree of group and
market closure. When closing boundaries, groups compete for workers and their
skills by modifying their exclusivity factor, depending on market conditions, par-
ticularly market share and potential size growth. Group competition is further
mediated by the size of the employer’s hiring bias coefficient. If the coefficient is
high, a group may secure an advantage in hiring for all their members on top of
skill level, and thus gain a decisive edge over rival groups.
Stochasticity. Random numbers are used to generate agents’ heterogeneity. Work-
ers’ skills are random in order to avoid creating intergroup inequality from the
outset and to allow for differences in market share among groups to emerge from
the adaptive strategies of agents. The protection/expansion coefficient of each
group is also randomized. This makes the model less predictable and makes it
possible to explore the dynamics of individual competition under different pro-
tection/expansion tendencies of groups.
Collectives. Groups are both a collection of workers and a type of agent in the
model.
Observation. A dataset with average values of key variables for each model
variation, design point, experimental run, and time period is produced (see Ex-
perimental Design on page 114 below). In addition to the parameters of each
design point, including number of groups, unemployment rate, and hiring bias
coefficient, the dataset reports average protection/exclusion coefficients and ex-
clusivity factors of the top percentile of groups ranked according to their employ-
ment rate. The maximum group size in each period and the main output variable,
the index of inequality in market share, are also reported.
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4.2.3 Details
Initialization. Time starts at 0. The model was initialized with 30 unemployed
workers in each group. The exclusivity factor was initialized with the value of
1 to prevent workers from changing group in t=1 when all workers are still un-
employed. The hiring probability for each group was set to 1 divided by the
number of groups. The hiring bias coefficient at t=0 is 0. Hence, without mar-
ket closure, members of all groups have the same probability of being hired. A
log-normal distribution with identical parameters for each equally sized group
is used to generate workers’ initial skill level. There are two reasons why a log-
normal distribution is suitable for representing workers’ skills. First, all values of
a log-normal distribution are positive, something than cannot be guaranteed with
a normal distribution. And second, the skewness and right tail of the resulting
skill distribution resembles observed income distributions in real labor markets.2
Skills are redrawn every simulation run. The speed of skill growth, which is con-
trolled by a constant C or skill growth modifier (see Section 4.2.4 below), was
set at a low arbitrary level of 1% to avoid explosive skill growth. Similarly, to
prevent all unemployed workers rushing to the group with the highest employ-
ment rate, they choose randomly among the top 20% of the distribution of group
employment rate. Initialization values are summarized in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Initialization of key parameters
Parameter Value
Constants
Workers per group (supply) 30
C (skill growth modifier) 0.01





Hiring probability 1/number of groups




(one distribution for each group)
Log-normal distribution (un-
derlying normal distribution
with µ =; σ = 0.2).
Protection/expansion coefficients
(one value for each group)
Uniform continuous distribu-
tion; range: see factorial de-
sign.
2 See Limpert, Stahel, and Abbt (2001) for a discussion of these and more properties of log-
normal distributions.
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Input data. No external data was used to initialize the simulation.
4.2.4 Submodels
For each of the processes listed above in the model description, the exact agent
behavior is explained below.
Change group (workers). After hiring takes place, some workers remain unem-
ployed. Faced with unemployment, workers have to choose between remaining
in their current group and profiting from the skills of their fellow workers, or
changing to a new group and profiting from them instead. To avoid complicated
calculations of the probability of getting a job as a member of any group at t+1
given observed group average skills and hiring probabilities at t, workers make
their decision to change groups based on a simple heuristic followed simultane-
ously by all unemployed workers (synchronous updating). Unemployed workers
move to one randomly chosen group from the top x percent of the group employ-
ment rate distribution. All things equal, the observed group employment rate at
t is the best indicator of the probability of getting a job as a member of a given
group at t+1. However, not all things are equal. Given that workers’ own skill
level affects group average skills, changing group in this way involves a sizable
amount of uncertainty. Even if all workers observe the same group employment
rate distribution before changing groups, the number of workers actually mov-
ing to a new group and the resulting modified group skills are unknown to each
worker. Moreover, they are also unaware of how many workers are in fact ac-
cepted in the new group and hence cannot accurately predict their skills level
after workers have been reshuffled. Whether workers changing groups are re-
jected by the new group depends on the group’s exclusivity factor or probability
of rejection. This is operationalized for every attempted change of group as a
unique trial drawn from a binomial distribution with p = exclusivity factor.
Compute group variables (groups). At each t, group size (S), potential size grow-
th (SP), market share (M), average skills (KAvg), and employment rate (E) of a




































Update skills (workers). Workers i in each group g update their skills (K) as a
function of groups’ average skills according to equation 4.6.
Kgi,t = K
g




Without the inclusion of a simple mechanism to update workers’ skills, the re-
sults of the simulation would be trivial. Given that the employer hires workers
with the highest skills and that skills are randomly distributed among individuals
and groups, not allowing skills to be modified would mean workers on the upper
area of the skill distribution would tend to remain employed until the end of the
simulation. The same result would be achieved if skill growth is a linear function
of actual skill growth: the higher the skill level, the faster the skill growth. The
solution is to allow skills to grow as a function of group average skills but cor-
rect for actual skill level. As given by equation 4.6, the skills of workers below
group average grow faster than those above group average. Multiplying group
average skills by 2 prevents growth from becoming negative for workers with
above-average skills. The constant C or skill growth modifier controls how fast
or slowly skills grow within the group.
Hire workers (employer). Hiring is an iterative process. The employer observes
the updated distribution of skills after unemployed workers have moved to a
new group and puts them in descending order. He then hires workers one at
a time by setting their employment status to employed starting from the worker
with the highest skill level down the distribution of skills until the fixed number
of jobs demanded is reached. It is assumed that at each t, all workers are ac-
tively looking for a job, regardless of market conditions and employment history.
This implies that before hiring, the employment status of all workers is set to un-
employed. Although in principle all members of a given group enjoy the same
probability PH = 1/(number of groups) of being hired, those at the end of the
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queue are less likely to get the job since the probability that vacancies remain un-
filled falls with each hiring iteration. The decision of hiring is operationalized as
a unique trial drawn from a binomial distribution with p = group’s hiring proba-
bility (PH). Hiring decisions are, without hiring bias, ‘group blind.’ However, if
the degree of market closure is greater than 0, the hiring probability PH of the one
group favored by market closure is modified upwards by a hiring bias coefficient







H + BH · (1− 1N ) if group benefits from market closure,
PgH − BH · 1N if not
(4.7)
The hiring bias coefficient (BH), takes values between 0 (open market with
equal hiring probabilities for each group) and 1 (closed market with hiring prob-
ability of 1 for one group and 0 for all others). Note that since 1/N is the initial
hiring probability, what equation 4.7 does is to modify the hiring probability of
each group, either bringing it closer to 1 (first if condition) or closer to 0 (second
if condition). The magnitude of the modification in both cases is a percentage of
the distance between actual hiring probability and 1 or 0, respectively. As shown
in Table 4.3, with two groups (1 and 2), this means that the gain in absolute terms
in the hiring probability of the group benefiting from market closure (P1H) is iden-




H. With N > 2, the equal losses
of each group not benefiting from closure is added to the hiring probability of the
privileged group.








0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00
0.20 0.60 0.40 0.10
0.40 0.70 0.30 0.20
0.60 0.80 0.20 0.30
0.80 0.90 0.10 0.40
1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50
Close/open group (groups). Unlike market closure, group closure is endogenous.
At each t, groups compute an exclusivity factor (EF) based on observed mar-
ket share (Mgt ), potential size growth (S
g
P,t), and protection/expansion coefficient
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XP/E controls the relative importance of present market share and future mar-
ket share in deciding how closed or open group boundaries should be. There is
no utility function to maximize, nor a discount rate for values of future market
share. A simple behavioral rule is assumed on the basis of observed state vari-
ables. The higher the value of XP/E and the higher the market share, the more
likely it is that a group protects current employed workers by closing its bound-
aries to incoming unemployed workers. The more exclusive a group becomes, the
higher the probability of rejecting new members up to a maximum value EF = 1
(XgP/E = 0, M
g
t = 1). By contrast, the lower the value of XP/E and the higher the
potential size growth, the more a group values growing in size as a means to a
higher market share in the future. This leads to more permeable boundaries or
no boundaries at all if the minimum is reached, where 0% of all new members
are accepted (XgP/E = 0, S
g
P,t = 1). XP/E varies among groups. It is defined at the
beginning of every simulation and remains constant for a particular simulation
run.
The simple mechanism to set the exclusivity factor described by equation 4.8
captures the logic of rationally driven group closure, as discussed in Section 2.4
above. Driven by shared economic interests, groups close their boundaries to
protect accumulated resources and open their boundaries to expand group size
in the hope of increasing market share. Moreover, given that the exclusivity fac-
tor takes the form of a probability, it is not necessary to be explicit about which
attributes of workers are relevant for gaining access to the group. In the case
of professional associations, it could, for example, be assumed that membership
rules focus on those same skills that members need to be successful in the market.
However, this need not always be the case. Group membership may be decided
on the basis of ascriptive traits such as gender, ethnicity, or religion which bear
little weight on the skills valued in the market. Explicitly modeling membership
rules using different individual attributes correlated to different degrees to skills
might be an interesting extension of this submodel.
Index of market share inequality (intergroup inequality). The index measures
the ratio of the average distance of individual group market shares to mean mar-
ket share and the maximum possible size of that distance. For a total of N groups,
the numerator of the index is defined as the mean absolute deviation (MAD) of
the distribution of group market shares M at t, as given by equation 4.9. With






Since market share is a number between 0 and 1, the maximum mean absolute
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deviation of the distribution MADmax for the market share (M) of any given num-
ber of groups N is reached when one group dominates the market with a market
share of 1 while all other groups have a market share of zero. Thus, MADmax can
be simplified to equation 4.10.
MADMaxt =
2 · (N − 1)
N2
(4.10)
Dividing (9) by (10), the index of intergroup market share inequality (I) is ob-







2 · (N − 1) (4.11)
If the market share of all groups is equal, the index drops to the minimum
value of 0. By contrast, if one group dominates the market, the index peaks at a
maximum value of 1. As an example, Table 4.4 shows the results of equations 4.9,
4.10, and 4.11 with N = 2 groups in the market and using arbitrarily chosen
market shares. A maximum level of intergroup inequality is reached at t = 1 and
t = 7, while the minimum level is obtained at t = 4.
Table 4.4: Example of values of index of market share inequality (I)





1 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00
2 0.20 0.80 0.50 0.30 0.50 0.60
3 0.40 0.60 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.20
4 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00
5 0.60 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.20
6 0.80 0.20 0.50 0.30 0.50 0.60
7 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00
4.3 Experimental design
The model was implemented using Python.3 DOE was used to set up the experi-
ment and initialize the remaining model parameters (Lorscheid, Heine, & Meyer,
2012), including number of time periods, number of groups, unemployment rate
(intensity of individual competition), and hiring bias coefficient. As already ex-
plained above, the hiring bias coefficient implements the degree of market closure
as an exogenous parameter. By contrast, the degree of group closure captured by
the exclusivity factor is determined endogenously (see submodels). Table 4.5
summarizes dependent, independent, and control variables.
3 https://www.python.org/
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Table 4.5: Classification of variables
Dependent variable Independent variable Control variables
Average differences in
market share over all t
(index of market share
inequality).
Hiring bias coefficient Time periods
Number of groups
Unemployment rate
A factorial experimental design with three factor levels for control variables
and eleven factor levels for the independent variable, a total of 108 design points,
was implemented (Table 4.6). To establish the optimal number of runs (n) for each
set of factors, the experimental error was computed for the dependent variable in
a subsample of 48 design points for n = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 50, 100, 250, and 500.
For each n and each design point, the coefficient of variation Cv = standard deviationmean
was estimated (Lorscheid et al., 2012). Results indicate that Cv stabilizes around
30 iterations at most, although for over half of the subsample of 48 design points,
results are stable even with as few as 5 runs. As a result, 30 iterations were run
for each design point.
Table 4.6: Factorial design
Factors Factor level range Factor levels
Hiring bias coefficient [0, 1] {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1}
Time periods [0,∞] {100, 300}
Number of groups [2,∞] {5, 10, 25}
Unemployment rate [0, 1] {0.1, 0.2, 0.4}
Using this factorial design, three models were explored. First, a null model was
run for the 18 combinations of control variables in which all workers’ and groups’
actions are turned off. Workers do not change groups, nor are their skills updated.
Groups refrain from closing the group. Second, an open-groups model was run
for all 108 design points with group closure turned off. Third, a full model includ-
ing all processes described in Section 4.2 was used. The diverse constellations
produced by these three models allow us to explore intergroup inequality under
varying degrees of market and group closure, time horizons, number of compet-
ing groups, and labor market conditions. Most importantly, it makes it possible
to investigate the four causal paths connecting individual and group competition
to intergroup inequality separately (see Section 4.1). Table 4.7 summarizes the
three model variations.
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Table 4.7: Model variations
Model Restrictions Design points
Null model Workers: no skill upgrade, no group change.
Groups: no group closure.
Hiring bias coefficient (degree of market closure) = 0.
18
Open-groups model Groups: no group closure. 108
Full model None 108
4.4 Results
To better understand the different processes modeled, each of the four causal
paths identified in Section 4.1 was isolated and analyzed separately. Since the
simulations were run 30 times and over various time periods for each parameter
setting, results are presented as box plots of the distribution of model outcomes
over all time periods, except for the initial period t = 0, and all model runs.
4.4.1 Pure individual competition
[Null model.] Turning off group closure and workers’ skill updates, and setting
the degree of market closure to zero, the model becomes predictable. Without
group hiring bias and skill growth, market inequality is fully explained by the
differences in skill levels among groups. Although those with the highest skills
are more likely to be employed, since skills are drawn randomly from a log-
normal distribution with identical parameters for each group, differences in mar-
ket share among groups remain low. Intergroup inequality could be arbitrar-
ily raised by simply initializing the model with an unequal distribution of skills
among groups.
As shown in Figure 4.1, the only factor that affects the overall level of inter-
group inequality is the unemployment rate. Given that hiring starts with the
workers with highest skills and goes on iteratively down the distribution of skills
until all vacancies are filled, the higher the unemployment rate, or, put differently,
the fewer the vacancies, the more crucial it is to be at the front of the skills queue.
In other words, given the way the hiring process was implemented, a tight labor
market elevates the premium of having higher skills. Higher rates of unemploy-
ment magnify any small differences in the skill distribution among groups and
produce comparatively greater intergroup inequality.

























Unemployment = low (5%) Unemployment = high (20%) Unemployment = extreme (50%)
Unemployment rate
Figure 4.1: Pure individual competition, intergroup inequality and unemploy-
ment
4.4.2 Individual competition through group membership
[Open-groups model with degree of market closure = 0.] Allowing for skills to grow as
a function of group average skills and for unemployed workers to move freely to
groups with higher employment rates dramatically increases the levels of inter-
group inequality. As shown in Figure 4.2, a smaller number of groups and larger
unemployment rates are associated with higher intergroup inequality. As unem-
ployment rates grow, the pressure on unemployed workers to leave the group in-
creases. Groups with higher employment rates tend to attract more unemployed
workers over time and quickly consolidate into a few big groups. Some groups
even lose all their members during this process of polarization of market share.
The fewer groups in the market, the more likely it is that a single dominant group
emerges and hoards most of workers. Thus, in addition to inequality produced by
pure individual competition, as individual competition through group member-
ship increases, driven by high unemployment and small numbers of alternative
groups to move to, intergroup inequality explodes.
4.4.3 Group competition through group closure
[Full model with degree of market closure = 0.] Adding group closure to the mix,
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Figure 4.2: Individual competition through group membership, intergroup in-
equality, number of groups, and unemployment
in. The more they value present market share, the more likely they are to re-
ject new workers. The opposite is true when groups place more emphasis on
size growth and future market share than in protection of current market share.
However, all else held constant, more groups necessarily implies smaller initial
market shares for each group and hence bigger potential size growth. There-
fore, even when protection/expansion coefficients indicate a high preference for
present market share, and irrespective of level of unemployment, if the number
of groups is large, groups are more readily inclined to open their boundaries and
bet on expansion. This tendency is depicted on Figure 4.3 using mean values of
the exclusivity factor for the top quintile of groups with the highest employment
rate over all experiments.
As it was shown with models (i) and (ii), with open groups, higher unem-
ployment leads to a process of market share polarization and high intergroup
inequality, particularly pronounced when the number of groups is small. How-
ever, allowing for group closure, the same process that drives group consolidation
forward also pushes groups to tighten their boundaries. Instead of exacerbating
intergroup inequality when unemployment is high, group closure in fact reduces
inequality by putting a cap on the process of group consolidation and limiting the
emergence of extreme differences in market share. Closed groups do not grow.
As shown in Table 4.8, the relationship between group closure and intergroup
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Figure 4.3: Mean exclusivity factor and group size
inequality tends to be more negative with fewer groups and higher unemploy-
ment rates. The higher the floating population of unemployed workers, the more
effective is group closure in preventing one group from dominating the market,
although inequality tends to be greater with higher unemployment. At extreme
levels of unemployment and with many groups in the market, the negative rela-
tionship between group closure and inequality seems to flatten somewhat. Under
such extreme conditions, the sheer number of workers rushing to the groups with
the highest employment rate takes away some of the effectiveness of group clo-
sure to slow down market share polarization.





N groups = 5 -0.03 -0.60 -0.57
N groups = 10 -0.24 -0.69 -0.56
N groups = 20 -0.33 -0.57 -0.36
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4.4.4 Pure group competition through market closure
[Open-groups model with variable degree of market closure.] Contrary to the inhibitory
effect of group closure on the process of consolidation of group size and polariza-
tion of market share observed in a model with unfettered individual competition
in a market with open group boundaries (ii), market closure acts as a catalyst. By
allowing workers to move freely into the group benefiting from market closure,
the emergence of a dominant group that hoards all workers and jobs is unavoid-
able and swift. The higher the degree of market closure, the faster a dominant
group appears. Increasing the number of groups slightly slows down the pro-
cess (see Figure 4.4), while higher unemployment further accelerates it (see Fig-
ure 4.5).4 In the end, however, is only a matter of time until intergroup inequality
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Figure 4.4: Number of groups and number of periods to reach maximum inequal-
ity
After this discussion of how each of the four processes of individual and group
competition bring about intergroup inequality separately, Table 4.9 summarizes
the minimum, mean, and maximum levels of market share inequality produced
by each process. As was argued above, results show that each process is indepen-
dently sufficient to produce moderate and high levels of intergroup inequality.
The fact that pure individual competition generates only relatively low levels of
4 Given that in some cases the steady state of the model is not reached after 100 periods of time,
the graphs only show the design points where time was allowed to reach 300.
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Figure 4.5: Unemployment and number of periods to reach maximum inequality
market share inequality should not affect the validity of this conclusion, since
it follows from the conscious decision to initialize the model with worker skills
equally distributed among groups. Initializing the model with an unequal distri-
bution of skills would mean market share inequality reaching high values com-
parable to those in processes ii, iii, and iv.
Table 4.9: Different levels of inequality obtained from each model
Index of market share inequality Min Mean Max
(i) Pure individual competition 0.02 0.04 0.09
(ii) Individual competition through group membership 0.12 0.42 0.99
(iii) Group competition through group closure 0.10 0.32 0.78
(iv) Pure group competition through market closure 0.61 0.95 1.00
4.4.5 All processes at the same time
While each process can produce high levels of inequality separately, what hap-
pens if they all interact simultaneously? Letting all independent and control vari-
ables vary in the full model makes it difficult to understand the output using
simple two-dimensional graphs as has been done so far. Instead, regression anal-
ysis was used on the output dataset to produce a three-dimensional response sur-
face that represents the relationship between degree of market closure, degree of
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group closure, and intergroup inequality under different combinations of number
of groups and unemployment rate for each experiment across all design points.
Since the dependent variable, the index of market share inequality, is defined in
the range [0.1], a Tobit regression was used with right-censored values set at 1.
Independent and control variables were included linearly in the model, as well
as interaction terms among them and quadratic terms for degree of market and
group closure.
Results are shown in Figure 4.6. Darker regions of the surface (red) correspond
to higher inequality, lighter regions (blue) to lower inequality. Three results are
worth mentioning. First, as already shown in the previous model variations, it is
still true that higher unemployment and fewer groups exert pressure on workers
to amalgamate into a few dominant groups and produce high levels of intergroup
inequality. Thus, on average, market share inequality is highest in the top right-
hand graph (5 groups and extreme unemployment) and lowest in the bottom
left-hand graph (20 groups and low unemployment).
Second, the interaction between group and market closure is not linear and
depends on both number of groups and unemployment rate. Although low de-
grees of group closure combine with high levels of market closure to increase
intergroup inequality, as group closure increases, it waters down the impact of
market closure on inequality. Therefore, from the perspective of group closure,
market closure enhances its power to slow down market share polarization; from
the perspective of market closure, group closure reduces its effectiveness to ac-
celerate that same process. The negative interaction between the two forms of
closure becomes stronger the more intensive individual competition for group
membership is, as captured by number of groups and unemployment rates. Why
the interaction is negative is easy to reconstruct. If employers are only allowed to
hire workers from one group (high degree of market closure) but only a small por-
tion of unemployed workers are permitted into the group (high degree of group
closure), a labor shortage is created that reduces the overall number of employed
workers and limits market share differences among groups. The interesting ques-
tion raised by this combination of high levels of market and group closure is what
happens when demand remains unsatisfied, something that was not modeled in
the simulations. Will groups change their preference for future market share and
open the group despite market dominance to meet excess demand? Or will the
employer simply decide to ignore market closure and hire workers from other
groups to fill all vacancies? If labor shortage leads to opening the group, inter-
group inequality would rise further, whereas if it leads to opening the market,
inequality would fall.
Third, and in line with the results summarized in Table 4.9, different combina-
tions of individual and group competition produce varying levels of intergroup
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inequality, from low through intermediate to high. A high degree of market clo-
sure leads to high levels of inequality if combined with a low degree of group
closure, but it produces intermediate market share inequality if group closure is
high. By contrast, while a low degree of group closure produces low intergroup
inequality if combined with no market closure, as the degree of market closure
grows, so does inequality. In addition, and irrespective of levels of group or mar-
ket closure, a reduced number of groups and a higher unemployment rate push
market share inequality upwards.
In conclusion, not only are pure individual competition, individual competi-
tion though group membership, group competition through group closure, and
pure group competition through market closure independently sufficient to pro-
duce comparable levels of inequality, but also their interaction is equally capable
of bringing about a comparably broad spectrum of possible levels of intergroup
inequality. This is the reason why, in the face of a given unequal distribution
of resources, for instance, a market for accountancy services where 80% of all
transactions are in the hands of one particular professional association, these four
different causal paths have to be analyzed and their distinct effects disentangled
both analytically and empirically. Are practitioners accounting for 80% of the
market better competitors if taken individually? Is their individual advantage
the result of group membership? What attributes are decisive for becoming part
of a group that grants advantages to its members? Or is their advantageous po-
sition the inevitable consequence of a market in which allocation rules are biased
towards one group? Failure to answer these questions will render any explana-
tion of intergroup inequality incomplete.
4.5 Summary
The aim of this chapter was to demonstrate how market and group closure oper-
ate to causally produce inequality in markets. A computer-simulated agent-based
model (ABM) of a simplified market for professional services was implemented
and used to conduct virtual experiments of the effect of closure on market share
inequality of competing professional groups under varying market conditions.
In the model, individual workers compete for a fixed number of jobs offered by a
unique employer by choosing membership in a professional group, while groups
compete for market share by closing or opening their boundaries and letting in
more or fewer workers with different skill levels. The degree of market closure
is given exogenously and benefits only one group. Results show that individual
competition, market closure, and group closure, both individually and in combi-
nation under different levels of unemployment and varying numbers of groups,
are causally sufficient to produce high levels of intergroup inequality.
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Figure 4.6: Response surface for market share inequality and degree of market
and group closure
Chapter 5
Closure in families: parental choices
and children’s skills
Two central questions in the study of social inequality and the life span have
caught the attention of scholars for decades: Why do some individuals become
more successful than others as they grow up? And why does economic and social
success tend to persist across generations? Social scientists now recognize that the
intricacies of skill formation constitute an important piece of the puzzle. Cogni-
tive abilities, including but not limited to those measured by IQ tests, as well as
socio-emotional capacities such as achievement-striving, perseverance, assertive-
ness, curiosity, ambition, delay of gratification, and sociability, have been shown
both to predict individual disparities in education, earnings, health, well-being,
and deviant behavior (Heckman & Kautz, 2012; Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi,
& Goldberg, 2007) and to be crucial in the transmission of advantage from one
generation to the next (Ermisch, Jäntti, & Smeeding, 2012).
Multidisciplinary research on skill formation has revealed the cumulative char-
acter of skill growth during a person’s life span, pointing to the pivotal charac-
ter and indelibility of parental investments in shaping children’s skills starting
early in life (Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron, & Shonkoff, 2006, and the references
cited therein). The extent of parental material and time resources a child enjoys
depends both on the amount of resources commanded by their parents and on
parental discretion in allocating them within the family (Behrman, 1997; Conley,
2005). As a result, in order to explain differences in individual skills, parental allo-
cation choices may be as important as the amount of parental resources available
to allocate.
This chapter shows how direct forms of closure inside the family, in the form
of parental investment behavior, serves as a transformational mechanism linking
parental allocation decisions at the microlevel of the household to the emergence
of skill inequality at the societal level.1 To do so, it uses agent-based modeling
1 This chapter, including this introductory words, has been published in the Journal of Artificial
Societies and Social Simulation (Cardona, 2014a), http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/17/4/8.html
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(ABM) to explore what happens to inequality in cognitive and socio-emotional
skills within and across generations if parents differ in their investment behavior.
The model also explores how variations in resources available to households, as
well as number and spacing of children, affect the unequal distribution of skills in
families and in society over time. In contrast to the model on market closure and
group closure presented in the previous chapter, the present model is oriented
more toward empirical reality. In particular, skills growth is modeled according
to the technology of skill formation developed in the field of economics, cali-
brated with empirically estimated parameters from existing research. In addition
to a more evidence-oriented simulation design, one prediction of the model is
validated using empirical data.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.1 makes the case for parental
investment behavior beyond optimizing agents. Section 5.2 describes the model
using the Overview, Design Concepts, and Details (ODD) protocol (Grimm et al.,
2006, 2010). Section 5.3 explains the experimental design based on the Design
of Experiments (DOE) (Lorscheid et al., 2012). The results of the experiments
and an empirical validation of one prediction of the model are presented in Sec-
tion 5.4 and Section 5.5 respectively. In documenting the simulation, an effort
was made to comply with best practices. Therefore, in addition to the ODD and
the DOE, the full code of the simulation in Python is provided; and is available
at: http://www.openabm.org/model/4084/version/1/view.
5.1 Beyond optimizing parents: heuristics and norms
Traditionally, models of parental investments have been dominated by depictions
from biology and economics of individuals as optimizers. In evolutionary biol-
ogy, parents invest in their offspring to maximize reproductive success (Hamil-
ton, 1964a, 1964b; Trivers, 1972), while in economics, parents maximize house-
hold utility, which is a function of children’s achieved levels of wealth, income,
or human capital (Becker & Tomes, 1986; Behrman, Pollak, & Taubman, 1982; for
a review, see Björklund & Jäntti, 2009, 493–95). Despite the dominance of these
assumptions about parental behavior, or perhaps precisely as a consequence of it,
models that compare alternative parental investment strategies among humans
and their impact on children’s outcomes, such as the simulation study by Davis,
Todd, and Bullock (1999) on alternative feeding strategies among birds, have not
yet been devised. ABM offers a natural modeling strategy to represent heteroge-
neous agents and to inquire into the macro-consequences of agent behavior under
changing environmental conditions. With the use of ABM, it is thus possible to
go beyond optimizing parents and compare optimizing with non-optimizing be-
havior.
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There are at least two good reasons not to limit the modeling of parental in-
vestments to optimizing agents. First, the assumption that parents are perfect op-
timizers ignores the extensively documented computational and informational
limitations faced by individuals in solving real-world tasks (Kahneman, 2011).
There is no reason to believe that the same internal and environmental constraints
that make Homo economicus an unlikely model of decision making in general are
not equally limiting in the demanding task of optimizing parental investments.
Finding the optimal investment profile that maximizes children’s skills would re-
quire that parents have perfect information about the child’s endowments; know
the exact functional form of skill formation; and are capable of allocating, in real
time, just the right amount of nourishment, toys, emotional support, cognitive
stimulation, and other parental inputs that will produce the best possible outcome
in all their offspring many years into the future. Since this kind of optimization
is most likely intractable for individuals, and perhaps even burdensome for less
powerful computers, parents may instead default to simple heuristics or rules of
thumb in the allocation of resources (Gigerenzer, 2004), which, although not nec-
essarily less effective in bringing them closer to their goal of promoting children’s
skills, are computationally less costly. Second, declaring that all parents behave as
output maximizers ignores agent heterogeneity in motives and goals. Culturally
dictated norms regarding the relative importance of children within the family, in
particular those related to gender and birth order, constitute an alternative frame-
work that regulates parental resource allocation among siblings.
In the following, heuristics and norms that shape parental investments are
briefly discussed. The exact operationalization of these alternative forms of pa-
rental behavior are explained in the model description below (see Parental in-
vestment behavior on page 142).
5.1.1 Heuristics
According to (Gigerenzer, 2004), a complete model of a heuristic consists of three
elements: first, the exact rules that guide decision making; second, the individ-
ual capacities they exploit; and third, the type of problem they are supposed to
solve (p. 67). For parental investments two candidate heuristics can be found in
the literature on the intrahousehold allocation of resources: a) equality and b)
reinforcing or compensation.
Allocation rules. For an egalitarian distribution, the allocation rule is very sim-
ple: divide total resources equally among children (Hertwig, Davis, & Sulloway,
2002). Research on the so-called dilution hypothesis, which poses a negative re-
lationship between sibship size and amount of resources available to siblings,
128 5.1 Beyond optimizing parents: heuristics and norms
provides indirect empirical support for the equality heuristic (Baydar, Hyle, &
Brooks-Gunn, 1997; Blake, 1989; Stewart, 2005). As an alternative rule to equal-
ity, a growing body of empirical research supports both the existence of com-
pensatory (Del Bono, Ermisch, & Francesconi, 2012) and reinforcing investment
strategies (Datar, Kilburn, & Loughran, 2010) triggered by children’s initial en-
dowments. When parents reinforce (compensate) they give more than the equal
share of resources to children with high (low) endowments relative to their sib-
lings.
Individual capacities. At a minimum, parents should be able to divide inputs.
This is a plausible assumption for goods, services, and time devoted to children.
Other inputs such as affection might prove to be more difficult to ration. In ad-
dition, allocating inputs requires that parents keep track of past resources given
to children and adapt present distribution accordingly. Finally, to follow com-
pensating or reinforcing strategies, parents must be in a position both to observe
children’s strengths and weaknesses and to draw comparisons between them in
order to reallocate resources. Thus, divisibility of inputs, memory of past alloca-
tion, and perception of children’s differences are required to put these two heuris-
tics into practice.
Type of problem. The third element of the heuristic model is more difficult to
pinpoint, since research on parental investment behavior in humans from a heuris-
tic perspective is scant. The explanation advanced here is therefore sketchy and
should be updated when more research on the subject becomes available. Ac-
cording to Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011), an egalitarian distribution of re-
sources is an instance of a “tradeoff” heuristic, where individuals weigh alterna-
tives equally, a “1/N Rule” (Ibid.: pp. 470f. and the references cited there). In the
context of parental investments, Hertwig et al. (2002) argued that an egalitarian
distribution should be observed among parents who command enough resources
and can afford not having to decide which of their offspring to nourish preferen-
tially. This, however, is a prediction about the environmental conditions under
which such a heuristic is likely to be observed in parental investment behavior
and not an explanation of the problem the heuristic is supposed to solve. In gen-
eral terms, the problem faced by parents can be formulated as allocation of resour-
ces under uncertainty regarding both observed child endowments and expected
returns on investment. Davis and Peter (2001) suggest that for equal expected
returns an egalitarian distribution should yield the highest outcomes from paren-
tal inputs. However, it is also plausible that equality is less a response to equal
expected returns and more an adaptation to unknown returns. In the domain of
financial decisions, equal allocation of assets among alternative investments, or
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“naïve diversification,” has been demonstrated to yield surprisingly positive re-
sults compared with more complicated allocation strategies (DeMiguel, Garlappi,
& Uppal, 2007). Thus, with noisy expected returns on investments, parents may
default to an egalitarian distribution as a way to reduce the volatility of child
outcomes.
A similar argument can be advanced to explain the heuristic of reinforcement
or compensation. According to the taxonomy found in Gigerenzer and Gaiss-
maier (2011), this heuristic can be classified as a “one-clever-cue” heuristic, a
form of “one-reason”-type heuristic. Instead of weighing cues equally, as with
the egalitarian heuristics (i.e., number of children), individuals look for a “good”
cue among known alternatives and choose one based on that standard. If parents
face uncertainty about returns but somehow observe child endowments at birth,
this additional information might be interpreted as a cue for expected returns on
investments that can be used to adjust allocation decisions. Highly endowed chil-
dren promise high returns, hence reinforcement as a way to secure higher pay-
offs; low-endowed children, by contrast, threaten to produce low returns, hence
compensation as a way to reduce losses. In both cases the cue that activates the
heuristic is the child’s endowments and the problem the heuristic solves is return
volatility.
Which of these two strategies is followed by parents—equality or compensation-
reinforcement—may depend on the environment they face (Todd & Wolpin, 2007).
As argued by Conley (2005), families with fewer resources may tend to prioritize
parental investments toward better-endowed children. The rationale behind re-
inforcement is summarized by Conley as the desire of low-class parents to maxi-
mize upward mobility. By the same token, if middle-class and high-class parents
aim to avoid downward mobility, as Goldthorpe (2000) argues, then compen-
sation for less-endowed children or equality could be the ecologically rational
strategy. To some extent these arguments are compatible with the hypothesis
of Trivers and Willard (1973) that parents always follow a gender-specific rein-
forcing strategy, changing parental investment behavior depending on available
resources, but always in such a way that the most promising gender in terms of
expected reproductive success is favored.2 Such a relationship between resource
scarcity/reinforcing strategies and resource abundance/compensation has been
observed in birds and shown through simulation to produce high payoffs in
terms of offspring fitness (Davis & Peter, 2001).
2 According to this hypothesis, if sexual competition is more decisive for the reproductive suc-
cess of males than females and if the rank or status of parents correlates with that of their
offspring, then low-rank parents would tend to invest preferentially in females, while high-
rank parents who can afford giving males enough resources to successfully face reproductive
competition would favor them instead (Trivers & Willard, 1973). In humans, this hypothesis
predicts that high-status parents invest more in boys and low-status parents more in girls, a
correlation that has been supported by only weak and mixed evidence when tested empirically
(Cronk, 2007).
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In the case of equality, an additional environmental triggering factor could be
the difficulty in observing differences in endowments among children. If par-
ents are unable to extract meaningful cues about the potential of their offspring,
the less risky guess in the allocation of resources is to distribute them equally
among siblings. Furthermore, even if parents choose a compensating or reinforc-
ing strategy, an equality heuristic can still be used as an anchor (Messick, 1993), a
benchmark to help them decide how much of their resources should be devoted
to one particular child.
5.1.2 Norms
Norms about gender and birth order, such as those manifested in the millennia-
old traditions of primogeniture and son privilege, are the two most prominent
allocation rules likely to affect parental investment behavior across societies. In
the case of gender, parental bias can be as moderate as spending more time with
same-sex children (Lundberg, 2005) or as extreme as selective abortion and even
infanticide (Sen, 1992, 2003). Thus, even if only for outliers, the bias in the al-
location of resources can in practice approach a maximum of zero investments
in particular children. In contrast to gender, research on birth order norms sug-
gests that investment bias along this dimension tends to be much more moderate,
taking the form of favoritism rather than outright neglect. Empirical studies on
parental favoritism offer mixed results as to which child receives more parental
attention. Although there is evidence of both last-born and first-born bias, what
seems to be a consistent result is that middle children are seldom favored (Suitor,
Sechrist, Plikuhn, Pardo, & Pillemer, 2008).
It is important to note the apparent overlap of norm-oriented behavior with
heuristic-based and optimizing behavior. Norm-oriented agents follow rules of
thumb to guide their investment decisions in a way that, on the surface, appears
to be similar to heuristic-following agents. Yet, in contrast to heuristics, norms are
not means to an end but ends in themselves. The goal of norm-oriented behavior
is to comply with the norm rather than to achieve an ulterior goal by using the
norm as an instrument, as in the case of heuristics. In practice, it is true, by merely
observing parental behavior it is not always possible to decide whether norms or
heuristics are guiding decision making. For example, parents who abide by an
equality norm may appear to an observer as behaving exactly the same way as
parents who follow an equality heuristic, although the underlying decision mode
is different.3 Furthermore, favoritism based on gender or birth order may result
when parents adapt to environmentally dictated expected payoffs of parental in-
3 See Messick (1993) for an experimental design that tries to distinguish between the two types
of decision modes.
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vestments, and hence may to some extent be compatible with optimizing behav-
ior (see Lundberg, 2005 and Ejrnæs & Pörtner, 2004, for an economic perspective;
Trivers & Willard, 1973 and Sulloway, 1996, for a biological perspective). How-
ever, norms change only gradually and persist even after environmental condi-
tions have shifted (see, e. g., Almond, Edlund, & Milligan, 2013), so normative
pressure may still influence action even if the payoffs seen from the perspective
of a rational agent are no longer present. Finally, both gender and birth order bias
can be explained without resorting to norms; for example, first-born and gen-
der favoritism may result from a reinforcing heuristic strategy, where parents use
age (Davis & Peter, 2001, 311) and gender (Trivers & Willard, 1973) as cues for
expected payoffs and invest accordingly.
In short, heuristics and norms are alternative and separate forms of action that
parents may follow when allocating resources among children, even if empiri-
cally they are not always clearly distinguishable from each other and may to some
extent be compatible with optimizing behavior. As summarized in Table 5.1, pa-
rental investment strategies vary according to agents’ goals, available informa-
tion, and computational capabilities.
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5.2 Model description
5.2.1 Overview
Purpose. The model explores the emergence of inequality in cognitive and socio-
emotional skills at the societal level within and across generations that results
from differences in parental investment behavior at the household level during
childhood and adolescence. Parents behave alternatively as optimizers, heuristic-
based, or norm-oriented. The simulation is a middle-range model informed by
stylized facts from research on skill formation and the intrahousehold allocation
of resources. It is intended to produce testable hypotheses about parental deci-
sions and overall skill inequality in society. Since the main focus is on parental in-
vestment decisions, other processes, including skill homophily in partner search,
fertility decisions (number and spacing of children), and the amount of resources
available to parents, are treated as exogenous factors that are varied experimen-
tally.
Entities, State Variables, and Scales. The only scale in the model is time (t). One
time unit equals 2 years, derived from the biennial empirical estimates used to cal-
ibrate the technology of skill formation (see Section 5.2.4 on Submodels below).
Two entities are modeled: persons (or individuals) and parents (or households).
Individual state variables can be classified into four groups: demographics, part-
ner matching, life-course events, and skill formation. Households combine moth-
ers and fathers into one agent with state variables related to fertility and parental
investments. Endogenous variables are identified with an “[e]” and exogenous
variables with an “[x]” (see Table 5.2 and Table 5.3) The most central endoge-
nous variables in the model are the current skill stocks of each individual and the
amount of parental resources invested by households in each child.
Process Overview and Scheduling. Each generation of individuals follows a stan-
dard life course, with identical life stages and age intervals for particular events.
The life course consists of three stages—childhood, adolescence, and adulthood—
as depicted in Figure 5.1. During the first two stages (ages 0 to B), cognitive and
socio-emotional skills are produced through parental investments starting from
an initial inherited amount of skill endowments. In the first period of adulthood
(age B+ 1), agents update their skill from investments in the last period of adoles-
cence. During the third stage (ages B + 1 to D), individuals find a partner, form
a household, give birth to the next generation, and invest in the skills of their
offspring.
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Table 5.2: Individual state variables
State Variable Description
ind_id, hh_id, hh_id_parents, gen_id [x] Numerical identifications (Ids) were assigned to each
individual to facilitate keeping track of skill de-
pendencies within families and across generations.
ind_id is unique; hh_id identifies current household;
hh_id_parents is shared by siblings and refers back
one generation; and gen_id is equal for all agents be-
longing to the same generation.
Demographics
age_ind [e] Age of individual in number of years
sex [x] Female (1), male (2)
birth_order [e] First-born, second-born, etc. [1, 2, . . . ] Partner match-
ing
homophily_skills_partner [x] Preference for a partner with similar skill level [0, 1]
Life-course events (see Figure 5.1 below)
age_end_childhood [x] Age of last year of childhood; A in Figure 5.1
age_end_adolescence [x] Age of last year of adolescence; B in Figure 5.1
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Captures how difficult it is to compensate early in-
vestments with late investments in t. Higher values
are associated with higher elasticities of input substi-
tution. (−∞,1].
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Table 5.3: Household state variables
State Variable Description
hh_id [x] Numerical Ids assigned to each household




List of parents’ and children’s Ids belong-
ing to the household
Fertility
age_parents [e] Age of parents (age of mothers = age of fa-
thers)
intended_fertility [x] Intended total number of children
actual_fertility [e] Actual total number of children
child_spacing [x] Distance in years between each birth
number_children_0_16 [e] Number of children between 0 and 16




Heritability of cognitive and non-cognitive
skills [0, 1]
Parental investments
(see Submodels, equations 5.4 - 5.9)
parental_cognitive_skills [e]
parental_soc_emo_skills [e]
Average maternal and paternal cognitive
and socio-emotional skills [0,1]
available_res_total [x] Total annual resources available to invest
in offspring (0, 1]
investment_behavior [x] One of the different investment strategies
followed by parents optimal, equality, re-
inforcement/compensation, son privilege,
first-born privilege, last-born privilege
investment_bias [x] Deviation from perfectly egalitarian dis-
tribution of resources among siblings [0,
1]. Used for heuristic-based and norm-
oriented investment behavior.
parental_inv_child_n [e] Vector with resources allocated by parents
to each of their children (0, 1]
Figure 5.1: Life course for individuals in each generation
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At each t, processes are executed, starting with adults (age >= B and < D),
then households, and finally children and adolescents (age < B). Among adults,
only partner matching is executed in random order, since potential partners are
limited and it matters who chooses first. For the remaining processes, the order
of execution is not relevant, so it is scheduled according to the individual’s or
household’s Id. Partner matching in the next generation starts only after parental
investments have ended, which is the time when all individuals within a given
generation have reached adulthood. Processes update state variables as soon as
they are executed. The simulation is run for the number of generations defined in
the experimental design (see Experimental Design on page 145). Output variables
are produced at the end of all runs.
While t < time needed for all generations to reach adulthood For each generation
While t < (D + (intended+_fertility x child_spacing)) x (Id of current generation)
For all Persons
Person finds a partner and forms a Household
For all Households within one generation
Household updates number of children and adolescents
If parents are in their fertile years, if they have not reached their
intended fertility and are considering birth spacing, then
Household gives birth to a new child, draws child’s sex from a
random distribution, and computes child’s initial skill endowments
End If
If Household has only one child or adolescent, then
Household invests all resources in that child
Else
Household decides the amount of parental resources to invest in each
child according to its investment behavior
End If
For all Persons
If Person is a child or an adolescent or is in the first period of adulthood
If Person is not new born (age > 0), then
Given parental inputs in t-1 and all parameters of the technology of
skill production, Person updates its current skill stocks
End If
Save all state variables
Increase t in one unit (2 years)
For all Persons
Increase age of each individual in 1 t unit
End While
End While
Create data set with Person and Household state variables for all generations Compute output
variables and save them to a generation data set
5.2.2 Design concepts
Basic principles. At the core of the simulation is skill formation through pa-
rental investments. Skill growth is modeled according to the technology of skill
formation developed by Cunha and Heckman (2007), where initial endowments
at birth are augmented by subsequent parental investments in a dynamic, self-
reinforcing process of skill accumulation during multiple stages of the life course.
Although skills are multiple in nature (Cunha & Heckman, 2007), they can be re-
duced to low-dimensional constructs (Heckman, Pinto, & Savelyev, 2012). Here,
two dimensions of skills are assumed: cognitive skills and socio-emotional skills.
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Stages of development are also simplified to include only childhood and adoles-
cence as two central phases of skill growth. Parental investment decisions are in-
formed by research on the intrahousehold allocation of resources (Behrman, 1997)
and on heuristics in decision making (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Three fur-
ther processes of intergenerational dynamics-partner matching, fertility, and skill
inheritance-are included but modeled in a simplified manner.
Emergence. Skill inequality is the main emergent phenomenon in the model. In-
equality is measured both within a generation and across generations (see Mea-
sures of inequality on page 144).
Adaptation. Depending on which behavioral model they follow, parents adapt
resource allocation decisions to family size, available resources, and children’s
attributes, including age, sex, and skill endowments (see Parental Behavior on
page 142).
Objectives. For optimizing parents, the goal is to maximize the expected sum
of their children’s skills when they reach adulthood. Heuristic-based agents also
strive to increase the sum of their children’s skills as adults. By contrast, the im-
plicit goal of norm-oriented parents is to comply with allocation rules as dictated
by norms about gender and birth order.
Prediction. To allocate resources among siblings optimally, optimizing parents
maximize future skill stocks and thus predict how present inputs will affect chil-
dren’s skill formation in the future.
Sensing. Parents observe children’s skills without error.
Interaction. Parents interact directly with their children inside the household
through parental investments. Adults interact with each other when searching
for a partner. There is no direct interaction among households.
Stochasticity. Stochasticity is used to simplify the much more complex pro-
cesses of partner matching, fertility, skill inheritance, and the determination of the
amount of parental resources available to invest in children. Instead of provid-
ing an explicit model of genetic transmission and gene-environment interaction,
skill inheritance is implemented by producing a correlated random distribution
of children’s skills based on empirically plausible fixed parent-child skill correla-
tions. Stochasticity is also included in the models of partner matching and child
bearing to produce variability in parental skill similarities and siblings’ gender
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composition respectively. The amount of resources available to adults to invest
in children is treated as a random variable, too, with a distribution that reflects
the amount of parental resource inequality as experienced by children. Parental
resources are distributed unequally among parents, but so is the willingness of
parents to invest those resources in their children. When posing the existence of
an exogenous distribution of resources effectively invested in children as a single
dimension, it is not necessary to model the source of parental resources (e. g., la-
bor markets) nor how parents decide between their own consumption and child
investments.
Collectives. Households combine mothers and fathers into one agent.
Observation. All endogenous state variables are collected at each time period in
a main dataset. A second dataset is also generated that summarizes for each simu-
lation run and for each generation key exogenous parameters, including number
of children per parent, child spacing, and number of agents in each generation, as
well as key outcome variables (see Measures of inequality on page 144).
5.2.3 Details
Initialization. Without a previous generation of parents to invest in children’s
skills, agents in the first generation start their lives as adults. To avoid creating
skill inequality from the outset, both initial endowments and current levels of
cognitive and socio-emotional skills are drawn from a random beta distribution
with parameters alpha = beta = 7. With these parameters, the beta distribution
is similar in shape to a normal distribution but with values defined in the range
[0, 1]. The intragenerational inequality (Gini) of this initial distribution is approxi-
mately 0.145. The remaining values of exogenous parameters of life-course events
and technology of skill formation are listed in Section 5.2.4 on Submodels be-
low, while number of agents as well as parameters for partner matching, fertility,
and parental investments vary depending on the experimental setting and are
explained in Section 5.3 on Experimental Design.
Input data. No external input data are used.
5.2.4 Submodels
Life-course events. Life-course events are fixed for all agents with the values
A = 6 and B = 16, which are approximations for sensitive developmental stages
of cognitive and socio-emotional skills (Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, & ter
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Weel, 2008) and were chosen to match empirical estimations of the technology
of skill formation by Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010). B and C corre-
spond to starting and final periods of child bearing; C and D are described by
equation 5.1 and 5.2, as follows:
C = B + child spacing · (intended fertility− 1) (5.1)
D = B + C (5.2)
Equation 5.1 means that parents invest in their children until each of them has
reached adulthood. Although B, C, and D can be calibrated to match country-
specific demographic characteristics, here they take on some plausible values in-
tended to give the model a simple yet realistic life-course dynamic (see Table 5.4).




Partner matching. Individuals are divided into two groups according to gender.
Matching proceeds by taking the first agent in one list (e. g., men) and matching
him with a probability p to an agent in the list of the opposite sex (e. g., women),
starting from the first in the list, and moving down until a match occurs. After
a successful match, the second agent of the first list is picked and the process
is repeated with the remaining agents in the second list. Matching is continued
until all individuals have found a partner or until no unmatched members of the
opposite sex are left. Individuals without a partner remain single for the rest of
the simulation.4 The probability of success is modeled as a unique trial drawn
from a binomial distribution, with p as a function of the Euclidean distance d
of cognitive and socio-emotional skills (equation 5.3) normalized in the interval
[0, 1] and modified by the homophily coefficient h (homophily_skills_partner), as
expressed in equation 5.4.
d =
√







4 For a brief review of recent simulation-based models of marriage and mate selection, see
Walker and Davis (2013).
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If h = 0, partner matching takes place with a probability of 0.5 of matching
success for every matched pair of individuals. If h = 1, the normalized Euclidean
distance alone determines the deviation of p from 0.5.
Parental available resources. At age B, households draw their available resour-
ces randomly from a distribution modified experimentally to reflect different lev-
els of inequality between parents (see Experimental Design on page 145). The
amount of resources remains constant over the life course.
Child rearing. Number of children and child spacing are fixed parameters de-
fined at the start of each simulation. Only sex composition is probabilistic. Each
child has the same probability of 0.50 of being a boy or a girl. This aims at a 50:50
ratio and allows for multiple combinations of sibship sex composition. Given a
number of children and child spacing, households give birth to the first child at
age B and then again after the number of years determined by child spacing has
elapsed. This continues until households have reached the number of children
predefined for a given simulation run.
Initial skill endowments. For each child i, initial cognitive (θci,0) and socio-emo-
tional skill endowments (θei,0) are drawn from a beta-distributed random distribu-
tion, with parameters alpha = beta = 7. The same applies to the initial distribution
of adult skills in the first generation of agents, which correlates on average by a
magnitude given by the heritability coefficient b with the distributions of one of
the parents (e. g., maternal skills). During the generation of the random correla-
tion distribution, a negligible amount of outliers slightly exceed 1. In these cases
the value is corrected and assigned the value 1. Parameter b captures both genetic
and environmental factors that influence children’s skills at birth. According to
research on behavioral genetics, the heritability of IQ and of personality traits
has been estimated at around 0.50 to 0.80 and 0.20 to 0.50 respectively (Johnson,
Turkheimer, Gottesman, & Bouchard Jr., 2009). To simplify, b is assumed to be
0.50 for both cognitive and socio-emotional skills (Table 5.5). This is not only
an empirically plausible value, but given that the parameter is used to generate
a correlated random distribution that on average produces a correlation of 0.50,
it prevents direct parent-child inheritance at a fixed rate from dominating skill
transmission across generations.
Update skills. Skill growth is modeled according to the technology of skill for-
mation developed by Cunha and Heckman (2007) and extended in Cunha et al.
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p), ∀ x ∈ {c, e} , ∀ t ∈ {0, ..., B} , ∀ s ∈ {1, 2} (5.5)
For agent i, next-period cognitive (θci,t+1) and socio-emotional skills (θ
e
i,t+1) are
a function of skill stocks (θci,t, θ
e
i,t), parental skills (θ
c
p, θep), and present parental in-
vestments (Ii,p,t).6 Given that skills remain constant after individuals have reached
adulthood, parental skills have no time subscript. The function is defined for each
age t starting at birth (t = 0) and up to adulthood (t = B). Parameters are dif-
ferent depending on the life-cycle stage s (childhood: s = 1; adolescence: s = 2;
see Figure 5.1 above). Equation 5.6 expresses equation 5.5 as a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) production function. (See Table 5.6 below for a list of the





























The functional form of the technology of skill formation defined by equation 5.6
captures two important stylized facts about skill growth (Cunha & Heckman,
2007):
i) Dynamic complementarity (self-productivity and cross-productivity). Skills in t+1
depend on past stocks of both cognitive and socio-emotional skills.
i) Sensitive periods. Depending on the age of the child, investments in skills
may have more or less indelible consequences for children’s skill devel-
opment. The substitutability parameter φs and the associated elasticity of
5 Similar models of cognitive skill formation have been developed by Todd and Wolpin (2003,
2007). See early efforts to formulate the technology of skill production in Ben-Porath (1967).
6 The statistical model used by Cunha et al. (2010) includes an error term nxt that captures shocks
and unobserved inputs. These are not modeled in the present version of the simulation to
avoid additional sources of randomness in skill growth and hence the term was left out of
equation 5.5.
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substitution 1/(1− φxs ) capture how difficult it is to compensate early in-
vestments with late investments. The higher φxs is, the higher the elasticity
of substitution and the easier it is to substitute early investments with late
ones. Low values of s imply that early and late investments are comple-
ments. Elasticities are specific to each type of skill (x = c, e) and each stage
of the life course (s = 1, 2).
The exact content of parental investments (Ip,t) and the reason to include pa-
rental skills (θcp, θep) in equations 5.5 and 5.6 require further clarification. As re-
search on brain development suggests, the two most relevant factors affecting
children’s emotional and cognitive development at the neurophysiological level,
aside from prenatal factors, are parental care and a cognitively stimulating en-
vironment (Hackman, Farah, & Meaney, 2010). Parents invest in their children
not only by spending material resources in goods and services, but also by de-
ciding on the quantity and quality of time and attention to be devoted to their
offspring (Berger, Paxson, & Waldfogel, 2009; Heckman, 2006). Both the quan-
tity and quality dimensions of parental inputs are reflected in equations 5.5 and
5.6. While (Ip,t) measures the amount of parental inputs, a combination of ma-
terial resources and parenting time, parental skills (θcp, θep) can be understood as
a proxy for quality of parenting.7 This separation of quantity from quality of in-
puts makes it possible to accommodate in the model the finding that household
material resources do not necessarily correspond to good parenting (Heckman,
2008). Accordingly, even parents with fewer resources but high parenting skills
may contribute to children’s skill formation effectively.
To parameterize equation 5.6, empirical estimates based on the Children of the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), a representative U.S. longitu-
dinal study, were used (Cunha et al., 2010). High-quality parameter estimates
for other countries are not available. These estimates control for measurement
error, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogeneity of parental inputs (Ibid: Table
V, p. 919). The original estimates conflate multiple measures of parental resour-
ces from the HOME scale into a single dimension of parental investments. Pa-
rental skills refer to those of the mother. Investments in different types of skills
were not distinguished. Cognitive and non-cognitive (in this case socio-emotional
skills) were summarized into two independent dimensions based on various age-
specific scales of child development (Ibid.: Appendix, Section 9, for a list of mea-
sures). Estimates were obtained from biennial measures of children during two
stages of development: ages 0 to 6 years and ages 6 to 14 years. To accommo-
7 The interpretation of parental skills as quality of parenting is not explicitly made in Cunha et
al. (2010); however, there is evidence that parenting styles vary according to parental socio-
economic status (Bornstein & Bradley, 2003), which in turn correlates with cognitive and non-
cognitive skills.
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date the estimates to the present simulation, parameter estimates for the second
stage of development (ages 6 to 14 years) were assumed to remain constant up to
age 16. Furthermore, arbitrary scales were assumed for parental investments and
skills, all ranging from 0 to 1. As shown in their web appendix (Ibid.: A11, Table
11-1), rescaling the variables for parental inputs and skills makes no qualitative
difference in terms of parameter estimates (Ibid.: p. 921). Finally, parental skills
(θcp, θep) were taken to be the average of both maternal and paternal skills and not
only the skills of the mother.
Table 5.6: Parameterization of the technology of skill formation
Parameter Value
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Parental investment behavior. Three alternative models of parental behavior
are considered: optimizing, heuristic-based, and norm-oriented. All types of par-
ents allocate their available resources (Ip,t) among their children i 1, . . . N, as spec-






Until the birth of the second child, the first-born receives all parental resources
(I1,p,t = Ip,t). The same is true for the youngest child after all older siblings have
reached adulthood.
(i) Optimizing behavior. Parents choose how much to invest in each sibling
i 1, . . . N in order to maximize the total expected sum of cognitive and socio-
emotional skills over all children when they reach adulthood (t = B), subject
to the technology of skill formation and the budgetary restriction. Optimization













i,j), ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., N} , ∀ t ∈ {0, ..., B} (5.8)
subject to equations 5.6 and 5.7.
The result of the optimization is a vector I with the amount of resources to
invest in each child i and each period t until t = B for every child. Maximiza-
tion does not weigh a particular type of skill higher than the other, nor the skills
of a particular sibling. To optimize equation 5.8 in Python, the module for con-
strained optimization found in SciPy was used with the option for sequential
least-squares programming.8 Before applying the optimization algorithm, the
equation had to be solved analytically by means of backward induction (i.e., by
reformulating the optimization problem for all periods t in terms of first-period
investments). In Python, this was achieved using the library for symbolic mathe-
matics SymPy.9
(ii) Heuristic-based behavior. Two alternative heuristics are considered: equal-




































, ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., N} (5.11)
An egalitarian distribution divides resources equally by the number of chil-
dren (equation 5.9). By adhering to the other heuristic (equations 5.10 and 5.11),
parents may instead choose an unequal distribution of resources either through
reinforcement, by giving more to the child with the highest average endowments
at birth (θci,0, θ
e
i,0), or through compensation, preferentially allocating resources to
the less-endowed child. The exact size of preferential investment cannot be eas-
ily inferred from the empirical literature on parental investments (see Section 5.1
above), and hence the size of compensation or reinforcement is modified exper-
imentally by the investment bias parameter δ {0, 1}. Choosing to reinforce or
to compensate children’s endowments is a function of the amount of resources
available to parents. Reinforcement is followed by parents with relatively low
resources, compensation by those with relatively high resources. The mean of
the parental resource distribution is used to distinguish between low resources
(below the mean) and high resources (equal to or greater than the mean).
(iii) Norm-oriented behavior. The two norms considered are son preference (e-
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N (1+ δ) , i
b
Ip,t
N (1− δN−1) , i 6= ib
, ∀ b ∈ {f.born,l.born} , ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., N} (5.13)
As with reinforcing and compensating strategies, the size of the deviation from
an egalitarian distribution is measured by the investment_bias parameter δ {0, 1}.
The value of δ varies depending on the strength of parental bias, which can be as
high as 1 in the case of infanticide.
10 Daughter preference is not modeled as a separate parental investment behavior, since results
would be analytically identical to those obtained from son preference.
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Measures of inequality. One measure of intragenerational inequality and two
of intergenerational inequality are provided.
(i) Gini. This measures inequality in the distribution of cognitive (θci ) and socio-
emotional skills (θei ) among individuals n belonging to a given generation g (e-









− n + 1
n
, ∀ x ∈ {c, e} , ∀ g ∈ {1, ..., G} (5.14)
(ii) Intraclass correlation. This measures the portion of total variance in cog-
nitive skills (θei ) and socio-emotional skills (θ
e
i ) due to variations between house-
holds h (equation 5.15). ICC can be interpreted as a measure of shared environ-
ment and used to quantify inequality among siblings. Values are defined in the
range [0, 1]. The higher the ICC, the more important is family background for














, ∀ x ∈ {c, e} , ∀ g ∈ {1, ..., G} (5.15)
where θˆxj,g is household’s h mean and θ
x
g the overall generation mean.
(iii) Intergenerational correlation. The Pearson correlation coefficient between
children’s cognitive and socio-emotional skills and parental average skills (house-
hold skills) is used as a measure of intergenerational persistence of inequality.
Values are defined in the range [0, 1]. A correlation close to 1 means high persis-
tence.
5.3 Experimental design
The DOE was used to set up the experiments (see Lorscheid et al., 2012). Ta-
ble 5.7 summarizes the dependent, independent, and control variables. Although
the analysis is exploratory and is intended to produce and not to test hypotheses
about which forms of parental behavior lead to which levels of inequality in so-
ciety, it seems reasonable to expect higher levels of inequality both within and
across generations from non-egalitarian and optimal allocation strategies com-
pared to egalitarian strategies. The reason is simple: given variability in individ-
11 If the size of households vary, equation 5.15 should correct for household size in the denom-
inator. This correction is not necessary in the present study because household size remains
constant within each simulation run (see Experimental Design below).
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ual gender, birth order, and skills, parents that are blind to these differences will
tend, over time, to level them up unintentionally through egalitarian resource al-
location. By contrast, resource allocation that not only deviates from equality but
is dictated by precisely those differences in gender, birth order, or skills should
tend to create divergent paths of individual skill growth along those same dimen-
sions and ultimately increase overall inequality. In other words, it is reasonable to
expect that equality (inequality) at the micro-level should translate into equality
(inequality) at the macro-level. This, however, is a simple and “naïve” intuition
about the macro-consequences of alternative parental behavior that needs to be
explored systematically using the experimental setup. In particular, the experi-
ments allow for the exploration of parental allocation decisions under changing
environmental conditions within the household (number of children and child
spacing) and in society as a whole (differences in resources among households).
Table 5.7: Classification of variables













Factor levels for the independent and control variables are shown in Table 5.8.
In the case of inequality of parental resources, zero inequality means equal re-
sources for all parents. Low inequality and high inequality are implemented by
a beta distribution with parameters that approximate a normal and a log-normal
distribution respectively.
Table 5.8: Factorial design
Factors Factor level range Factor levels
Investment behav-
ior
− {Optimal, equality, reinforcement
- compensation, son privilege,
first-born privilege, last-born
privilege}
Number of children [0, x]* {2, 3, 4}
Child spacing [1, x]* {2, 4, 6}
Inequality of paren-
tal resources
− {0, low, high}
Skill homophily [0, 1] {0.2, 0.8}
Investment bias (δ) [0, 1] {0.2, 0.8}
* In the factor level range, the x equals the upper boundary defined by the biological limits of childbirth.
Chapter 5 Closure in families: parental choices and children’s skills 147
A full factorial design was implemented. Since investment bias is not defined
for optimizing and egalitarian parents, the number of design points varies de-
pending on parental behavior, as summarized in Table 5.9. A total of 540 design
points was thus obtained.
Table 5.9: Factorial design
Parental investment behavior Design points
Optimizing







4. Son privilege 108
5. First-born favoritism 108
6. Late-born favoritism 108
For each design point, the optimal number of runs (n) was established by
computing the experimental error for the dependent variables for n = 5, 10, 15,
20, 25, 50, 100, 250, and 500 using egalitarian parents, which is the simplest
allocation rule. For each n and each design point, the coefficient of variation
Cv = standard deviationmean was estimated as suggested in Lorscheid et al. (2012). Re-
sults indicate that Cv stabilizes at around 50 iterations at most.
Owing to constraints in computer power, two separate experiments were run
to make simulation experiments computationally feasible. Simulating optimizing
parents is computationally expensive. Each household in the simulation, at each
t, solves a dynamic problem of optimizing resource allocation among a changing
number of children. Thus, the first experiment excluded optimizing parents and
ran the remaining 486 design points, including egalitarian parents, alongside all
other non-egalitarian strategies for 1,000 initial agents over five generations. The
second experiment considered optimizing parents and again included all design
points for egalitarian parents. The number of initial agents was 100, and the sim-
ulation was run for three generations. In this way, the computational burden was
reduced and all parental behavior models could be compared with one another
using egalitarian parents as a benchmark.
5.4 Results
To visualize and analyze output, a metamodel was used. Each of the three depen-
dent variables for each type of skill was summarized based on a linear-regression
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Tobit model, with the dependent variable defined in the range [0, 1]. The regres-
sors included all independent and control variables (see Table 5.7), and an inter-
action term between parental investment behavior and number of children, child
spacing, and parental resources. All variables were treated as categorical and
were included in the model using dummies for each of its values, thus allowing
for nonlinearities. A dummy for each generation was also included to control for
time. For each of the two experiments, the data used to estimate the parameters
of the regression encompassed all generations and experimental runs for each de-
sign point, as described above. The values of dependent variables corresponded
to levels observed at the end of each generation when all agents had reached
adulthood. Results are presented using predicted values.
5.4.1 Experiment 1: egalitarian vs. non-egalitarian parents
Non-egalitarian strategies include unequal distribution of resources based on child
endowments (reinforcement/compensation), gender (son privilege), and birth or-
der (first-born or last-born privilege). Figure 5.2 summarizes the predicted mar-
gins for each dependent variable and type of skill as a function of parental in-
vestment strategies. Both overall predicted averages and averages for changes
in covariates are displayed. Changes are presented using the overall predicted
average as a benchmark. The graph lines do not represent any particular trend;
they are shown to facilitate the visualization of predicted values across parental
investment strategies. Based on these results, five conclusions can be drawn.
i) Parental behavior matters. Parental investment strategies at the household
level do affect aggregate levels of skill inequality within and across gener-
ations. This is particularly true for Gini and ICC. Intergenerational correla-
tions are relatively insensitive to different parental investment strategies.
ii) Results are comparable for both types of skills. Differences among parental cog-
nitive and socio-emotional skills are not substantial. Only the ICC displays
skill-specific differences. The ICC for cognitive skills is relatively more sen-
sitive to child spacing, while the ICC for socio-emotional skills is relatively
more elastic to fertility. Aggregate levels of inequality for parents that con-
ferred last-born privilege also vary between types of skills; however, the
differences are small.
iii) Being egalitarian or not is the most important distinction in parental investment
behavior. In terms of effect on aggregate levels of inequality, the largest dif-
ferences can be seen between egalitarian and non-egalitarian parental in-
vestment strategies. Among non-egalitarian investment strategies, levels of
inequality are comparable.
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iv) There is a tradeoff between equality at home and inequality within and across gen-
erations. Equality at home reduces skill inequality within one generation
(Gini) but at the cost of increasing inequality across generations (ICC, in-
tergenerational correlation). The opposite is true for a non-egalitarian allo-
cation of resources at home. This contradicts the “naïve” expectation that
equality (inequality) at the micro-level always leads to equality (inequality)
at the macro-level.
v) Changes in the environment reduce or exacerbate inequality depending on parental
investment behavior. Although greater inequality in the distribution of pa-
rental resources produces greater inequality within (Gini) and across gen-
erations (ICC) for all types of parental investment strategies, changes in the
composition of the household (fertility and child spacing) affect inequal-
ity differently depending on parental choices. All else being equal, higher
fertility and wider child spacing have no influence on inequality within a
generation but reduce inequality across generations if the parents are egali-
tarian. Yet, if they are non-egalitarian, larger families are associated with a
lower Gini, a higher ICC (with the exception of son privilege), and a lower
intergenerational correlation. Wider child spacing has no influence on Gini
or intergenerational correlation but tends to reduce sibling similarity.
5.4.2 Experiment 2: egalitarian vs. optimizing parents
Do optimizing parents differ from egalitarian parents? Figure 5.3 summarizes
the predicted margins for each dependent variable and type of skill when parents
act as optimizers relative to the predicted values for egalitarian parents using the
latter as a reference (see Figure 5.2). The closer the difference in predicted values
is to zero, the more optimizing parents produce the same results as egalitarian
ones. On the graph, error bars around predicted values show whether differences
above or below zero are statistically significant.
At the aggregate level, differences between egalitarian and optimizing parents
are small. Only the difference in ICC for cognitive skills is sizable. Most of the
differences between the two types of parental behavior are evident in their effects
on inequality across generations as a response to changes in child spacing. When
child spacing increases both the ICC and the intergenerational correlation for op-
timizing parents increases more than for egalitarian parents. The opposite is true
for socio-emotional skills, for which wider child spacing reduces inequality across
generations. In short, aside from their response to child spacing, societal levels of
inequality generated by optimizing parents remain fairly close to those produced
by egalitarian parents. This implies, by transitivity, that non-egalitarian parents
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Figure 5.2: Differences in predicted values between egalitarian and non-
egalitarian parents, showing 95% confidence intervals12
12 Confidence intervals are so narrow that they appear as small rectangles on the graph. Lines
connecting these rectangles have been included to facilitate comparisons among models.
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Figure 5.3: Differences in predicted values between egalitarian and optimizing
parents, showing 95% confidence intervals
5.5 Validation
Although the simulation is a middle-range model, it is possible to assert the va-
lidity of at least one of its conclusions using empirical data. Ideally, cross-country
representative data on cognitive and socio-emotional skills for all members of
the household and for more than one generation, as well as data on parental al-
location behavior, would be required to test the relationship between parental
investments and societal levels of inequality. Unfortunately, such comprehen-
sive data do not exist. Although there are scattered, country-specific longitudinal
studies with some of the data needed, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynam-
ics (United States) and Socio-Economic Panel (Germany), they are not sufficient
to compare the Gini, ICC, and intergenerational correlation of different skills for
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various countries with varying parental investment strategies. For this reason,
only one model prediction can be validated, and only through indirect measures.
In terms of data needed, the less demanding prediction to validate is the one
related to cognitive skills within one generation, since neither data on siblings or
parents nor data on multiple generations are required. One common operational-
ization of cognitive skills is IQ. To obtain the distribution of cognitive skills for
young people, data from the Programme for International Student Assessment
(PISA) was used. The PISA test evaluates student competencies from randomly
selected students in multiple countries at age 15 in mathematics, science, and lan-
guage.13 As shown by Lynn and Vanhanen (2006, 69) , the correlation between
average mathematics scores in the PISA study and average country IQ is 0.876.
Thus, as a proxy measure of inequality in cognitive abilities within one genera-
tion, the Gini of total individual raw math scores in 61 countries based on 2009
PISA data was computed.
Furthermore, as a measure of parental investment strategies in the countries for
which PISA results are collected, the World Values Survey (WVS) was used. The
WVS includes representative data on values and beliefs across countries that con-
centrate over 85% of the world’s population.14 Based on this dataset, Inglehart
and Welzel (2005) defined a two-dimensional space that classifies all countries
in the survey according to their values: traditional vs. secular and survival vs.
self-expression. The more countries tend toward secular and self-expression val-
ues, the more they adhere to values such as individual freedom, equality, and
democracy. Although society-wide trends in values and beliefs are not a direct
measure of parental intrahousehold resource allocation strategies, it is plausible
to assume that parents in countries that score high in traditional and survival
values are more likely to follow non-egalitarian allocation rules such as gen-
der or birth-order privileges and reinforcing heuristics, while parents in coun-
tries with predominantly secular and self-expression values are more likely to be
inclined to follow egalitarian strategies that provide each individual child with
equal chances. In addition, and more specific to gender inequality, the WVS asks
respondents whether they agree, disagree, or neither agree nor disagree that men
should have a greater right to a job than women if jobs are scarce. If one codes
“agree” as -1, “neither agree nor disagree” as 0, and “disagree” as 1, a gender-
equality scale can be constructed, with average scores at the country level defined
between -1 (low gender equality) and 1 (high gender equality).
According to the predictions of the model, the inequality in mathematics scores
should be greater in countries with traditional and survival values and higher
gender inequality and less in countries with secular and self-expression values
13 http://www.oecd.org/pisa
14 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org
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and a lower tolerance for differences between men and women. As depicted in
Figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, this is in fact the case. The correlation between the Gini of
mathematics scores and the traditional/secular index is -0.54; if the survival/self-
expression index is used instead, the correlation is cut down by one third but re-
mains negative. Using the gender-equality scale, the correlation is -0.37. Similar
results are obtained if science and language individual raw scores are used: corre-
lations are -0.45 and -0.32 for the traditional/secular index, -0.33 and -0.33 for the
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Figure 5.6: Gini of PISA mathematics scores and country according to gender
equality score
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5.6 Summary
In this chapter, an agent-based simulation model (ABM) was developed and im-
plemented using Python to explore the emergence of intragenerational and in-
tergenerational skill inequality at the societal level that results from differences in
parental investment behavior at the household level during early stages of the life
course. The simulation can best be described as a middle-range model, informed
by research on skill formation and the intrahousehold allocation of resources. Pa-
rental behavior was modeled as optimal, heuristic-based, or norm-oriented. Skills
grow according to the technology of skill formation developed in the field of eco-
nomics, calibrated with empirically estimated parameters from existing research.
Agents go through a simplified life course. During childhood and adolescence,
skills are produced through parental investments. In adulthood, individuals find
a partner, give birth to the next generation, and invest in offspring. Number and
spacing of children and available resources are treated as exogenous factors and
are varied experimentally.
Simulation experiments suggested that parental decisions at the household
level, a direct form of closure, play a role in the emergence of inequality at the
societal level. Following egalitarian allocation rules as opposed to nonegalitar-
ian heuristic or norm-based rules appears to be the most important distinction in
parental investment behavior to explain aggregate differences in Gini, ICC, and
intergenerational correlations of cognitive and socio-emotional skills. Results ob-
tained from optimizing parental behavior were surprisingly close to those of egal-
itarian parents and thus distinct from those of heuristic-based and norm-oriented
parental behavior. Furthermore, there is a tradeoff between equality at home and
inequality at the macrolevel. Changes in the environment reduce or exacerbate
inequality depending on parental investment behavior. Finally, the fact that one
prediction of the model related to the distribution of cognitive skills within one
generation and parental allocation strategies seems to be supported by empiri-
cal data, despite the proxy nature of the measures used, gives credence to the




Closure in networks: language skills
and friendship ties
The potential of applying the concept of closure to the study of social networks
resides not only in understanding how social ties are formed and persist, or how
individuals are affected by such ties, but in combining both processes systemat-
ically. By looking at social networks through the lens of network formation and
peer effects simultaneously it becomes clear how exclusionary action brings about
inequality.
There is abundant empirical evidence on the processes involved in tie creation,
consolidation, and decay. Phenomena such as homophily and preferential at-
tachment, dyadic transactions (in particular, reciprocity and repetition), triadic
configurations (including balance and triadic closure), and contextual variables
(such as physical space and shared activities) are all critical to understanding tie
formation (Rivera, Soderstrom, & Uzzi, 2010). Parallel to the research on network
formation, there is a growing literature on peer effects that is full of examples
of how relationships exert a decisive influence on individuals, both positive, as
with the spread of happiness (Fowler & Christakis, 2008), and negative, as with
the apparent contagious character of suicide (Bearman & Moody, 2004).
The study of social inequality and social stratification has benefited from both
research fields. Understanding network formation has been central in the study
of inequalities resulting from differences in social capital, the resources embed-
ded in social relationships (Burt, 2005; Lin, 2009). Similarly, peer effects in crime
(Baerveldt et al., 2008), health (Smith & Christakis, 2008), and performance in
school and tertiary education (Sacerdote, 2011) have become almost common-
sense knowledge in discussions of social deviance and social problems. Given
the relevance of each of these two research traditions taken separately for the
study of social inequality and stratification, there is much to be gained by consid-
ering network formation and peer effects simultaneously from the perspective of
closure as exclusionary action.
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Efforts have already been devoted to achieve exactly this integration. For ex-
ample, as reviewed by DiMaggio and Garip (2011, 2012), the spread of benefi-
cial practices and behavior can be explained by the combined effect of tie forma-
tion and network dynamics. Given homophilous network formation, cumulative
(dis)advantage results from network externalities, peer learning, and peer pres-
sure, exacerbated by network segregation and repeated network interaction. In a
similar vein but in much more general terms, Mulder et al. (2009) and Bowles et
al. (2010) offer an explanation of the emergence and persistence of skill inequality
within and across generations through the combined effect of network segrega-
tion and human capital spillovers through network ties.
Following this line of thought, this chapter investigates the role of language
spoken at home, as a proxy measure for children’s proficiency in the language
spoken in kindergarten, on the creation of friendship ties at an early age. Insofar
as friendship ties bring together individuals with shared attributes, they create,
intentionally or otherwise, clusters of advantage and disadvantage, a form of clo-
sure that operates through direct interaction. If the language skills of those at the
upper end of the skill distribution help them build networks that further acceler-
ate their language development, while those less proficient in the language, such
as children growing up in a bilingual environment, are not able to do so because
of their lower language skills in the language spoken in kindergarten, then the
effect of language on tie formation could set in motion both a virtuous and a vi-
cious cycle in terms of language development, depending on the initial skills of a
child in the early stages of the life course.
Networks have long been recognized as important contexts for child develop-
ment (Cochran, 1993; Cochran & Brassard, 1979). Language, too, is developed to
some extent through peer interaction, something that is particularly evident in
the acquisition of a second language (e. g., Oller & Eilers, 2002; Swain, Brooks, &
Tocalli-Beller, 2002). Peers provide children with the opportunity to use language
and with a language model to learn from, both of which may potentially im-
pact their language acquisition (Hoff, 2006), although interaction with competent
adult speakers is still decisive and cannot be substituted for by peers (e. g., Hut-
tenlocher, Waterfall, Vasilyeva, Vevea, & Hedges, 2010). While there are few stud-
ies measuring the exact impact of peers on language development (Hoff, 2006,
71), existing quantitative evidence seems to confirm a positive effect of peers’ lan-
guage skills on language development in preschool children. For example, Mash-
burn, Justice, Downer, and Pianta (2009) using data for 1,812 4-year-old children
in 453 classrooms in the U.S. found a positive influence of classmates’ language
skills on language skill growth. Justice, Petscher, Schatschneider, and Mashburn
(2011) arrive at similar conclusions with a smaller sample of 338 children in 49
classrooms. Thus, based on research about the importance of networks for de-
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velopment in general and studies about peers and language development in par-
ticular, it seems safe to assume as a premise for the following analysis that the
number of peers (network size) and their language skills in the language they use
in kindergarten (network composition) may affect language development begin-
ning early in life.
The analysis conducted in this chapter builds upon previous studies on friend-
ship formation in preschool children. Friendship ties have been shown to be de-
termined by age and gender homophily, popularity, reciprocity, and triadic clo-
sure (Daniel, Santos, Peceguina, & Vaughn, 2012; Schaefer, Light, Fabes, Han-
ish, & Martin, 2010). In this chapter, data on the friendship networks from 125
preschool children distributed in six different classrooms from two kindergartens
in Germany are used to explore the so far neglected effect of proficiency in the lan-
guage spoken in the kindergarten (in this case German) on tie formation.1 Based
on estimates from exponential random graph models (ERGM), two questions are
answered:
• Do homophily, triadic closure, and reciprocity explain friendship network
formation of preschool children?
• How are language skills in the language spoken at the kindergarten relevant
for network formation?
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 presents data and measures.
The methods used, exponential random graph models (ERGM), are briefly ex-
plained in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 presents bivariate results, summarizes esti-
mates of the ERGMs, and discusses in detail the effect of language proficiency on
tie formation from the perspective of inequality through peer effects.
1 The data on friendship networks used in this chapter were collected by the research project
“Ethnic Heterogeneity and the Production of Inequality in Educational Organizations from
Early Childhood Onward”, which is part the Collaborative Research Unit (CRC) 882 at Bielefeld
University (http://www.sfb882.uni-bielefeld.de/en). The project is lead by Prof. Isabell
Diehm; the research team is composed by the research fellows Jennifer Carnin, Claudia
Machold, and Lara Pötzschke, as well as by Melanie Kuhn and Miriam Mai, who are former
research fellows and current associated members of the project (http://www.sfb882.uni-
bielefeld.de/en/projects/b1).
I am very grateful to Melanie Kuhn, Miriam Mai, Lara Pötzschke, and Jennifer Carnin
for their efforts to collect and prepare the data on friendship networks and for making it
available for conducting the research reported in this chapter.
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6.1 Data and measures
6.1.1 Site
Data were collected in two ethnically diverse kindergartens in Germany as part of
a longitudinal ethnographic study of ethnicity and inequality in the educational
system (see Diehm, Kuhn, & Mai, 2013, for more details about the study). Data
gathering was conducted in six different classrooms in the two kindergartens over
a period of approximately 6 weeks in early 2013.
6.1.2 Data
Data relevant to the present analysis comes from three different sources. For a
total of 125 children, data on friendship ties were gathered by means of short
individual interviews with each child. Language skills were measured individ-
ually for a subsample of 44 children using the standardized test Delfin4, which
measures proficiency in the German language (Fried, Briedigkeit, Isele, & Schun-
der, 2009). Additional socio-demographic variables, such as gender and age, but
also language spoken at home, were collected using a standardized questionnaire
completed by the child’s parents.
6.1.3 Measures
• Friendship ties: children were asked to name up to three other children in
the same classroom as theirs with whom they enjoyed playing. Preference
for play partners is an appropriate proxy for friendship given the high over-
lap between play and friendship among preschool children (Fehr, 1995).
• Language proficiency: as a direct measure of proficiency in German the
scores from the Delfin4 test were used. The test is routinely collected by
kindergartens themselves in cooperation with elementary schools. Scores
were therefore analyzed as secondary data.2 Results of the test are defined
in the interval [20, 75]. Values below 47.8 mean that children need addi-
tional German language training. However, since test scores were not col-
lected for all children from which friendship ties were elicited, the first lan-
guage spoken in the family was used as an indirect measure for proficiency
in the German language (German as primary language at home = high Ger-
man language skills; other primary language spoken at home = low German
language skills). See Figure 6.2 in the results section below (Section 6.3) for
2 In North Rhine-Westphalia, where the data was collected, the test will be discontinued by the
end of 2014. For more information on Delfin4, see Diehm et al. (2013).
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the relationship between Delphi4 scores and this proxy measure of German
language skills.
• To investigate homophily in basic sociodemographic attributes, a dummy
variable for sex (1=boys) and age measured in months were included. Ta-
ble 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the individuals and the net-
works of each classroom.
6.1.4 Missing data
Of the 125 children in the sample, data were not collected for 19 children whose
parents declined to take part in the study. This amounts to 15% of the sample on
friendship ties, which is not very high and does not affect the indegree distribu-
tion because the other children’s answers about ties to the missing 19 cases are
available. Regarding the covariates, there are almost complete cases. First lan-
guage spoken at home was missing for two children only. For them a category
of “missing” was created as a separate language and kept in the analysis. There
were no missing data for these age and gender variables. Only the birth month
of one child was missing, so for this child an age in months equal to the expected
average age given the year of birth was imputed.
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Individual level (N = 125)
Age 56.416 11.073 31 82
Sex (Boy = 1) 0.568 0.497 0 1
Family language (German = 1) 0.744 0.438 0 1
Outdegree 1.648 1.138 0 3
Indegree 1.648 1.421 0 7
Network level (N = 6)
Classroom size 20.833 1.602 19 23
Density 0.134 0.026 0.094 0.162
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6.2 Methods: exponential random graph models
(ERGM)
Exponential random graph models (ERGM) or p* models are statistical mod-
els that investigate the mechanisms underlying tie formation (Robins, Pattison,
Kalish, & Lusher, 2007). The main advantage of ERGMs is the possibility of mak-
ing statistically informed conjectures about the likely local processes involved in
network formation based on cross-sectional data. Even if the dynamics of net-
work formation remain concealed, the microprocess underlying tie creation can
be inferred from the resulting network configuration observed at a single point
in time. An additional advantage of ERGMs is their versatility. They allow one to
model simultaneously various local processes in networks, including the effect of
different dyadic and triadic mechanisms, as well as various forms of interaction
between node attributes and ties.
The logic behind ERGMs is simple. The frequency of configurations observed
in the data, such as reciprocal or homophilous ties, is compared with a distri-
bution from a sample obtained through simulation of all theoretically possible
networks generated by chance that have the same number of nodes and ties as
the network at hand. If the configurations found in the data are more frequent
than expected by chance it can be inferred that the tie-formation processes asso-
ciated with the observed configurations explain how the network came about.3
The general formulation of an ERGM is given by equation 6.1 (Robins et al., 2007,
178–9).










Pr(Y=y) is the probability distribution of networks of all possible networks with
a given number of nodes, y is the observed network, k is a normalizing factor, A
are the configurations, gA tells whether A is observed in the graph, and ηA quan-
tifies the importance of A in the model, that is, the higher or lower probability of
tie creation given a configuration.
Based on past research using ERGMs (Daniel et al., 2012) and similar studies
with longitudinal data (Schaefer et al., 2010), equation 6.1 was fitted with the
following network configurations:
• Network configurations based on ties.
– Density: General tendency for tie formation.
3 For a comprehensive introduction to ERGMs see Lusher, Koskinen, and Robins (2012).
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– Reciprocity: Children are mentioned as friends by those they regard as
friends.
– Isolates, sinks, and sources: These effects represent children without any
incoming ties (sources), without outgoing ties (sinks) or without both
incoming and outgoing ties (isolates). As suggested by Robins, Patti-
son, and Wang (2009), it is important to include these configurations
as control variables to better fit data.
– Triadic closure: For undirected graphs, triadic closure constitutes a tri-
angle, whereas directed graphs allow for a total of seven possible trian-
gle-like configurations. To simplify, and since the outdegree is limited
to three friends by design, only two forms of triadic closure that in-
volve one-directional ties are considered. These are the so-called tran-
sitive and cyclic triads (see Figure 6.1). While the former measures the
tendency of friends to become friends, the latter captures generalized
exchange (Robins et al., 2009).
Figure 6.1: Two forms of triadic closure
• Node configurations based on node attributes (sex, age, and language spo-
ken at home).
– Activity and popularity: Children with a given attribute tend to nomi-
nate more friends (activity) or receive more nominations from others
(popularity).
– Homophily in dyadic/categorical attributes (sex and family language): Chil-
dren who share the same attribute tend to be connected. A positive
parameter means homophily, a negative parameter heterophily.
– Homophily in continuous attributes (age): The logic is the same as with
dyadic attributes. However, for continuous attributes, similarity is
measured by the distance between the attributes of two nodes. If chil-
dren with the same age tend to build ties, homophily is high. This cor-
responds to a negative parameter estimate (the smaller the distance,
the higher the probability of a tie).
164 6.3 Results
Two models are estimated. Model 1 treats language as a dichotomous variable,
while Model 2 operationalizes language spoken at home categorically, coding the
exact family language spoken by children at home, thus assuming that children
who speak the same language at home have similar command of the German
language. Aside from these differences in measuring language, Models 1 and 2
are identical.
It is assumed that parameter estimates of equation 6.1 are the same for all class-
rooms, which is a reasonable assumption given that the two kindergartens in the
sample are similar in their demographic composition. This same strategy was fol-
lowed by Schaefer et al. (2010), whereas Daniel et al. (2012) used a meta-analysis
approach that allowed for differences across classrooms. To estimate the param-
eters, a unique adjacency matrix with the ties of all children in the six classrooms
was created. Since ties are not allowed between classrooms, a structural zero ma-
trix that sets all between-classroom ties to zero was specified.
Because nonresponse missing data are present in the outdegree of 19 children,
two alternative estimation strategies were followed. First, Models 1 and 2 were
estimated using maximum likelihood estimates (MLE), ignoring missing data and
assigning zeros in the adjacency matrix to the outgoing ties of children that did
not report who their playmates were. Second, in order to get around the possible
bias introduced by missing data in MLE, models were fitted a second time using
Bayesian estimates and data augmentation methods (for a comparison of the two
estimation methods, see Lusher et al., 2012, 147–9). The software PNet and its
extension MPNet were used to obtain MLE and Bayesian estimates, respectively.4
6.3 Results
Results are presented in four steps. First, central descriptive and bivariate results
are discussed. Second, MLE and Bayesian estimates of Models 1 and 2 are sum-
marized. Third, a sensitivity analysis of the results was conducted by including
high-order configurations in the models and fitting them once again using both
MLE and Bayesian estimates. Closing the analysis, results were interpreted from
the perspective of peer effects on the development of German language profi-
ciency.
6.3.1 Descriptive and bivariate results
Distribution of language spoken at home. The distribution of languages spoken
by children in the whole sample is summarized in Table 6.2. Children who speak
German at home constitute the clear majority, reaching almost 75% of the total
4 Software and documentation can be downloaded from http://sna.unimelb.edu.au/PNet
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number of participants in the study. In the remaining 25% of the sample, roughly
three-fourths correspond to children who speak Turkish, Kurdish, and Russian at
home. Only a small minority of children speak a language different from the four
most prevalent languages in the sample. It is important to note that the second
and third languages spoken in the family were also collected. Except for eight
children, families that reported speaking a language other than German at home
also declared that they spoke German as a second family language. Similarly,
35 out of 93 children that spoke German at home as the primary language also
spoke a second language different from German. As explained next, in terms
of language proficiency, the first and not the second language spoken at home
seemed to be the most important indicator of proficiency in the German language.
Table 6.2: Language spoken at home
Language N %
German 93 74.4 %
Turkish 8 6.4 %
Kurdish 6 4.8 %
Russian 6 4.8 %
Arabic 2 1.6 %
Tamil 2 1.6 %
Albanian 1 0.8 %
Kosovar 1 0.8 %
Persian 1 0.8 %
Roma 1 0.8 %
Amaziht 1 0.8 %
Hungarian 1 0.8 %
Missing 2 1.6 %
Total 125 100 %
Language spoken at home and German language proficiency. The starting point
of this analysis was that German language proficiency correlates with German
language use at home. The results displayed in Figure 6.2 give credence to this
assertion. For a subsample of 44 children for whom command of the German
language was assessed, average test scores were higher for children who spoke
German at home as the primary language. A t-test suggests that this difference is
statistically significant (p<0.05).
One could argue that the relevant distinction is whether children speak only
German at home or not, that is, whether there is a second family language. Fig-
ure 6.3 shows average language skills for children classified according to their
first and second language spoken at home. As can be seen, the best predictor of








































Figure 6.3: Language proficiency and first and second language spoken at home
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Language proficiency, network size, and network composition. As argued in
the introduction to this chapter, differences in language proficiency as a func-
tion of primary language spoken at home can impact children’s language skill
development through friendship networks (size and composition). For the sub-
sample of children for whom German language proficiency was measured, the
correlation between German language skills and both total degree (network size)
and proportion of total incoming and outgoing ties constituted by children that
spoke German as a primary language at home (network composition) was pos-
itive (ρ = 0.13 and ρ = 0.08, respectively).5 While this result proves nothing
about the direction of causality in these two bivariate relations, results are at least
consistent with the premise of the present analysis about the positive impact of
network size and composition on language skills.
Language homophily in friendship ties. From the perspective of network forma-
tion and inequality in language development, the decisive question is whether
language proficiency plays a role in the emergence of friendship networks. As
shown in Figure 6.4, there appears to be no clear division of ties along the lines
of language spoken at home and hence along differences in command of the Ger-
man language.6
Beyond the mere visual inspection of Figure 6.4, language assortativity can
be measured using a summary index. There are various strategies to quantify
segregation in networks depending on which null model or definition of non-
segregation is assumed (Bojanowski & Corten, 2014). Since the focus here is tie
formation, it is critical to know whether the mixing pattern inside the classrooms
can be explained by a child’s preference for friends with similar language skills
or whether it simply results from the constrained opportunities to form friend-
ships given the distribution of children in terms of language spoken at home
(Table 6.2). In other words, considering that one-fourth of the children spoke
a language other than German at home, chances are higher that they will make
friends with those in the German-speaking majority than vice versa.
With this distinction between choice and opportunity structure in mind, the
Coleman’s homophily index was chosen (Coleman, 1958). The index measures
the tendency of nodes to connect across categorical boundaries over and above
what can be expected assuming a uniform probability of tie formation, condi-
tioned on the relative size of each category in the population. If the number of
ties within categories correspond to what is expected by their size, the index takes
the value of zero. Positive values of the index indicate homophily. The index
5 Given the high skewness of degree distribution in social networks, Spearman’s ρ and not Pear-
son’s r was used as a measure of correlation.
6 Each classroom is called by the name of a fruit, a strategy used during field work to ensure
data anonymity.
168 6.3 Results
(a) Lemons (b) Apples (c) Cherries
(d) Raspberries (e) Melons (f) Pears
Figure 6.4: Friendship ties in 6 classrooms (black nodes: German spoken at home;
white nodes: other language.)
is defined for each category separately and was computed classifying children
according to a dichotomous distinction regarding the primary language spoken
at home: those coming from German-speaking households and those from non-
German-speaking households. Although using a categorical variable with each
language separately would be more precise than a dichotomous distinction, chil-
dren belonging to the non-German-speaking minority were scattered in the six
classrooms so that at most only two children per classroom spoke the same non-
German language at home as their primary language.
Results for the homophily index for each group in each classroom are summa-
rized in Figure 6.5. The difference between groups is evident. While children
in the German-speaking group showed positive or low homophily, children in
the non-German-speaking group tended toward heterophily. Recall that Cole-
man’s index controls for the relative size of the groups, so the heterophily among
non-German-speaking groups is not due to their minority status. It is also inter-
esting to note that, except for two classrooms, the homophilous tendency among
German-speaking children was rather small. The two exceptions were the ‘cher-
ries’ and the ‘melons.’
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German Non-German
Figure 6.5: Homophily in friendship ties by language spoken at home
6.3.2 ERGM: maximum likelihood estimates (MLE)
To investigate the data further equation 6.1 was fitted to include all network con-
figurations listed in Section 6.2. First, maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) in
PNet were used without imputing missing data on friendship ties and setting
the maximum number of outgoing ties to three. In the next section, the results
of using Bayesian methods and data augmentation for missing ties are reported.
Language spoken at home is tested both as dichotomous (Model 1) and as a cate-
gorical variable (Model 2).
The MLE are summarized in Table 6.3. Estimates were run until all parameters
converged (convergence < 0.1). The interpretation of the parameters is straight-
forward. Positive and statistically significant coefficients mean a greater-than-
chance frequency of the particular configuration in the observed data (e. g., reci-
procity), while negative and statistically significant coefficients mean a lower-
than-chance frequency. These effects should be interpreted ceteris paribus, that is,
keeping the other coefficients constant as in linear regression models. The size of
the coefficient is not as relevant as whether the parameter deviates from what is
expected by chance or not.
Model 1: Language dichotomous. The parameters for reciprocity and transitive
closure were positive, while the parameter for cyclic closure was negative. This
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suggests that children tend to make friends with friends of friends but are not
engaged in generalized exchange constellations. Boys appear to be both less ac-
tive and less popular than girls, as indicated by the negative parameter for the
interaction of activity and popularity with sex of the child. This means that both
indegree and outdegree is lower for boys. Irrespective of sex, older children tend
to be more popular. The effects of similarity in sex and age suggest homophily in
the two variables. However, once these effects are taken into account, proficiency
in German language as measured through primary language spoken at home ap-
pears to have no impact on tie formation. The parameters for activity, popularity,
and homophily of family language are estimated with large standard errors and
thus are statistically not different from chance.
Goodness-of-fit analysis showed convergence and stability of parameter esti-
mates. This can be inferred from the t-ratio obtained by comparing predicted
counts of various graph statistics using model parameters with the observed
graph. In all cases the t-ratio is below 0.1 for configurations explicitly defined
in the model and below 2.0 for the remaining configurations, which are the rec-
ommended rules of thumb to assess goodness of fit in ERGMs (Lusher et al., 2012,
pp. 165–77; 181–2).
Model 2: Language categorical. As a robustness test for the nonsignificant effect
of language found in Model 1, a second model was fitted in which language was
operationalized categorically. Results of this new model are also summarized in
Table 6.3. Except for age homophily, estimates are very close to those of Model 1.
The effect of language homophily is here also statistically nonsignificant, suggest-
ing that German language proficiency appears to add little to the probability of
tie formation over and above the network configurations included in the model.
6.3.3 ERGM: Bayesian estimates with imputed data
So far, missing data has not been addressed, which can have serious consequences
for parameter estimates (Kossinets, 2006). Therefore, to evaluate the stability of
results obtained from MLEs equation 6.1 was fitted using Bayesian methods that
include data augmentation for missing values. Parameter estimates were com-
puted using MPNet, an extension of PNet for multilevel networks. A total of
20 estimation runs were performed to produce better estimates. Goodness-of-fit
analysis showed that the model fit the data well. Owing to problems with the soft-
ware, an interaction with a continuous node attribute made the program crash.
For this reason, age was operationalized in years and treated as a categorical vari-
able. Results are summarized in Table 6.4. The interpretation of the coefficients
is the same as with MLE.
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Table 6.3: MLE
Model 1 Model 2
Effects Estimates Std. Error Converg. Estimates Std. Error Converg.
Density -4.639 0.761* 0.023 -3.907 0.637* -0.033
Reciprocity 1.602 0.296* 0.025 1.603 0.310* 0.003
Sink -0.064 0.435 -0.006 -0.069 0.424 0.005
Source -1.189 0.410* -0.019 -1.166 0.388* -0.026
Isolates -0.264 0.479 -0.019 -0.219 0.479 -0.049
Triadic closure
transitive triad 0.952 0.109* 0.022 0.956 0.108* -0.085
cyclic triad -1.102 0.341* 0.026 -1.098 0.363* -0.031
Sex
(boys = 1)
activity -0.812 0.255* 0.002 -0.793 0.244* -0.031
popularity -1.588 0.282* 0.034 -1.590 0.280* 0.006
homophily 2.272 0.342* 0.028 2.261 0.341* -0.037
Age
(in months. continuous)
activity 0.009 0.009 0.022 0.022 0.009* -0.039
popularity 0.022 0.008* 0.032 -0.034 0.009* 0.047
homophily (distance) -0.034 0.009* -0.014 0.008 0.009 -0.032
Language at home
(German=1)
activity 0.726 0.436 0.031
popularity 0.671 0.431 0.023
homophily -0.529 0.459 0.034
(Categorical)
match 0.276 0.147 -0.038
* Statistically significant estimates, Wald test at 95% confidence level.
Model 1: Language dichotomous. Results were very similar to those obtained
through MLE. The sign of the parameters is consistent with the results already
discussed. The main difference is that with Bayesian estimates the parameters
associated with primary language at home were statistically significant. Children
with a higher German language proficiency, those who spoke German as a pri-
mary language at home, tended to be more active (higher outdegree) and more
popular (higher indegree) than those with lower German language skills. How-
ever, the homophily coefficient is negative, suggesting a tendency of the children
to form friendship ties across boundaries of proficiency of German language, ce-
teris paribus.
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Table 6.4: Bayesian estimates with missing data imputation
Model 1 Model 2
Effects Estimates Std. Error Estimates Std. Error
Density -3.447 0.004 -2.916 0.010
Reciprocity 1.550 0.048 1.568 0.001
Sink -0.392* 0.036 -0.550* 0.009
Source -0.729* 0.023 -0.915* 0.016
Isolates 0.010 0.009 -0.518* 0.025
Triadic closure
transitive triad 0.708* 0.012 0.679* 0.004
cyclic triad -0.744* 0.016 -0.770* 0.004
Sex (boys = 1)
activity -0.909* 0.023 -0.699* 0.001
popularity -1.725* 0.055 -1.878* 0.023
homophily 2.410* 0.023 2.488* 0.013
Age
(in years. categorical)








* Statistically significant estimates, Wald test at 95% confidence level.
Model 2: Language categorical. As with Model 1, results from Model 2 using
Bayesian estimates were comparable to those obtained through MLE. Again, the
only difference was the coefficient for language measured categorically, which in
this case was statistically significant but very close to zero. This should come as
no surprise, since as shown in Model 1, children who spoke German at home
were indifferent to the language of their peers, whereas those who spoke a dif-
ferent primary language other than German at home seldom have the chance to
find others who share their same language proficiency given the small numbers
and high diversity of non-German speakers within classrooms (see Section 6.3.1,
Table 6.2).
6.3.4 Sensitivity analysis: higher-order parameters
As evidenced by the similarity of results obtained with and without missing data
imputation, parameter estimates seem to be robust to missing values. However,
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Figure 6.6: Higher order triads
to further test the sensitivity of results to model specification, higher-order pa-
rameters were specified and equation 6.1 was again fitted with MLE and Bayesian
methods.
Higher-order parameters refer to tie configurations that are more complex than
dyads or triads. To measure the tendency of the network to be centralized in inde-
gree or outdegree, two additional parameters were included: popularity spread
(multiple ties pointing to one node) and activity spread (one node pointing to
multiple ties). In addition, based on Robins et al. (2009), triadic closure was mod-
eled in more detail, making use of higher-order triads. Four triadic configura-
tions were tested separately (see Figure 6.6): (i) path closure, which corresponds
to transitive closure and measures the tendency of open triads to closure; (ii) ac-
tivity closure and (iii) popularity closure, or the tendency to connect among those
who share outgoing or incoming ties, respectively; and (iv) cyclic closure, which
as already mentioned, captures generalized exchange relationships.
Results are displayed in Table 6.5 for MLE with missing data and in Table 6.6
for Bayesian estimates with imputed data. Goodness-of-fit analysis suggested
that all models fit the data well. Results were consistent with parameter estimates
presented so far and suggest that the effect of reciprocity and triadic closure, as
well as sex, age, and language, are robust to changes in model specification.
6.3.5 Discussion: the effect of language on tie formation
As explained by Lusher et al. (2012, ch. 8), the effects associated with node at-
tributes should not be interpreted independent of each other. The probability of
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Table 6.5: MLE: Higher order parameters
Model 1 Model 2
Effects Estimates Std. Error Converg. Estimates Std. Error Converg.
Density -5.764 1.355* 0.010 -5.149 1.350* -0.018
Reciprocity 1.535 0.293* 0.082 1.545 0.295* -0.012
Sink -1.860 1.246 -0.016 -1.863 1.290 0.077
Source -0.659 0.783 -0.046 -0.709 0.781 0.029
Isolates -1.479 1.414 -0.055 -1.501 1.394 -0.045
Centralization
popularity -0.422 0.436 -0.028 -0.387 0.445 -0.030
activity 1.311 0.896 -0.013 1.319 0.896 -0.013
Triadic closure
path closure 1.799 0.706* -0.007 1.798 0.698* -0.009
activity closure -0.336 0.140* 0.017 -0.328 0.141* -0.031
popularity closure -0.635 0.404 0.005 -0.645 0.393 -0.003
cyclic closure -0.121 0.680 -0.010 -0.116 0.663 -0.011
Sex
(boys = 1)
activity -0.815 0.263* -0.052 -0.809 0.264* 0.038
popularity -1.586 0.284* -0.053 -1.593 0.286* -0.005
homophily 2.254 0.361* -0.059 2.252 0.336* -0.010
Age
(in months. continuous)
activity 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.010 -0.028
popularity 0.024 0.009* 0.005 0.024 0.009* -0.023
homophily (distance) -0.034 0.008* -0.055 -0.034 0.009* -0.078
Language at home
(German=1)
activity 0.699 0.412 -0.015
popularity 0.683 0.383 -0.012
homophily -0.519 0.425 -0.020
(Categorical)
match 0.279 0.143 -0.049
* Statistically significant estimates, Wald test at 95% confidence level.
a tie among, say two girls, is affected by their popularity, activity, and homophily
parameters simultaneously. In order to make interpretation of the total effect of
node attributes easier, they therefore advise the use of conditional odds ratios.
This is analogous to the interpretation of the coefficients of a logistic regression:
given a baseline probability between nodes with a certain attribute, the relative
increase or decrease in the probability of a tie for all possible remaining combina-
tions of attributes is computed. As an example, define the activity parameter θs,
popularity parameter θr, and the homophily parameter θh. In the case of sex, with
boys = 1 and girls = 0, the odd ratios can be formulated as follows (see Lusher et
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Table 6.6: Bayesian estimates with missing data imputation: Higher-order pa-
rameters
Model 1 Model 2
Effects Estimates Std. Error Estimates Std. Error
Density -2.337* 0.002 -2.498* 0.012
Reciprocity 1.833* 0.007 1.402* 0.021
Sink 0.757* 0.009 0.041 0.021
Source -1.044* 0.014 -1.226* 0.042
Isolates 0.254* 0.011 -0.130* 0.045
Centralization
popularity 0.047* 0.000 0.209* 0.017
activity -1.164* 0.003 -0.777* 0.004
Triadic closure
path closure 0.704* 0.011 1.523* 0.029
activity closure 0.817* 0.010 -0.084* 0.034
popularity closure -0.436* 0.011 -0.363* 0.074
cyclic closure -0.352* 0.008 -0.347* 0.013
Sex (boy=1)
activity -0.829* 0.020 -0.638* 0.035
popularity -1.315* 0.009 -1.468* 0.048
homophily 2.017* 0.012 1.977* 0.095
Age
(in years. categorical)








* Statistically significant estimates, Wald test at 95% confidence level.
al., 2012, 97–8):
• Tie between girls = 1 (baseline)
• Tie between boys = eθs+θr+θh
• Tie between a boy and a girl = eθs
• Tie between a girl and a boy = eθr
To illustrate, Figure 6.7 displays the effects of sex on tie formation based on
MLE parameter estimates of Model 1, Table 6.3. As can be seen, same sex ties
have a higher probability to be observed in the data than ties across sexes.
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Figure 6.7: MLE total effect of sex on tie formation (odds ratios)
The same analysis can be conducted with German language skills. Since MLEs
for language proficiency were statistically not significant, Bayesian estimates were
used instead. As shown in Figure 6.8, the lowest probability for tie formation was
predicted for ties among children who spoke primary language other than Ger-
man at home (baseline). These children seemed to prefer peers who had German
as their home language. By contrast, children from households in which German
was the primary language seemed to make no distinction across language lines.
In other words, language spoken at home does not seem to create a strong seg-
regation across the boundary created by command of the German language such
that proficient speakers are friends with proficient speakers and nonproficient
speakers are friends with others like them. In fact, the combination that would
definitely bring children together with lower German language skills appeared to
be less prevalent in the data. So, if at all, segregation is likely among those who
are better off being segregated in terms of being exposed to proficient peers in the
German language.
Despite this lack of evidence for segregation, language seems to affect network
size. Children who speak German at home tend to be both more active connec-
tors and more popular friendship choices, which results in bigger networks for
them. This is consistent with the heterophilous preference of children from non-
German-speaking households for children whose primary language is German
and the indifference of the latter for the language of their friends. In other words,
the former are choosy and have smaller networks, the latter are less exclusive and
have bigger networks.
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Figure 6.8: Bayesian estimates total effect of language spoken at home on tie for-
mation (odds ratios)
In a nutshell, it can be concluded that German language skills, measured in-
directly according to the primary language spoken at home, affects friendship
networks through differences in activity and popularity that result in differences
in network size and through the integration of children with different language
skills. What the net effect of these differences in tie formation on German lan-
guage development is remains an open question, and the answer depends on the
relative importance of composition effects versus size effects. From the perspec-
tive of children in the minority group, those who speak a language other than
German at home, composition effects might be positive while size effects might
be negative. Estimates suggest that these children do exclude other children like
themselves from their networks (others who speak a language other than German
at home), which may turn out to be advantageous for them because it leads to a
higher prevalence of friends in their networks who are proficient in the German
language and from whom they can learn the language. On the other hand, their
networks are smaller and hence they probably have a smaller chance of practicing
the language. From the perspective of children in the majority group, those who
speak German at home, results are exactly the opposite. They may benefit from
bigger networks but probably lose from having friends in their networks who
are less proficient in the German language. As a consequence of these opposing
tendencies for children in different categories, the direction of the net effect on
inequality in terms of advantages and disadvantages in language development
cannot be predicted without ambiguity.
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6.4 Summary
This chapter investigates the role of language skills in network formation, a direct
form of closure, among 125 preschool children in two ethnically diverse kinder-
gartens in Germany. The premise of the analysis is that peers can foster language
development by providing a model to learn the language (composition effects)
and interaction partners to practice (size effects). Using exponential random
graph models (ERGM), the impact on tie formation of the language spoken by
children at home, a proxy for proficiency in the German language, was quanti-
fied. The models were fitted both with MLE and Bayesian methods, controlling
for dyadic and triadic processes shown in previous studies to affect friendship tie
creation.
Results suggested that reciprocity, triadic closure, gender and age differences
in activity and popularity, and age and gender homophily predict network ties.
Language spoken at home impacts tie formation in two ways. First, it promotes
integration: children who speak a primary language other than German at home
(lower German language skills) prefer children as friends who live in a house-
hold that speaks German (higher German language skills), while the latter make
no distinction across this language line when creating friendship ties. Second,
children with higher German language proficiency are more active and popular
connectors and hence enjoy bigger friendship networks.
How these effects of language on tie formation impact German language devel-
opment is not clear since composition effects seem to favor children with low Ger-
man language skills (more friends with high German language proficiency) while
size effects seem to benefit children with high German language skills (more




What have we learned? The path
ahead
7.1 Main contributions
The main contributions of the present investigation can be summarized in three
groups: a meta-level about how to do sociological research, a substantive applied
level in the study of social inequality, and a methodological level regarding the
use of agent-based simulation methods in a life-course perspective and of statis-
tical models to quantify network formation in children.
i) At a meta-level, this dissertation contributed to the discussion of fundamen-
tal epistemological and metaphysical issues surrounding the debate on so-
cial mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in sociology (Hedström &
Ylikoski, 2010). It showed how to make the mechanistic agenda in sociol-
ogy work by providing a definition of social mechanisms as an enriched
heuristic and by making explicit both the core principles of a mechanistic
approach and the risks of following the champions of social mechanisms in
sociology without a healthy dose of skepticism. It also demonstrated how
to apply a mechanistic agenda to guide research by emphasizing generative
causality in theorizing and by choosing methods that explicitly model pro-
cesses that actively bring about the explanandum, in particular agent-based
simulation modeling and statistical network analysis methods of exponen-
tial random graph models (ERGM).
ii) At the more applied level, it showed how to turn these principles of a mech-
anistic approach to social science into substantive research on social in-
equality by making a contribution to the theory and explanation of social
inequality (Diewald & Faist, 2011; Therborn, 2006; Tilly, 1998). To achieve
this, it redefined the Weberian concept of closure as an action-based trans-
formational mechanism connecting various forms of exclusionary action at
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the microlevel, typified and classified in a closure space according to the
forms of interaction and motives of action, to intergroup inequality at the
macrolevel across contexts. Based on three separate studies it showed how
exclusionary action brings about inequality in markets, families, and net-
works.
iii) At a methodological level, the model presented in Chapter 5 took a first step
toward bringing together agent-based modeling (ABM) and social inequal-
ity research from a life-course perspective (Mayer, 2009), which has not
been tried before (Meyer, Lorscheid, & Troitzsch, 2009; Squazzoni & Casnici,
2013).1 Using simulation methods for the study of the life course is of par-
ticular relevance given the known restrictions affecting large longitudinal
studies, such as missing data due to attrition, high administrative costs, and
a rather slow pace of accumulating longitudinal data. Moreover, if agent-
based simulation models are calibrated using empirical data, they can be
used as virtual laboratories to generate hypotheses, guide data collection,
and assist policy makers in designing and implementing social policy.2 The
fact that the code of the model was also made available to the research com-
munity for further exploration and development (Cardona, 2014b) makes
the contribution of the present study more significant.
iv) Also at a methodological level, the study also contributes to the quantitative
study of social networks by applying exponential random graph models
(ERGM) to investigate network formation in preschool children. So far,
there are only a few studies that deal with the networks of young children
using advanced statistical modeling tools (e. g., Daniel et al., 2012; Schae-
fer et al., 2010). In addition, the present study builds on previous studies
by measuring the effect of language on tie formation and by analyzing the
results from the perspective of peer effects and the production of social in-
equality.
Despite these contributions, there is still much ground to be covered, both on
the meta-level of the metaphysics of mechanisms and the epistemology of mech-
1 It is true that ABM has already been used to understand the emergence of inequalities across
contexts, as evidenced by existing studies on crime (Makowsky, 2006), health (Auchincloss,
Riolo, Brown, Cook, & Diez Roux, 2011), labor markets (Dawid & Gemkow, 2013), gender
(Robison-Cox, Martell, & Emrich, 2007), and place of residence (Schelling, 1971). However,
there is still much to be done using ABM to investigate origins and persistence of inequalities
in income, education, health, and deviant behavior paying attention to the role of categories
such as class, gender and ethnicity among others and contexts like labor markets, social net-
works, neighborhoods, and households, within which individual lives evolve over time and
decision-making takes place.
2 These arguments about ABM and life-course research have already been made in Cardona
(2014a).
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anistic explanations, as well as on the substantive level of empirical research and
theorizing about closure as exclusionary action.
7.2 The future of a mechanistic agenda in sociology
The intricacies of the discussion on social mechanisms and mechanistic explana-
tions in sociology presented in this work are a good indicator of the difficulties
faced by anyone trying to make sense of this approach and evidence for the dif-
ficulties raised by the approach itself. The emphasis on individual predilections
in theory and method when making use of the concept of social mechanisms ex-
plains why the discussion seems to have been more effective, at least up to now,
in bringing forth particular agendas in the discipline (e. g., analytical sociology)
than in fostering a more broadly based debate on causation and causal explana-
tion in sociology. This programmatic bias of the discussion has a clear downside.
It raises skepticism among sociologists about the pertinence of a mechanistic ap-
proach and its alleged novelty. Thus, while some appear to be more concerned
with particular agendas, the skeptical are growing wary about the very notion of
mechanisms and mechanistic explanations.
Where do we go from here? In the light of what was discussed in Chapter 1,
two positions can be defended.3 First, an ’opportunistic’ or ’cynical’ position can
be taken that reduces the notion of mechanisms to a transient metaphor to be used
instrumentally for higher programmatic goals. This, of course, would disappoint
the gullible among sociologists who had taken the social mechanism discussion at
face value without being aware of its programmatic bias. The skeptical, however,
will be satisfied, since an opportunistic or cynical position gives them a justifi-
cation for their skepticism. The strategy of treating the mechanistic agenda as
a ‘style of theorizing,’ a combination of deeper causal explanations, generative
causality, and middle-range theorizing, can be accommodated under this ’oppor-
tunistic’ position.
However, going down this path seems to go against the efforts of pushing a
mechanistic agenda in sociology. Why insist on mechanisms if they are mere la-
bels for a style of theorizing that simply bundles some other principles? Why not
just embrace those principles and give up the “mechanistic talk” instead? If the
mechanistic approach can be reduced to its constitutive elements—deeper and
more transparent causal explanations, generative causality, and middle-range the-
orizing—then the idea of social mechanisms becomes de facto dispensable. In-
deed, anyone committed to those same three principles practices ‘mechanism-
based’ research already. In one word, if the mechanistic approach does not de-
3 Some of these ideas are found in Cardona (2013b).
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pend upon the existence of mechanisms, there is no need for the concept; the
same principles it allegedly represents can be safely endorsed and applied with-
out mentioning mechanisms at all.
Second, and in contrast to this instrumental, programmatic view, a ’purist’ po-
sition might be defended that judges the mechanistic approach in its own right,
not as an accessory metaphor to any particular theoretical or methodological pro-
gram in sociology but as an ongoing debate on the nature of causation and causal
explanation despite methodological and theoretical tensions. Only if attention is
directed away from programmatic struggles and focused on the core principles
of generative causality and on a commitment to understanding through causal
explanation can a broad-based discussion on social mechanisms and mechanis-
tic explanations be fruitfully pursued. This, again, would disappoint the gullible
who think they can do without the philosophy. It might, in fact, also disappoint
the skeptical who had already given up the efforts to understand a mechanistic
approach to sociology, rejecting it as vacuous ’mechanistic talk.’
This second alternative, in addition to endorsing the three principles of a mech-
anistic approach, would require a deeper commitment to investigating mecha-
nisms as real social phenomena. This of course raises the same problem that
philosophers are trying to solve and champions of mechanisms in sociology were
so quick to give up: what are mechanisms? How do we define them by giving
voice to the theoretical pluralism of sociology and the different competing social
ontologies the discipline has to offer? The definition provided in this work of so-
cial mechanisms as a robust and recurrent concatenation of outcomes that, given certain
initial conditions, causally produces the explanandum is by no means definite; it en-
tails some core assumptions, widely attributed to social mechanisms—extension
and recurrence in time, generative causality, as well as dependence on and robust-
ness to initial conditions—while leaving most others unanswered such as their
generality or stability. The definition is thus compatible with different social on-
tologies, such as processes or systems, as well as with other theoretical issues,
including issues surrounding individualism and holism, theories of action, hi-
erarchies and reducibility, and observability, among others. To be sure, anyone
already committed to a specific social ontology (e. g., Bunge’s systemism) need
not endorse this core definition. However, it provides a minimal consensus of
what a social mechanism is, or to be more precise, of what a social mechanism
is supposed to be, for the decisive proof of the existence of mechanisms in the
social world and the extent to which a research program built around it succeeds
in fulfilling the promises it makes, remains an empirical question.
Admittedly, the first alternative, ’opportunism,’ is the less costly. It protects
the status quo for both the advocates and the skeptics of social mechanisms. By
contrast, the second alternative might force sociologists at both ends of the spec-
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trum to reconsider their positions. It implies diving squarely into philosophical
questions and hence requires sociologists to invest time and effort in develop-
ing informed opinions on the philosophy of causation and explanation. If they
fail to do so, they will very likely end up divesting the concept of its substance
and the discussion on mechanisms and mechanistic explanations of its entire pur-
pose. Among those ’purists’ who decide to look into the philosophy of causation
and causal explanation, some might decide not to support a mechanistic agenda
while others who do support it will eventually have to choose a particular social
ontology, theory, and method to put it into practice. However, and irrespective
of these choices, probably only a purist position combined with a commitment to
develop an ontology of social mechanisms will allow for understanding of and
debate about the essence of a mechanistic approach, free from individual theo-
retical and methodological biases. And only then will gullibility or skepticism be
warranted.
7.3 Closure as an explanation of intergroup inequality
The discussion on the meaning of closure and the application of the concept to
inequality in markets, families, and networks can be seen as a plea for urgently
needed conceptual and methodological rigor when raising causal claims about
the origin of intergroup inequality.4 Gender, age, or occupation may certainly
provide a basis for closure practices. It is, however, a mistake to animate these
categories and regard them as actors acting effectively to exclude others sim-
ply because we observe an unequal distribution of resources among individu-
als grouped by them. In the case of collective actors, for example, even if it
is shown that some categorically defined collectives do constitute a group with
shared economic interests (e. g., lawyers), this need not imply that the group is
capable of concerted collective action (Olson, 1971). Moreover, the fact that a
well-constituted group decides to act upon its interests does not guarantee that its
action will bring about the desired results, as was shown in the case of British ac-
countants discussed by Walker and Shackleton (1998). In other words, the action
character of the concept of closure as defined in the present investigation requires
that any empirical study making a case for closure as an explanation of inequality
should provide unambiguous evidence of actors bringing about inequality inten-
tionally or not through direct or mediated forms of interaction. Without action
there is no closure.
To be sure, the definition of closure as exclusionary action offered here is far
from being a fully-fledged theory of inequality. Many questions remain unan-
4 Some of these arguments were already made by Cardona (2013a).
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swered. In particular, the situational and action formation aspects of exclusion-
ary action should be a priority in future research. A complete explanation of
intergroup inequality based on exclusionary action as a transformational mecha-
nism that closes the macro-micro-macro circuit needs to include situational and
action formation mechanisms.
Take for example the emergence of skill inequality among groups defined by
socio-economic status. As explained in Chapter 5, differences in status attain-
ment within one generation can be traced back to differences in skill levels among
classes or socioeconomic categories. Across generations, differences in resources
in the previous generations reproduce skill inequalities in the next generation th-
rough parental investment behavior along those same socioeconomic boundaries.
Dissecting analytically each part of the process, three causal paths can be identi-
fied to explain the production and reproduction of socioeconomic differences in
skills. The complete macro-micro-macro chain is summarized in Figure 7.1.
1. Resource differences among parents (situational). An unequal distribution of
parental skills produces inequality in parental education, income, and oc-
cupation (Heckman & Kautz, 2012). Differences in resources set the stage
for parental investments.
2. Stratified parental investment behavior (action formation). Given the risk of
downward mobility, it is rational for parents to invest differentially in chil-
dren depending on children’s skills and parental resources (Cardona & Die-
wald, 2014). This defines the rationale of action in terms of costs and bene-
fits of alternative parental behavior.
3. Intentional and direct closure through parental investments (transformational).
Given parental resources, parents invest differently in children, intention-
ally or otherwise, depending on the child’s gender, birth order and ob-
served skills, thus producing differences in skill growth (Chapter 5). Differ-
ences in skill growth among children affect their life chances, in particular
their education and occupational attainment, that is, their class position as
adults (hence we come again to 1, resource differences among parents). This
process repeats in each generation.
In short, formulating an explanation of inequality that bridges the micro to the
macro and back again not only requires shedding light on the societal conditions
under which exclusionary action is most likely to arise, but also makes it neces-
sary place exclusionary acts and the actors enacting them under the microscope.
A theory articulating closure with broader stratification processes, as was the
project of Parkin and Murphy, might be needed to understand the structural con-
ditions needed for exclusionary action to emerge. In particular, it should be ex-
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Figure 7.1: An explanation of socio-economic differences in skills
plained why certain groups or individuals belonging to a particular category are
more able or more willing than others to practice closure. In the context of mar-
kets, the theory of rents by Sørensen (1996, 2000) offers a good example of how the
emergence of exclusionary collective action can be theoretically based and traced
back to deeper processes—in his theory, the struggles over enduring rents from
rent-producing assets.
In addition to structural conditions, the inner logic of exclusionary acts needs
to be understood. This is particularly relevant given the complexity of the pro-
posed ’closure space,’ which spans a diverse combination of actors, motives and
modes of interaction. Opening the black box of agency is relevant not only for
intentional and mediated forms of closure, for which political institutions and
discourses may play a critical role in shaping the logic behind concerted efforts
to introduce exclusionary devices such as laws (Chua & Poullaos, 1998), but also
for unintentional and direct forms, for which society-wide stereotypes and le-
gitimizing ideologies coupled with organizational practices enable and constrain
individual exclusionary acts (Roscigno, 2007).
Bringing clarity to these additional issues surrounding different forms of exclu-
sionary action should be an integral part of a thorough explanation of intergroup
inequality from a mechanistic perspective using the concept of closure as its core
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transformational mechanism. To advance such a systematic research program
that bridges the macro-micro-macro circuit of exclusionary action, keeping the
concept of closure explanatory by preserving its action-based character, as was
the goal of this study, is a necessary first step.
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